Est. of Swenson, R. Appeal of: L.S. & R.S.-C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 1, 2014
• Docket: 2289 MDA 2013
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S48002-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

IN THE ESTATE OF: RICHARD C. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SWENSON : PENNSYLVANIA : : : APPEAL OF: LORA SWENSON AND : RENEE SWENSON-CAMPBELL : No. 2289 MDA 2013

Appeal from the Order entered December 4, 2013, Court of Common Pleas, Bradford County, -0171

BEFORE: DONOHUE, JENKINS and PLATT*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED AUGUST 01, 2014

Lora Swenson and Renee Swenson-

from the order of court striking their appeal from the admission of Richard

The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history

of this case as follows:

Decedent, Richard Swenson, succumbed to illness on April 25, 2013. His Last Will and Testament dated June 10, 2009 was admitted into probate by decree of the Bradford County Register of Wills on May 11, 2013. Appellants filed an appeal to the admittance of the Will claiming the Will was not a valid instrument, and [that] they were entitled to his estate through intestacy laws. Appellants are the

believed and expected to be able to prove that Decedent was not of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will, and that it was procured by undue influence, duress, constraint and fraud by the named Executor and residual beneficiary, Nancy Kitchin. The June 10, 2009 Will appoints Nancy Kitchin as executrix and the residual beneficiary.

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S48002-14

On September 20, 2013, [Kitchin] filed a [m]otion to [s]trike the appeal arguing that Appellants lacked standing pursuant to Estate of Luongo, 823 A.2d 942 (2003 Pa.Super) [sic]. [It] further alleged that [Kitchin] had been a neighbor and a friend, as well as an employee to Mr. Swenson for over [21] years, and that she had been named as executrix in all three prior wills as well as a beneficiary. Attached to the [m]otion to [s]trike

April 11, 2008, February 6, 2009, and June 2, 2009. Appellants were not mentioned in these wills. [Kitchin] was appointed executrix and a beneficiary in all three prior wills.

Argument was heard on October 28, 2013. [The trial court] entered an order on December 4, 2013, gran [a]ppeal and decreed that the assets be turned over to her so she could distribute them as executrix accordingly.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/10/14, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).

This timely appeal follows. Appellants present the sole issue on appeal

the

We begin by acknowledging the following principles:

On appeal from the Register of Wills' decree admitting a will to probate, the Orphans' court must iss the petition, grant an issue in case of a substantial Wagner's Estate, 137 A. 616, 618 ([Pa.] 1927). With respect to this

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Court's standard and scope of appellate review in will contests, the Orphans' court decision will not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion or a fundamental error in applying the correct principles of law. In re Elias' Estate, 4 239 A.2d 393 ([Pa.] 1968). See also In re Estate of Presutti, 783 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. 2001). If the record supports the court's factual findings, we will defer to these findings and will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Blumenthal, 812 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2002). We are not constrained, however, to give the same deference to the court's legal conclusions. Id.

In re Estate of Luongo, 823 A.2d 942, 951 (Pa. Super. 2003) (footnote

omitted).

decedent's will. In will contests, the right to an appeal is statutory as is the

designation of the parties on whom the right is conferred, and is defined at

Id. at 953

(internal citation omitted). This statute provides that,

[a]ny party in interest seeking to challenge the probate of a will or who is otherwise aggrieved by a decree of the register, or a fiduciary whose estate or trust is so aggrieved, may appeal therefrom to the court within one year of the decree: Provided, That the executor designated in an instrument shall not by virtue of such designation be deemed a party in interest who may appeal from a decree refusing probate of it. The court, upon petition of a party in interest, may limit the time for appeal to three months.

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20 Pa.C.S.A. §908 (em

validity of a will does not have standing to do so unless he can prove he

would be entitled to participate in the decedent's estate if the will before the

Luongo, 823 A.2d at 954. (citing In re Ash's

Estate

the contestant's share of the estate must be smaller because of probate or

Id.

from a decree of probate turns delicately on the specific facts and

Id. at 955.

