Estate of Abdallah El Deek v. Islamic Republic of Iran

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: August 6, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-2241
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ESTATE OF ABDALLAH EL DEEK, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Case No. 23-cv-2241 (CRC) v.

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case concerns 47 foreign nationals who were injured during terrorist attacks

perpetrated at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, in the 1980s. 324 total plaintiffs—including

33 of the direct victims, 1 their estates, and their immediate family members—bring claims

against the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”) and the Iranian Ministry of Information and

Security (“MOIS”), alleging that they funded and supported the designated terrorist group

Hezbollah, which in turn carried out the attacks. As is common in these cases, Iran and MOIS

have failed to appear. But under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), the defendants

are still presumptively immune from suit unless the plaintiffs can show that an exception to

immunity applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604. Relevant here, the FSIA abrogates foreign sovereign

immunity for suits seeking money damages for personal injury or death resulting from the

1 14 of the 47 victims are plaintiffs in other cases pending before this Court. Mohammed Abdallah, Fouad Abboud, Ibrahim Abboud, Mohamad Chamoun, Issam Mansour, Ahmad Kanaan, Bashir Mehdi, Ali Mahfoud Chouman, Hussein Farhat, Hussein Hazimeh, Mohammed Zouheir Laban, and Kassem Ajeeb are plaintiffs in Abdallah v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 21- cv-2889 (CRC). Elie Salameh and Hassan Makki are plaintiffs in Estate of el Halabi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 22-cv-3190 (CRC). Their immediate relatives bring suit here. defendant country’s “provision of material support or resources” for “an act of torture,

extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, [or] hostage taking[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1).

Invoking this exception, the plaintiffs now move for default judgment. The Court finds, as it has

in the past, that Iran and MOIS are liable for the attacks due to their provision of material support

to Hezbollah. The Court further finds that the FSIA’s requirements for personal and subject

matter jurisdiction are met, and that the plaintiffs have submitted satisfactory evidence to support

a claim to relief. The Court will therefore grant the plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment and

direct the plaintiffs to move to appoint a special master to recommend appropriate damages.

I. Background

Given the default posture of these proceedings, the Court draws the following facts from

the allegations in the complaint, the plaintiffs’ supporting affidavits, and the record of related

cases arising from these attacks and involving the same defendants, of which the Court takes

judicial notice.

On April 18, 1983, “an unidentified male driver crashed a vehicle laden with hundreds of

pounds of explosives into the main entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut[,]” killing 63 people

and injuring more than 100 others. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 344–345; see also Est. of Doe v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7–8 (D.D.C. 2011). Fourteen plaintiffs in this case were

working at the Embassy during the April 18 attack and suffered “serious injuries.” ECFs 29-3,

29-4.

Because the embassy building was severely damaged, embassy operations were

temporarily transferred to another building—the Embassy Annex. Am. Compl. ¶ 350; Est. of

Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 7. Shortly thereafter, on September 20, 1984, another vehicle loaded

with explosives detonated at the Embassy Annex, killing at least eleven people and wounding at

2 least fifty more. See Am. Compl. ¶ 351; see also Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F.

Supp. 2d 128, 132 (D.D.C. 2001). Nineteen plaintiffs here were injured in the September 20

attack. See ECFs 29-3, 29-4. In addition, five victims of the April 18 attack were still employed

at the embassy and were injured again in the second attack. Id.

These attacks affected not only those directly involved, but also the victims’ family

members. As alleged in the complaint and attested to in supporting affidavits, the families of

these victims experienced significant emotional distress over their relatives’ injuries. Id.

