Essex Insurance v. Neely

236 F.R.D. 287, 2006 WL 898107
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. West Virginia
DecidedMarch 31, 2006
DocketNo. Civ.A. 5:04CV139
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 236 F.R.D. 287 (Essex Insurance v. Neely) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. West Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Essex Insurance v. Neely, 236 F.R.D. 287, 2006 WL 898107 (N.D.W. Va. 2006).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL

SEIBERT, United States Magistrate Judge.

On January 18, 2006 came the above named Plaintiff, by Christopher J. Sears, Esq., by telephone, and Defendants Dustin Neely and Mollie Fitzsimmons, by Chad Groome, Esq., in person, and Defendants Lucky Lady Saloon Association and Cheryl West, by Randy Gossett, Esq., in person, for Defendants Dustin Neely and Mollie Fitzsim-mons’ Motion to Compel discovery. Testimony was not taken, and no other evidence was introduced.

I. Introduction

A. Background.

The parties engaged in discovery and a dispute arose. The Defendants filed a Motion to Compel on November 14, 2005. The matter was referred to me by the Honorable Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., on December 8, 2005. A hearing on the Motion to Compel was held on January 18, 2006.

B. The Motion.

[288]*288Defendants’ Motion to Compel.1

C. Decision.

The Motion to Compel is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as hereinafter set forth.

II. Facts

1. On August 11, 2005, Defendants served Defendants’ First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.
2. On June 7, 2005, the parties filed their Meeting Report and Proposed Discovery Plan, in which it was agreed that all responses to interrogatories were due thirty (30) days after service.
3. On October 3, 2005, Plaintiff faxed its Responses to Defendants’ First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Defendants.
4. On October 17, 2005, Defendants sent a letter to Plaintiffs counsel asking Plaintiff to reconsider and supplement its response.
5. In their letter, dated October 26, 2005, Plaintiff continued to object to Defendants’ discovery requests.
6. On November 14, 2005, Defendants moved to compel.

III. Defendants’ Motion to Compel

A. Contentions of the Parties.

Defendants contend that a good faith effort has been made to resolve the discovery dispute without court action and that Plaintiff should be ordered to completely and fully respond to Defendants’ discovery requests. Additionally, Defendants contend, that because Plaintiffs responses should have been filed on or before September 11, 2005, Plaintiffs objections should be deemed waived.

Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ motion to compel should be denied because Defendants’ requests are unrelated to the issues in this case.

B. Timeliness of Motion to Compel.

“A motion to compel ... is deemed waived if it is not filed within thirty days after the discovery response or disclosure requirement sought was due ... unless such failure to file the motion was caused by excusable neglect or by some action of the non-moving party.” L.R. Civ. P. 37.02.

The local rules provide that Defendants are required to file a motion to compel within 30 days after a response is made. L.R. Civ. P. 37.02. In this case, Defendants would have been required to file their motion to compel on or about November 3, 2005.

Defendants did not file their motion within the precise time limits as this Court’s local rules require. However, this Court encourages good-faith efforts between the attorneys for the parties in resolving their discovery disputes. Although the strict deadline for filing the motion to compel might not have been met, this Court, because at least part of the delay was caused by the non-moving party, should exercise its discretion under the local rule and decide the motion on its merits.

C. The Standards.

1. Discovery — Scope. “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)®, (ii), and (in).” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).

2. Discovery — Scope. A party “may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). In addition, “the discovery rules are given ‘a [289]*289broad and liberal treatment.’” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co. Inc., 967 F.2d 980, 983 (4th Cir.1992) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947)). However, the discovery sought must be relevant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1); see also St. Bernard Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Levet, Civ. A. No. 91-4493, 1993 WL 386321, at *1 (E.D.La. Sept.16, 1993) (stating that “the Rule 26 requirement that material sought in discovery be relevant should be firmly applied and courts should exercise appropriate control over the discovery process”).

3. Discovery — Relevancy. A court must strike a balance between the broad scope of the rules of discovery and the discovery of relevant evidence that is ultimately deemed admissible or inadmissible at trial. The test for relevancy under the discovery rules is necessarily broader than the test for relevancy under Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) (“relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”). In striking the appropriate balance between these two tensions, “[district courts enjoy nearly unfettered discretion to control the timing and scope of discovery and impose sanctions for failures to comply with its discovery orders.” Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, West Virginia, 81 F.3d 416, 426 (4th Cir.1996) (citations omitted).

4. Discovery — Duty

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
236 F.R.D. 287, 2006 WL 898107, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/essex-insurance-v-neely-wvnd-2006.