Estate of Anderson v. Dana Corp.

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedSeptember 25, 2003
DocketI.C. NO. 016368
StatusPublished

This text of Estate of Anderson v. Dana Corp. (Estate of Anderson v. Dana Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estate of Anderson v. Dana Corp., (N.C. Super. Ct. 2003).

Opinions

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The Full Commission has reviewed the prior Opinion and Award based upon the record of the proceedings before Deputy Commissioner Jones. The appealing party has not shown good grounds to reconsider the evidence, receive further evidence or rehear the parties or their representatives. The Full Commission affirms in part and reverses in part the Opinion and Award of Deputy Commissioner Jones.

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The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties as:

STIPULATIONS
1. The parties are bound by and subject to the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.

2. At all relevant times, an employment relationship existed between deceased employee (hereafter "decedent") and defendant.

3. Defendant is a duly self-insured and Hartford Specialty Risk Services, Inc. is the third party administrator.

4. The date of injury which is the subject of this claim is October 3, 1998.

5. Decedent's average weekly wage on October 3, 1998 was $814.88, which yields a compensation rate of $532.00 per week.

6. Defendant admitted liability for decedent's back injuries pursuant to a Form 60 dated November 17, 1998.

7. Defendant paid decedent total disability compensation in the amount of $532.00 per week from October 5, 1998 through December 30, 1998.

8. Defendant filed a Form 28 dated January 4, 1999, which stated decedent had returned to work on December 30, 1998.

9. The parties stipulated the following exhibits into evidence at the hearing before Deputy Commissioner Jones:

a. Stipulated Exhibit 1 — decedent's medical records

b. Stipulated Exhibit 2 — defendant's personnel policy

10. The following exhibits were entered into the evidence of record at the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner:

a. Defendant's Exhibit 2 — Johnny Anderson, timeline

b. Defendant's Exhibit 3 — Quest Diagnostics Forensic Drug Testing Custody and Control Form

c. Defendant's Exhibit 4 — Drugs and Alcohol in the Workplace

11. The issues before the Commission are whether decedent was entitled to total disability benefits from December 31, 1998 to May 31, 2000; whether decedent was entitled to temporary partial disability benefits from June 1, 2000 through December 27, 2001; is decedent entitled to a 10% penalty pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-18; was decedent entitled to medical treatment or other compensation; and did decedent unjustifiably refuse suitable employment when he tested positive for cocaine on October 5, 1998.

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Based upon the competent evidence of record herein, the Full Commission makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Decedent was 49 years old at the time of the hearing before Deputy Commissioner Jones. Decedent began his employment with defendant in 1982 or 1983 as a machine technician. Decedent had a high school education.

2. As a machine technician decedent ran a welder. His responsibilities included setting up the welder, welding the drive shaft, taking the drive shaft off the line after welding, putting the drive shaft on the line and putting on a sleeve called a yoke shaft.

3. Decedent testified most sleeves he used weighed 30-35 pounds. Decedent lifted the sleeve out of a basket on the floor, placed it on the line and, if the sleeve did not fit, he lifted the drive shaft off the line, removed the sleeve, sanded the area and reapplied the sleeve before placing it back on the assembly line.

4. Decedent completed the welding on one drive shaft approximately every four minutes and decedent stood during his shift.

5. Decedent worked an average of eight hours a day and had the opportunity to work overtime.

6. On Saturday October 3, 1998 at approximately 12:15 p.m., decedent was removing a sleeve on a drive shaft, which was stuck. He had difficulty getting the sleeve off and proceeded to bang it against the rail line to try to remove it.

7. When he was attempting to remove the sleeve, decedent felt a sharp sudden pain in his back and thought he had pulled a muscle.

8. Decedent's injury occurred as he was completing his shift, which was finished at 12:30 p.m. Decedent was scheduled to work on Sunday, October 4, 1998, but decedent testified he was unable to work because of his back pain.

9. On Monday, October 5, 1998, decedent contacted defendant to inform his employer that he was unable to report for work due to his back injury. He was told to pick up forms for a required drug test and was sent by defendant to Pro Med for drug testing. It was defendant's policy to perform a drug test following an injury. Decedent was unable to see a doctor that day due to Pro Med's staffing, but did complete the required drug test.

10. Decedent was treated at Pro Med on October 7, 1998 by Dr. Jane Edminston, who diagnosed him with lumbar strain. Decedent was written out of work for two weeks and was then to return to work in a modified capacity.

11. The results of decedent's drug test indicated decedent tested positive for the presence of cocaine, morphine and codeine in his blood. However, the drug testing was done two days after the date of injury.

12. Decedent learned of the positive test from the plant manager, Donna Ray Doyle, on December 9, 1998 when he dropped off paperwork from his physician. Ms. Doyle informed decedent he tested positive and asked decedent if he had a drug problem. Decedent testified that he told Ms. Doyle he did not have a drug problem and that the cocaine must be from some pain medication he had taken the previous day for pain. Decedent denied any cocaine use when questioned by Ms. Doyle.

13. Decedent had been injured twice while working for defendant and knew it was defendant's policy to perform a drug test any time there was an injury reported.

14. Decedent testified at the hearing before Deputy Commissioner Jones that after the injury by accident occurred, he used cocaine at the home of a friend between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. on October 3, 1998. Decedent also admitted that he lied when he testified at a hearing for unemployment benefits when he represented that he had not used any drugs.

15. Decedent continued to be treated by Pro Med for lumbar strain by Dr. Patricia Henry. Dr. Henry referred decedent for physical therapy. Decedent was released by Dr. Henry for light duty work with restrictions of lifting 10 pounds or less from October 5, 1998 to November 23, 1998. Defendant did not have work available within decedent's restrictions and he remained out of work.

16. Dr. Alfred Rhyne, III of Charlotte Orthopedic Specialists, evaluated decedent on October 23, 1998. Dr. Rhyne indicated decedent's lumbar spine x-rays were negative. Dr. Rhyne recommended an MRI to rule out a right L4-5 HNP.

17. Defendant accepted liability for decedent's claim by filing a Form 60 on November 17, 1998. Decedent was paid temporary total disability benefits from October 4, 1998 through December 30, 1998.

18. On October 10, 1998, Dr. David DuPuy of Charlotte Orthopedic Specialists evaluated decedent. Dr. DuPuy found no evidence of focal disc herniation. Decedent's disc scan of L3/4 was normal. Dr. DuPuy concluded decedent had a broad base disc bulge at L5/S1 without evidence of focal disc herniation or nerve root impingement. Dr. DuPuy scheduled decedent for an FCE because he felt decedent's numbness in his toes was not consistent with decedent's nerve root distribution.

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Estate of Anderson v. Dana Corp., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-anderson-v-dana-corp-ncworkcompcom-2003.