The plaintiffs brought suit in August 2023, P.’s Mot. For Default J. on Liability at 1,

asserting that Iran and MOIS were responsible for the attacks because they provided training and

funding to Hezbollah. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 342–343, 347–349, 354, 370. The plaintiffs served

the defendants through diplomatic channels in July 2024, ECF No. 26, and after two months

without a response, they filed an affidavit in support of default, ECF No. 27. The Clerk of the

Court entered default against the defendants and the plaintiffs subsequently moved for a default

judgment as to the defendants’ liability under the FSIA. See ECF Nos. 28–29. Several other

courts in this district have already found both that Hezbollah was responsible for these specific

attacks and that the defendants are liable due to their provision of material support to Hezbollah.

See Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 404 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding liability

for the April 1983 bombing); Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 664 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54 (D.D.C.

2009) (finding same for the September 1984 bombing (citing Wagner, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 134)).

Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) permits courts to take judicial notice of facts “not subject to

reasonable dispute” that are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Under this rule, a court “may take judicial

notice of related proceedings and records in cases before the same court.” Brewer, 664 F. Supp.

3 2d at 47 (quoting Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F. Supp. 2d 105, 109 n.6 (D.D.C.

2005)). “Because of the multiplicity of FSIA-related litigation in this jurisdiction, Courts in this

District have frequently taken judicial notice of earlier, related proceedings.” Bathiard v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, No. 16-cv-1549 (CRC), 2019 WL 3412983, at *3 (D.D.C. July 29, 2019)

(quotation omitted) (collecting cases taking judicial notice of prior cases involving the same

attacks). This Court will do the same here.

II. Legal Standards

Under the FSIA, a plaintiff may obtain a default judgment when the defendant fails to

enter an appearance. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). “Entry of a default

judgment is not automatic.” Bathiard, 2019 WL 3412983, at *2 (quotation omitted). First, the

Court must consider whether it has personal jurisdiction over the defendants, Mwani v. bin

Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6–7 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the

action, James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996). See

Bathiard, 2019 WL 3412983, at *2. Even then, plaintiffs must establish their right to relief “by

evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). Thus, rather than accept unsupported

allegations as true, the Court must examine the plaintiffs’ allegations and any proof provided to

ensure they have carried their burden. See, e.g., Bluth v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 203 F. Supp.

3d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2016). When ruling on a motion for default judgment, a court may rely upon

the plaintiffs’ “uncontroverted factual allegations, which are supported by . . . documentary and

affidavit evidence.” Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 59 (D.D.C. 2010)

(quotation omitted).

4 III. Analysis

The Court finds all three requirements for entry of a default judgment—subject matter

jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and satisfactory evidence—satisfied here.

A. Personal Jurisdiction

The FSIA provides for personal jurisdiction where service has been properly made under

28 U.S.C. § 1608. Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 587 U.S. 1, 4 (2019). For service on a

“foreign state or political subdivision,” § 1608 permits service by four methods, in descending

order of preference:

(1) special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the foreign state,

(2) in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial documents, or, if the first two options are not applicable,

(3) by sending a copy of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with a translation of each into the official language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned, or, if service cannot be made under the third option,

(4) by requesting the Clerk of the Court to send the aforementioned package to the Secretary of State in Washington, District of Columbia, to the attention of the Director of Special Consular Services—and the Secretary shall transmit one copy of the papers through diplomatic channels to the foreign state and shall send to the clerk of the court a certified copy of the diplomatic note indicating when the papers were transmitted. Braun v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 228 F. Supp. 3d 64, 77–78 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 1608(a)). “No special arrangement exists between Plaintiffs and Iran, and no applicable

international convention on service governs here.” Cohen v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F.

Supp. 3d 71, 82 (D.D.C. 2017) (Cooper, J.).

The plaintiffs first attempted to serve the heads of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

and MOIS by sending them a copy of the summons and the complaint by certified mail. See

ECF No. 9–12. After this method proved unsuccessful, see ECF No. 15, the plaintiffs duly

5 served the defendants through diplomatic channels pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4), as

confirmed by a letter from the U.S. State Department filed with the Court. See ECF No. 26. The

Court therefore finds that service was properly effectuated, and that it may exercise personal

jurisdiction over Iran and MOIS.

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction & Liability

The FSIA is “the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts.”

