Espinoza v. Trans Union LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 11, 2024
• Docket: 2:22-cv-01670
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Raymond Espinoza, No. CV-22-01670-PHX-DWL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Trans Union LLC, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant 16 Equifax Information Services, LLC (“Equifax”). (Doc. 57.) Plaintiff, who is represented 17 by counsel, did not respond. For the following reasons, the motion is granted and this 18 action is terminated. 19 RELEVANT BACKGROUND 20 On January 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative pleading in this action, the First 21 Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. 14.) As relevant to Equifax,1 the FAC alleges as 22 follows. 23 On an unspecified date, non-party CBNA “inaccurately reported” a tradeline 24 regarding Plaintiff to Equifax. (Id. ¶ 7.) More specifically, “CBNA is inaccurately 25 reporting a tradeline . . . as BIG O TIRES/CBNA with a monthly payment amount of 26 $29.00 on Plaintiff’s . . . Equifax credit disclosure[]. The account reflected by the Errant

27 1 The FAC also names Trans Union, LLC (“Trans Union”), Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”), and Citibank, N.A. (“Citibank”) as Defendants. (Doc. 14.) 28 Plaintiff has since voluntarily dismissed Experian (Docs. 34) and Citibank (Doc. 59) and his claims against Trans Union were dismissed without leave to amend (Doc. 56). 1 Tradeline was closed by CBNA. Plaintiff no longer has an obligation to make monthly 2 payments to CBNA. [CBNA] closed the account. Hence, the entire balance is due 3 presently as Plaintiff has neither the right nor the obligation to satisfy this debt in monthly 4 installments.” (Id. ¶ 9.) 5 “On or about November 4, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a letter to Equifax disputing 6 the CBNA Errant Tradeline. In his dispute letter, Plaintiff explained that he does not owe 7 recurring payments. Hence, Plaintiff no longer has an obligation to make monthly 8 payments to CBNA. Plaintiff asked Equifax to report the monthly payment as $0.” (Id. 9 ¶ 16.) Nevertheless, “[o]n December 13, 2022, Plaintiff obtained his Equifax credit 10 disclosure, which showed that Equifax and CBNA failed or refused to report the Errant 11 Tradeline with a scheduled monthly payment as $0.00.” (Id. ¶ 22.) 12 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts two claims against Equifax. First, in 13 Count Seven, Plaintiff asserts a claim for negligent violation of the Fair Credit Reporting 14 Act (“FCRA”). (Id. ¶¶ 69-75.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that (1) “Equifax 15 negligently failed to maintain and/or follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum 16 possible accuracy of the information it reported to one or more third parties pertaining to 17 Plaintiff, in violation of 15 USC 1681e(b)”; and (2) “[a]fter receiving Plaintiff’s consumer 18 dispute to the Errant Tradeline, Equifax negligently failed to conduct a reasonable 19 reinvestigation as required by 15 U.S.C. 1681i.” (Id.) Second, in Count Eight, Plaintiff 20 asserts a claim for willful violation of the FCRA. (Id. ¶¶ 76-82.) The allegations 21 underlying this claim are similar to the allegations underlying Count Seven, except Plaintiff 22 alleges that Equifax’s failures were willful rather than negligent. (Id. ¶¶ 74, 81.) 23 On January 5, 2024, Equifax filed the pending motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 24 57.) The time to respond has expired and Plaintiff has not filed a response. 25 … 26 … 27 … 28 … 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. Legal Standard 3 “The court shall grant summary judgment if [a] movant shows that there is no 4 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 5 of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ only if it might affect the outcome of 6 the case, and a dispute is ‘genuine’ only if a reasonable trier of fact could resolve the issue 7 in the non-movant’s favor.” Fresno Motors, LLC v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 771 F.3d 8 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2014). The court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable 9 to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inference in the nonmoving party’s favor.” 10 Rookaird v. BNSF Ry. Co., 908 F.3d 451, 459 (9th Cir. 2018). “Summary judgment is 11 improper where divergent ultimate inferences may reasonably be drawn from the 12 undisputed facts.” Fresno Motors, 771 F.3d at 1125 (internal quotation marks omitted). 13 A party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing 14 the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, 15 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 16 if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 17 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “In order to carry its burden of 18 production, the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element 19 of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have 20 enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” 21 Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). “If . . . 22 [the] moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce 23 evidence to support its claim or defense.” Id. at 1103. 24 “If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue 25 of material fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Id. There is 26 no issue for trial unless enough evidence favors the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty 27 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “If the evidence is merely colorable or is not 28 significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50 (internal 1 citations omitted). At the same time, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, 2 and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. “[I]n ruling on a 3 motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the 4 prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.” Id. at 254. Thus, “the trial judge’s summary 5 judgment inquiry as to whether a genuine issue exists will be whether the evidence 6 presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for 7 either the plaintiff or the defendant.” Id. at 255. 