nieces, but were not named in his June 2009 will. We encountered a similar

situation in In re Estate of Briskman, 808 A.2d 928 (Pa. Super. 2002). In

that case, the decedent left the entirety of her estate to a male friend in a

will, arguing, inter alia, that it was the product of undue influence exerted by

few specific bequests (but none to the niece) and directed that the residue of

her estate be held in a charitable trust. The 1984 will did not name the

niece as a beneficiary, but only as a successor trustee, should the named

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trustee, her attorney, be unable to serve.1 Eventually, the trial court

reversed the decision of the Register of Wills to admit the 1993 will to

probate and vacated the letters testamentary that had been granted to the

. The executor appealed that decision

to this Court. We did not reach the merits of the issues raised by the

executor, however, as we concluded that the niece had lacked standing to

named successor

Id. at 931 (emphasis in the original). We concluded that the

niece was not aggrieved by probate of the 1993 will because she did not

have an interest thereunder and that she would not have any interest under

ve as

executor. Relevant to the case presently before us, we noted that the

Id. at 932. We then

considered whether the possibility of an interest, which would arise only

upon the invalidation of at least one prior will and the subsequent invocation

1 Although not germane to our discussion, we note that upon discovering this will, the niece filed a petition seeking to have it admitted to probate if the later will were set aside.

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of the laws of intestacy, was sufficient to create standing to challenge the

probate of a will:

Although our research has not uncovered any appellate court decisions on this issue, we have found two Common Pleas Court cases which reach the opposite result; that is, in both cases, an heir at law, who was not named as a beneficiary in a prior will, was found to have standing to contest the v his coming into an intestate share may appear to be Heffner Estate, 43 Pa.D. & C.2d 365, 369, 1967 WL 5834 (1967). See also Holtz Estate, 30 Pa.D. & C.2d 396, 1963 WL 6253 (1963). The trial court in Holtz Estate explained,

If appellant, as an heir at law, were excluded as a party in interest, the court in this proceeding would be deciding that the prior testamentary document was admissible to probate. Such a determination cannot be made collaterally in this proceeding. It can only be made when the will in question is offered for probate. Only in the probate proceedings could the possible existence of later wills or the partial destruction or revocation of the will be authoritatively determined. Holtz Estate, supra at 400. See also Heffner Estate, supra at

of decedent in existence, this, of itself, would not be a compelling reason for this court to foreclose contestant's efforts to prove that decedent died

However, if we were to follow this line of reasoning, then an heir at law would always be permitted to file an appeal from probate of a will in which the heir is not a named beneficiary. If the Legislature had intended that result, it could have

permitted to appeal the decision of a Register in

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[20 Pa.C.S.A.] § 908. It did not do so. Moreover, the statute was amended three times, in 1972, 1974, and 1976, since the Holtz and Heffner decisions. The clear and unambiguous language of the statute permits a party to appeal a Register's decision only if that party has an interest that has been aggrieved.

as a successor trustee under the 1984 will, or as an intestate heir at law if both wills are deemed invalid, is too remote to confer upon her an interest in the probate of the 1993 will.

Moreover, even if we were to assume Appellee has a legitimate interest in the outcome of the will contest, historically, that interest must be substantial, direct, and immediate to confer standing. In Re Francis Edward McGillick Foundation, 642 A.2d 467, 469 ([Pa.] 1994).

the outcome of the litigation which surpasses the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the

showing that the matter complained of caused harm to the party's interest. An

of the causal connection between the action complained of and the injury to the party challenging it, and is shown where the interest the party seeks to protect is within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.

South Whitehall Township Police Serv. v. South Whitehall Township, 555 A.2d 793, 795 ([Pa.] 1989) (internal citations omitted). Here, although

substantial, that is, one that surpasses the common interest of all citizens, it is neither direct nor immediate. As we discussed supra, her interest arises only if the named trustee is unavailable to

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serve under the 1984 will, or if both the 1993 will and the 1984 will are invalidated

Id. at 932-33.

Here, as in Briskman f an interest in

Briskman, we

conclude that this possibility is too remote to bring Appellants within the

sphere of the people upon whom Section 908 confers standing. We further

conclude, as in Briskman, that any possible interest they might have is not

direct or immediate, as it would only come to fruition after successfully

challenging a total of four wills.

Appellants argue that the trial court erred by not having an evidentiary

at 8. However, this request is based on essentially the same premise that

this Court rejected in Briskman: that an heir at law who is not a named

beneficiary would always have standing to file an appeal from probate of a

will on the theory that eventually, no matter how many prior wills there may

have been, he or she will have an interest because he or she is entitled to

take under the laws of intestacy.2 As stated above, in Briskman we noted

2 This is distinguishable from a situation in which there is no prior will, as -at-law has the right to be heard on the validity of a will, where there is no prior will, and the estate would pass by the laws of

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that the Legislature has chosen not to include unnamed heirs at law among

those permitted to appeal from the decision of the Register of Wills in

Section 908; rather, the Legislature has chosen to define that category as

simply by virtue of their status as an heir at law.

For t

determination and so we affirm its order.

Order affirmed.

Platt, J. concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 8/1/2014

Luongo, 823 A.2d at 954.

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