Espinoza v. State of Nevada

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: November 3, 2023
• Docket: 2:23-cv-01038
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 MARIO ESPINOZA, Case No. 2:23-cv-01038-MMD-DJA 7 Plaintiff, ORDER 8 v. 9 STATE OF NEVADA, et al., 10 Defendants. 11 12 Plaintiff Mario Espinoza brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 13 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated. (ECF No. 14 1-1.) This Court ordered Plaintiff to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma 15 pauperis or pay the full $402 filing fee on or before September 11, 2023, and then later 16 granted Plaintiff an extension of time until October 25, 2023. (ECF Nos. 3, 4, 5.) The Court 17 warned Plaintiff that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete 18 application to proceed in forma pauperis with all three documents or pay the full $402 19 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline. (ECF No. 5 at 2.) That deadline expired and 20 Plaintiff did not file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the full 21 $402 filing fee, or otherwise respond. 22 I. DISCUSSION 23 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 24 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 25 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 26 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or 27 comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) 28 (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep 2 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss 3 an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in 4 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk 5 of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 6 merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine 7 Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 8 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 9 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff’s 10 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 11 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 12 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 13 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 14 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 15 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 16 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 17 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 18 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 19 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 20 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 21 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 22 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 23 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 24 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 25 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 26 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 27 unless Plaintiff either files a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or 28 pays the $402 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a third order setting 1 || another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays 2 || the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not 3 || indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Plaintiff needs additional 4 || time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s order. Setting another deadline is not 5 || a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 6 || Ul. CONCLUSION 7 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 8 || weigh in favor of dismissal. 9 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 10 || Plaintiff's failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay 11 || the full $402 filing fee in compliance with this Court’s July 13 and September 12, 2023, 12 || orders. 13 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 14 || No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his 15 || claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 16 DATED THIS 3% day of November 2023. 17 18

20 we MIRANDA M. DU 21 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28