Nemariam v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 491 F.3d 470, 474 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

Under the FSIA, a foreign sovereign is presumptively immune from suit unless an exception

applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604. Relevant here, the FSIA abrogates a foreign sovereign’s

immunity where (1) “money damages are sought” (2) “against a foreign state for” (3) “personal

injury or death that” (4) “was caused” (5) “by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft

sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act.” 28

U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1); see Pennington v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 19-cv-796 (JEB), 2021

WL 2592910, at *2 (D.D.C. June 24, 2021).

The requirements of this exception are easily met here. The plaintiffs seek money

damages against Iran for personal injuries resulting from the 1983 and 1984 Beirut embassy

bombings. And because “Iran’s complicity in the embassy bombing is not subject to reasonable

dispute[,] the Court has no trouble taking as true the factual findings and legal conclusions in

decisions like Dammarell and Estate of Doe” finding that the 1983 and 1984 bombings were acts

of “extrajudicial killing,” for which Iran and MOIS provided material support. Bathiard, 2019

WL 3412983, at *4; see Est. of Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 14–15. Iran and MOIS therefore lack

immunity from these claims.

6 The FSIA imposes two additional requirements to establish subject matter jurisdiction.

First, the defendant foreign state must have been designated as a “state sponsor of terrorism” “at

the time of the act” or “as a result of such act” and “remain[ ] so designated when the claim is

filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). And second, the claimant or victim must at the time of

the act be a U.S. national, member of the U.S. armed forces, or qualifying employee or

contractor of the U.S. government acting within the scope of employment. Id.

§ 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii). These requirements are easily satisfied here. Iran was designated as a

state sponsor of terrorism in January 1984 in response to its role in sponsoring several terrorist

attacks in Lebanon, including the April 1983 bombing. See Est. of Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 10

(citing Dammarell, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 273). It has remained designated ever since. See Bureau

of Counterterrorism, State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 2, 2024),

https://perma.cc/5J54-URPZ. The victims here were all U.S. government employees who were

injured while working at the U.S. Embassy or Embassy Annex at the time of the attacks. See

Am. Compl. ¶ 3. And the claims, brought by the victims, family members on their own behalf,

and the decedents’ estates, arise from their resulting injuries. The Court may therefore exercise

subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims.

C. Satisfactory Evidence

Finally, the Court must determine whether the plaintiffs have provided satisfactory

evidence of their claims for the Court to enter a default judgment. “The Court’s conclusion that

Iran is liable for the embassy bombing does not by itself provide a sufficient basis for entry of

default judgment.” Bathiard, 2019 WL 3412983, at *4. “Plaintiffs must also provide some proof

that they suffered personal injury.” Id. To make this showing, the plaintiffs may again “rely

upon uncontroverted factual allegations that are supported by affidavits.” Id. (citation omitted).

7 Here, each individual plaintiff has submitted an affidavit on behalf of themselves or the estates

they represent. See ECFs 29-2, 29-3, 29-4, 29-5. For the direct victims and their estates, each

affiant attests that the victims experienced “serious injuries” resulting from the attacks. Id. As to

the family-member victims, each affiant represents that the plaintiff suffered “extraordinary

grief, mental anguish, and [emotional distress]” as a result of their family members’ injuries. Id.

And though the family-member plaintiffs are neither U.S. citizens nor government employees,

these plaintiffs “may continue to pursue claims under applicable state and/or foreign law.” Est.

of Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 20. The Court therefore finds that the plaintiffs’ affidavits establish

each plaintiff’s “claim or right to relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the court,” 28 U.S.C. §

1608(e), and will grant the plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment as to the defendants’ liability

for their claims.

D. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court will grant the plaintiffs’ motion for default judgement on

liability. The plaintiffs are directed to move to appoint one or more special masters to

recommend appropriate damages awards within 30 days of this filing. A separate order will

follow.

___________________________ CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge

Date: August 6, 2025