NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
ESTATE OF JOAN A. STEINKE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LINDA JEAN DIBARTOLO AND WILLIAM : HEAGY, SR. :
: No. 1258 MDA 2025
Appellants :
Appeal from the Order Entered September 3, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s):
2025-SU-001658
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2026 Linda Jean DeiBartolo and William Heagy, Sr. (“Appellants”) appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas dismissing their appeal from the judgment for possession entered by the magisterial district judge (“MDJ”). See 68 P.S. § 250.513. Appellants argue they did not enter into a settlement agreement for the entry of judgment against them or waive their right to appeal from the MDJ judgment. They also contend that the purported settlement agreement would be unenforceable for want of consideration and that the court erred in failing to resolve their counterclaims. We affirm. We deny the request of the Estate of Joan Steinke (“the Estate”) for attorneys’ fees under Pa.R.A.P. 2744.
Appellants leased the property located at 850 Wellsville Road in Wellsville, York County from the Estate. The lease was for a six-month term
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beginning in July 2024 and contained a provision allowing Appellants to purchase the property by January 31, 2025. Appellants did not purchase the property or vacate the property when the lease term ended. On March 7, 2025, the Estate posted a Notice to Quit, requiring Appellants to vacate the property by April 7, 2025. Appellants failed to vacate the property, and the Estate initiated a landlord-tenant proceeding before the MDJ.
The MDJ scheduled a hearing for April 23, 2025. On that date, the MDJ entered notice of judgment stating, “Possession is granted and the defendant is not permitted to satisfy the order for possession and avoid eviction by paying the rent in arrears and the costs of the proceedings.” Notice of Judgment, April 23, 2025. The MDJ judgment imposed $187.75 in costs and fees on the Appellants.
Appellants filed a timely appeal to the trial court. The trial court issued a rule on the Estate to file a complaint. The Estate filed a complaint and an amended complaint for ejectment or, in the alternative, for eviction.
The Estate also filed a “Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Dismiss Appeal.” The Estate asserted that on April 23, 2025, in lieu of proceeding with the hearing before the MDJ, the parties had reached a settlement agreement in open court wherein the MDJ was to enter judgment in the Estate’s favor and the Estate was to allow Appellants to remain on the property until June 15, 2025, without paying additional rent. The motion alleged:
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9. At the time and date set for the hearing of said Complaint, counsel for the [Estate] and former counsel for [Appellants]
reached an agreement acknowledging that rent was paid in full through June 15, 2025, that [Appellants] would vacate the Premises and relinquish possession of same to [Estate] on or before June 15, 2025, pay the costs of filing of the suit and that [the Estate] could seek an automatic/immediate Order of Possession on June 15, 2025[,] if [Appellants] failed to vacate.
10. The terms of the Agreement were reviewed with the parties and counsel in open court before the District Magistrate who confirmed their consent.
Motion to Enforce, 6/20/25, at ¶¶ 9-10. Appellants filed a response, denying the allegations in the Motion and asserting counterclaims of promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment to seek reimbursement from the Estate for improvements they allegedly made to the property.
The trial court held a hearing on the Estate’s Motion to Enforce. Four witnesses testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that the MDJ had entered judgment for the Estate pursuant to an oral settlement agreement between the parties:
At the hearing to enforce the settlement agreement the Court heard testimony from several individuals present at the MDJ hearing, including [Appellants’] former counsel. All the witnesses confirmed there was a settlement reached before the MDJ held a hearing. The MDJ confirmed the terms of the settlement with all parties and [Appellants] agreed to the settlement terms before the MDJ.
The Estate established the terms of the verbal settlement agreement to be: 1) [Appellants] would voluntarily vacate the property on or before June 6,[1] 2025; and 2) [Appellants] would
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1 We note the trial court states the parties agreed to a move-out date of June
6, 2025, when the testimony reflected the parties agreed Appellants could (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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not pay any additional rent for the period between the hearing and their departure by June 6, 2025. Notably, [Appellants] did not testify to repudiate the agreement nor did they call a single witness to repudiate the agreement.
Trial Court Opinion, Oct. 14, 2025, at 2 (formatting altered).
The court dismissed the appeal and reinstated the judgment for possession entered by the MDJ.2 This timely appeal follows.
Appellants raise the following issues:
I. Did the trial court commit an error of law and/or abused its discretion when it found that Appellants waived their right to appeal by entering into a purported oral agreement resolving the issues in dispute.
II. Did the trial court commit an error of law and/or abuse its discretion when it determined the purported settlement agreement was enforceable despite a lack of consideration.
