Estate of Abel Chacon v. County of Riverside

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedFebruary 23, 2024
Docket5:23-cv-00990
StatusUnknown

This text of Estate of Abel Chacon v. County of Riverside (Estate of Abel Chacon v. County of Riverside) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estate of Abel Chacon v. County of Riverside, (C.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 Denisse O. Gastélum, SBN 282771 Christian Contreras, SBN 330269 GASTÉLUM LAW, APC THE LAW OFFICES OF 2 A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION CHRISTIAN CONTRERAS 3 3767 Worsham Ave. PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION Long Beach, California 90808 360 E. 2nd St., 8th Floor 4 Tel: (213) 340-6112 Los Angeles, California 90012 Fax: (213) 402-8622 Tel: (323) 435-8000 5 Email: dgastelum@gastelumfirm.com Fax: (323) 597-0101 Email: CC@Contreras-Law.com 6 Attorneys for Plaintiffs, ESTATE OF ABEL CHACON, by and through successors in interest, Becky Shorty 7 and Charles Chacon; BECKY SHORTY, individually; CHARLES CHACON, individually 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA -EASTERN DIVISION 10

11 ESTATE OF ABEL CHACON, by ) CASE NO. 5:23-cv-00990-JGB-SHK and through successors in interest, ) [Assigned to the Hon. Jesus G. Bernal, 12 Becky Shorty and Charles Chacon; ) District Judge; Referred to the Hon. BECKY SHORTY, individually; ) Shashi H. Kewalramani, Magistrate 13 CHARLES CHACON, individually, ) Judge] ) 14 Plaintiffs, ) ) DISCOVERY MATTER 15 v. ) ) 16 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, a public ) [PROPOSED] STIPULATED ) PROTECTIVE ORDER 17 entity; RIVERSIDE COUNTY ) SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; ) 18 SHERIFF CHAD BIANCO, in his ) ) 19 individual and official capacities; ) EDWARD DELGADO; JAMES ) 20 KRACHMER; DAVID HOLM; ) ) 21 RONALD SANCHEZ; and DOES 1 ) through 10, individually, jointly and ) 22 severally, ) Defendants. ) 23 ) ) Discovery Cutoff: TBD 24 ) ) Trial: TBD 25 26 27 28 1 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 2 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, 3 proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be 4 warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter 5 the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order 6 does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and 7 that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited 8 information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable 9 legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3 (Filing 10 Protected Material), below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them 11 to a file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the 12 procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party 13 seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. 14 B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 15 Plaintiffs and the individual Defendants may produce certain documents 16 in this case that contain personal medical, employment or financial information. Such 17 information may implicate the privacy interests of the party and are properly protected 18 through a Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) protective order. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 19 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 (1984) (“Rule 26(c) includes among its express purposes the 20 protection of a ‘party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue 21 burden or expense.’ Although the Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to 22 other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad 23 purpose and language of the Rule.”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 617 24 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (a party’s privacy rights are to be protected through a “carefully 25 crafted protective order.”). 26 Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a 27 protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace officer 28 1 personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for the 2 following reasons. 3 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy 4 in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is 5 underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure 6 of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 7 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12-13 8 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based 9 discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is 10 consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] privilege 11 law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n. 4, 616 12 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are 13 not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 14 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants further contend that uncontrolled 15 disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the safety of non-party 16 witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. 17 Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement agencies 18 have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information 19 privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege 20 (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of their peace 21 officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that contain 22 critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or 23 communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – 24 potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs 25 type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, 26 and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or 27 rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y 28 v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 1 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 2 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 3 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. 4 Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further contend that such 5 personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian of 6 records pursuant to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release is likely to 7 result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection of third- 8 party witness information and statements and related legitimate law enforcement 9 investigations/interests; and a chilling of open and honest discussion regarding and/or 10 investigation into alleged misconduct that can erode a public entity’s ability to identify 11 and/or implement any remedial measures that may be required. 12 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same rights 13 as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to the 14 fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ compelled 15 statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828-830 16 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V.

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Related

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.
435 U.S. 589 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)
Tuite v. Henry
181 F.R.D. 175 (District of Columbia, 1998)

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Estate of Abel Chacon v. County of Riverside, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-abel-chacon-v-county-of-riverside-cacd-2024.