Estabilio v. Derr

CourtDistrict Court, D. Hawaii
DecidedApril 24, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-00021
StatusUnknown

This text of Estabilio v. Derr (Estabilio v. Derr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Hawaii primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estabilio v. Derr, (D. Haw. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

KELAUKILA ESTABILIO, CIV. NO. 23-00021 JAO-RT Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING PETITION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241 FOR A VS. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ESTELA DERR, Respondent.

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241 FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS I. INTRODUCTION Pro se Petitioner Kelaukila Estabilio submitted a Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), which is signed and dated January 12, 2023. ECF No. 1. At the time she filed the Petition, Petitioner was incarcerated at the Federal Detention Center in Honolulu, Hawai‘i (“FDC Honolulu”), serving a 54-month sentence for wire fraud. See Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Estabilio, No. 20-cr-00010-JMS (D. Haw. August 16, 2021) (ECF No. 53). As the sole ground raised in her Petition, Petitioner asserts that Respondent Estela Derr, the Warden at FDC Honolulu, failed to apply

the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”)! while carrying out her sentence. See ECF No. 1 at 1. Petitioner contends that her release date was supposed to be “November 2022,” although she does not explain why. /d. She does not offer more specifics regarding the credits she is owed, other than seeking “an order directing the [Bureau of Prisons] to apply [her] FSA Earned Time Credits.” /d. She “admit[s] that [she] did not exhaust [her] administrative remedies before seeking relief” but

says that such failure to exhaust should be excused in light of what should have been her release date. Id. In her Response, Respondent argues that the Petition should be dismissed as moot because, since the filing of the Petition, the Bureau of Prisons (““BOP’’) updated Petitioner’s FSA credits, awarding her 345 days of FSA earned time credits, so “Petitioner has received the specific relief she requested in her petition.” ECF No. 8 at 4. Notably, “[o]n March 3, 2023, Petitioner transferred to home confinement, where she will be supervised by the U.S. Probation Office under the

' The FSA, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, seeks to “provide incentives and rewards for prisoners to participate in and complete evidence-based recidivism reduction programs” by permitting prisoners to earn a designated number of days of “time credits” for every 30 days of successful participation in such programs, which can be applied toward either earlier movement into prerelease custody or earlier transfer to supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4); see also 28 C.F.R. § 523.40(b) (“[A]n eligible inmate... may earn FSA Time Credits to be applied toward prerelease custody or early transfer to supervised release under 18 U.S.C. 3624(g).”).

Federal Location Monitoring . . . program until her release date on July 29, 2023.” ECF No. 8-1 at 6, 4 9. Respondent also contends in a footnote that Petitioner failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. /d. at 4n.1. Petitioner did not file a reply. The Court finds that the Petition is not moot, but that Petitioner failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and DISMISSES the Petition without leave to amend.” Il. DISCUSSION “In a § 2241 petition, the petitioner has the “burden to prove his custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.’” Cabebe v. Derr, Civil No. 22-00496 SOM-KJM, 2023 WL 2713652 at *3 n.5 (March 30, 2023) (quoting Snook v. Wood, 89 F.3d 605, 609 (9th Cir. 1996)). Although the Court concludes that the Petition is not moot, Petitioner’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies means that she cannot meet her burden under § 2241. A. Mootness Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to “actual, ongoing” “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Lewis v. Cont’! Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990); see United States v. Strong,

Pursuant to Rule 7.1(c) of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, the Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without a hearing.

489 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). It therefore requires a case to amount to “a live controversy” before it can be heard in federal court. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 590 F.3d 725, 727 (9th Cir. 2009). The question of whether a case is “live” turns on whether the court can grant effective relief should it address the case’s merits. /d. “Failure to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement renders a habeas petition moot.” Kittel v. Thomas, 620 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Respondent argues that the Petition is moot because “Petitioner has received the specific relief that she requested in her Petition.” ECF No. 8 at 4. But that overstates the similarity between what Petitioner has already obtained and what she wants. Petitioner says she should have been released in November 2022, but she has not yet been released. ECF No. | at 1. So the Court is left to determine whether BOP’s updating of her FSA credits alone—to a date earlier than what BOP originally calculated but later than what Petitioner calculates—trenders the Petition moot. The Court finds a northern district of California case to be a helpful contrast. In Abernathy v. Acting Warden, FCI-Dublin, the District Judge determined that the petitioner’s claim was moot where she did not outline the number of credits she

was owed, and the BOP recalculated her sentence consistent with the FSA. Abernathy, Case No. 22-cv-03284-CRB (PR), 2023 WL 2960010 (N.D. Cal. Mar.

2, 2023). The Court reasoned that, “[b]ecause BOP already has granted petitioner the relief she seeks—trecalculation of her sentence in accordance with FSA—‘no effective relief can be granted due to subsequent developments.’” Jd. at *2 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)). Here, unlike the petitioner in Abernathy, the Petitioner indicates what she thinks her correct release date is. And that November 2022 date differs from what BOP now calculates as the release date, even taking into account its recent update of her FSA credits. See ECF No. 8-1 at 6, 9 (asserting a release date of July 20, 2023). Therefore, the Court would necessarily need to examine the merits of Petitioner’s estimation of her release date—as bald as it is—before it could decide whether to grant the relief she seeks. In other words, the Petition amounts to a live controversy, and the Court is unpersuaded that this case is moot. B. Failure to Exhaust Because Petitioner admittedly failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, the dispositive question is whether there are grounds to waive the exhaustion requirement in this case. The Court finds no such grounds.

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Related

Flast v. Cohen
392 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.
494 U.S. 472 (Supreme Court, 1990)
Kittel v. Thomas
620 F.3d 949 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Marion Calvin Tucker v. Peter Carlson, Warden
925 F.2d 330 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)
United States v. Kyulle Jay Strong
489 F.3d 1055 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Ward v. Chavez
678 F.3d 1042 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Sylvia Landfield Trust v. City of Los Angeles
729 F.3d 1189 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Snook v. Wood
89 F.3d 605 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)

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Estabilio v. Derr, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estabilio-v-derr-hid-2023.