III. Did the trial court commit an error of law and/or abuse its discretion when it dismissed the Appellants’ appeal with Counterclaims and summarily reinstated the Magisterial District Court judgment.
Appellants’ Br. at 4 (trial court answers omitted).
Appellants first argue the court erred in finding they had waived their right to appeal the MDJ judgment for possession. They argue that a settlement agreement waiving the right to appeal an MDJ judgment must be entered on a MDJ’s court docket, and here, only judgment was entered. Id. at 9 (citing
Hindman v. Doughty, 33 A. 563 (Pa. 1896)).3 They argue that because no
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remain on the property until June 15, 2025. This difference in dates has no bearing on the outcome of our disposition.
2 The order was dated August 29, 2025, but filed on September 3, 2025. 3 Appellants also cite Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia, which is not binding authority.
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agreement was entered on the docket, the “conversations surrounding a purported agreement are inconsequential and irrelevant[.]” Id. They also assert their prior counsel testified that Appellants had not specifically agreed to waive their right to appeal the judgment, and acknowledged that the MDJ’s notice of judgment contained instructions for filing a notice of appeal. Id. at 8.
A settlement agreement may be oral; it does not need to be reduced to writing to be enforceable. King v. Driscoll, 296 A.3d 1178, 1184 (Pa.Super. 2023); In re Estate of Tomcik, 286 A.3d 748, 761 (Pa.Super. 2022). If the agreement “contains all of the requisites for a valid contract,” the court is required to enforce it. Mastroni-Mucker v. Allstate Ins. Co., 976 A.2d 510, 518 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citation omitted). Whether the parties intended to enter into an oral agreement presents a question of fact. Gasbarre Prods., Inc. v. Smith, 270 A.3d 1209, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2022). We defer to the lower court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by competent evidence. Id. at 1217; King, 296 A.3d at 1183-84. The proponent of the settlement agreement bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. Gasbarre Prods., 270 A.3d at 1218.
Here, the Court of Common Pleas found “the competent, credible evidence indicates” an “enforceable, verbal settlement agreement existed with material terms[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 5. This finding is supported by the record. There was ample competent evidence that the parties orally agreed, in open court, that the MDJ would enter judgment for possession in the Estate’s favor
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and assign the costs of the action to Appellants, but the Estate would not seek to enforce possession until June 15, 2025, and would consider Appellants’ rent to be paid through that date.
Hindman did not impose a requirement that the terms of a settlement agreement waiving the right to appeal be recorded by the MDJ. In Hindman, the magistrate entered judgment in accordance with the result of arbitration, and the magistrate’s transcript stated that the parties had agreed to be bound by the arbitrators’ decision. See Hindman, 33 A. at 563. The defendant appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, and the plaintiff argued the appeal should be dismissed based on the parties’ agreement before the magistrate. Id. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument, based on the defendant’s bald denial – submitted in one sentence – that he had agreed to be bound by the arbitrator’s decision. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the defendant had not carried his burden to prove the inaccuracy of the magistrate’s record of an agreement by competent evidence. Id. at 563-64.
Thus, Hindman did not hold that the waiver of the right to appeal a magistrate’s judgment must be entered on the record by the magistrate to be enforceable. Rather, it held (1) a magistrate’s record of an agreement by the parties to abide by an arbitrator’s decision is evidence that the parties have forgone the right to appeal that decision, and (2) the magistrate’s record of such an agreement could only be proven inaccurate by competent evidence.
Here, the MDJ entered judgment but did not record the terms of an agreement by the parties for the entry of judgment. Hindman therefore does
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not apply. Moreover, here, upon the Estate’s assertion of a settlement agreement, the trial court heard evidence and found the Estate carried its burden to prove Appellants had orally agreed to the magistrate’s entry of judgment.
We next address whether the agreement for the entry of judgment foreclosed Appellants’ right to appeal that judgment. The interpretation of a settlement agreement is a question of law. Mastroni-Mucker, 976 A.2d at 517. Our standard of review is therefore de novo. Id. at 518. Our scope of review is plenary. Id.
Where a contract is missing an essential term, “the court may infer the parties’ intent from other evidence and impose a term consistent with it.” Nicholas v. Hofmann, 158 A.3d 675, 694 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted). We have explained the doctrine of necessary implication as follows:
In the absence of an express provision, the law will apply an agreement by the parties to a contract to do and perform those things that according to reason and justice they should do in order to carry out the purpose for which the contract was made and to refrain from doing anything that would destroy or injure the other party’s right to receive the fruits of the contract.