8 II. The Parties’ Arguments 9 Equifax argues it is entitled to summary judgment for five reasons. (Doc. 57.) First, 10 Equifax argues that because Plaintiff “does not have any evidence that Equifax caused him 11 to suffer any damages”—“Plaintiff admits that he has not sustained and is not seeking lost 12 wages, that he is not seeking any out-of-pocket financial loss, and that he has not sought 13 any medical treatment as a result of Equifax’s actions” and only offers “conclusory 14 statements regarding emotional distress” for which “he has zero proof to link the alleged 15 [distress] to Equifax”—it follows that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to pursue his 16 FCRA claims. (Id. at 9-13.) Second, Equifax argues that, for various reasons, Plaintiff 17 cannot show the challenged reporting was inaccurate, which is a prerequisite to liability 18 under the FCRA. (Id. at 13-18.) Third, Equifax argues that Plaintiff also lacks the 19 necessary evidence to succeed on an FCRA claim because “there was no ‘consumer report’ 20 to sustain a section 1681e(b) claim” and alternatively because “Equifax did not publish 21 Plaintiff’s consumer report to a third party.” (Id. at 18-19.) Fourth, Equifax argues that 22 Plaintiff also cannot establish liability because “the evidence clearly establishes that 23 Plaintiff did not submit a direct dispute to Equifax” and thus did not satisfy the requirement 24 in § 1681i that the “consumer” must “notif[y] the agency directly.” (Id. at 19-20.) Fifth, 25 Equifax argues that, at a minimum, Plaintiff lacks evidence of a willful violation, as 26 required under Count Eight. (Id. at 20-22.) 27 As noted, Plaintiff did not respond to the summary judgment motion. 28 … 1 IIII. Analysis 2 Although Plaintiff’s failure to respond to Equifax’s motion does not mean the 3 motion may be treated as unopposed and summarily granted on that basis,2 that failure still 4 carries significant consequences. Under Rule 56(e)(2), “[i]f a party . . . fails to properly 5 address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . 6 consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Here, Equifax asserted in its 7 summary judgment motion that Plaintiff did not suffer any damages arising from the 8 challenged conduct. (Doc. 57 at 9-13.) Equifax also submitted evidence in support of that 9 factual assertion. (Id.) Because Plaintiff did not respond to Equifax’s motion, the Court 10 may consider the absence of damages as undisputed. Cf. Scarff v. Intuit, Inc., 318 F. App’x 11 483, 486 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[D]efendants’ summary judgment motion contended the 12 plaintiffs failed to show they were personally damaged. . . . Because [Plaintiffs] failed to 13 respond to this contention with specific evidence they were somehow damaged, under Rule 14 56(e) the district court correctly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment 15 because the plaintiffs cannot prove fraud or conversion without damages.”). 16 In a related vein, Equifax asserted in its summary judgment motion that it “did not 17 publish Plaintiff’s consumer report to a third party” and that “there was no communication 18 from Equifax to anyone regarding Plaintiff in the relevant timeframe.” (Doc. 57 at 18.) 19 Because Plaintiff did not respond to Equifax’s motion, the Court may consider the absence 20 of third-party dissemination as undisputed. 21 Given this backdrop, Equifax is correct that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his 22 FCRA claims. See, e.g., TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 433-39 (2021) 23 (concluding that the subset of plaintiffs whose inaccurate credit reports were never 24 disseminated to third-party businesses lacked standing to pursue FCRA claims: “The 25 2 See, e.g., Finkle v. Ryan, 174 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1180-81 (D. Ariz. 2016) (“[A] local 26 rule permitting a district court to treat the lack of a response as consent to granting a motion does not apply to summary judgment motions. If a summary judgment motion is 27 unopposed, Rule 56 authorizes the court to consider a fact as undisputed, but it does not permit the court to grant summary judgment by default.”) (cleaned up); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, 28 advisory committee note to 2010 amendments (“[S]ummary judgment cannot be granted by default even if there is a complete failure to respond to the motion.”). 1 || standing inquiry in this case thus distinguishes between (1) credit files that consumer || reporting agencies maintain internally and (11) the consumer credit reports that consumer □□ reporting agencies disseminate to third-party creditors. The mere presence of an 4|| inaccuracy in an internal credit file, if it is not disclosed to a third party, causes no concrete || harm.”); Jaras v. Equifax, Inc., 766 F. App’x 492, 495 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Without any 6|| allegation of the [inaccurate] credit report harming Plaintiffs’ ability to enter a transaction with a third party in the past or imminent future, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a concrete 8 || injury for standing”); Gadomski v. Patelco Credit Union, 2022 WL 223878, *5 (E.D. Cal. 9|| 2022) (noting that “there is no clear authority on whether an inaccurate credit report alone 10 || is enough to establish a concrete injury in fact” before concluding that standing is lacking 11 || where the inaccurate credit report was never disseminated to third parties). 12 Finally, although “[a] federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case 13 || without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit (subject- matter jurisdiction),” Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 15 || 430-31 (2007), the Court clarifies if Plaintiff were somehow deemed to have standing here, 16 || it would have granted summary judgment to Equifax for the additional reasons identified 17 || in Equifax’s motion in light of Plaintiff's failure to dispute the factual assertions in 18 |} Equifax’s motion. 19 IT IS ORDERED that Equifax’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 57) is granted. Because this ruling disposes of all remaining claims in this action, the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action. 22 Dated this 11th day of March, 2024. 23 24 Lam ae”) 25 f CC —— Dominic W. Lanza 26 United States District Judge 27 28

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