A court should imply a missing term only when it is necessary to prevent injustice and it is abundantly clear that the parties intended to be bound by such term. Further, a court should only imply a term into a contract where it is clear that the parties contemplated it or that it is necessary to imply it to carry out the parties’ intentions.
Linde v. Linde, 210 A.3d 1083, 1091 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up).
Instantly, the trial court found that by entering the settlement agreement, Appellants implicitly waived the right to appeal:
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Here, the purpose of the settlement reached between [Appellants]
and the Estate was to provide a date certain by which [Appellants]
would voluntarily vacate the property. . . . If [Appellants] were permitted to appeal de novo from the judgment of the MDJ despite having reached a settlement agreement the purpose of the settlement agreement itself would be destroyed. Said differently, the settlement had no meaning whatsoever if [Appellants] could vitiate the agreement by appealing.
Trial Ct. Op. at 5. The court also explained that its “reinstatement of the MDJ judgment was a part of enforcing the settlement agreement[.]” Id. at 6.
We agree. Even if Appellants did not specifically promise not to appeal from the entry of judgment for possession, their doing so violates the purpose of the agreement: to bring the litigation to a close and for the Estate to resume possession on June 15, 2025. Appellants’ appeal to the trial court – and the instant appeal to this Court – have “destroy[ed] or injure[d] the [Estate’s] right to receive the fruits of the contract.” Linde, 210 A.3d at 1091 (citation omitted). The trial court did not err in finding that in agreeing to the entry of judgment, Appellants necessarily implied they had waived their right to appeal from the entry of that judgment, and that the court’s reinstatement of the judgment and dismissal of the appeal was necessary to enforce the agreement.
In their second issue, Appellants argue the court erred in finding the purported agreement to be enforceable, when it lacked consideration. They argue that although the court found that, under the terms of the agreement, they were not required to pay additional rent for the period between April 23, 2025, and June 15, 2025, the record reflects they had already paid rent for
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this period. They contend their alleged assent to have judgment for possession entered against would have conferred no benefit upon them.
The court found that Appellants “voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement on the advice of counsel understanding they were getting more favorable terms than they would have received by having a hearing and allowing the MDJ to simply enter his judgment.” Trial Ct. Op. at 6. It observed Appellants were permitted to remain in the property until June without paying additional rent.
We agree that Appellants received a benefit from the agreement.
Regardless of whether Appellants had already paid sufficient rent through June 15, 2025, the lease had already ended, and the Estate had commenced a landlord-tenant action in April 2025 seeking immediate possession of the property. However, instead of proceeding with its claim for immediate possession, the Estate agreed not to seek enforcement of the judgment for possession until June 15, 2025. Forgoing a legal claim is sufficient consideration. Rivers v. Del. Valley Mut. Cas. Co., 175 A.2d 87, 89 (Pa.Super. 1961). The agreement therefore was not unenforceable due to a lack of consideration.
In their final issue, Appellants argue the court erred or abused its discretion in dismissing their counterclaims without a hearing. Appellants’ Br. at 12 (citing Bennett v. Juzelenos, 791 A.2d 403 (Pa.Super. 2002)). They assert they raised claims of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel which
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were not resolved at the hearing on the motion to enforce the settlement agreement and “were dismissed without legal analysis.” Id. at 13.
We find this claim waived for lack of development. See Commonwealth v. Rush, 959 A.2d 945, 950-51 (Pa.Super. 2008) (“[I]t is the appellant’s obligation to present developed arguments and, in doing so, apply the relevant law to the facts of the case, persuade us there were errors, and convince us relief is due because of those errors”). Appellants do not explain the basis for their counterclaims or why they were not foreclosed by the entry of judgment in the Estate’s favor in the landlord-tenant action.4 We affirm the September 3, 2025 order.
Our final matter is the Estate’s request for “attorney’s fees and damages for the delay at the rate of 6% per annum in addition to legal interest pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2744.” The Estate’s Br. at 12 (footnote omitted). Rule 2744 provides that an appellate court may award reasonable counsel fees and other damages “if it determines that an appeal is frivolous or taken solely for delay or that the conduct of the participant against whom costs are to be imposed is dilatory, obdurate or vexatious.” Pa.R.A.P. 2744. We find the resolutions of Appellants’ issues were sufficiently debatable, rather than wholly frivolous, and that this appeal does not rise to the level of conduct contemplated by Rule 2744. We therefore deny the request.
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4 In Bennett, we found no settlement agreement had been reached, and remanded to the trial court for consideration of both the claims and counterclaims on their merits. 791 A.2d at 409. Bennett is inapplicable here.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 08/18/2026