Espinoza v. Drummond

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: January 18, 2022
• Docket: 3:21-cv-00240
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 Jesus Espinoza, Case No. 3:21-cv-00240-LRH-WGC 4 Plaintiff, ORDER 5 v.

6 David Drummond, et al.,

7 Defendants.

8 9 Plaintiff Jesus Espinoza brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 10 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Ely State 11 Prison. (ECF No. 7). On December 2, 2021, this Court ordered Espinoza to file an 12 amended complaint by January 1, 2022. (ECF No. 6). The Court warned Espinoza that 13 the action could be dismissed if he failed to file an amended complaint by that deadline. 14 (Id. at 9). That deadline expired and Espinoza did not file an amended complaint, move 15 for an extension, or otherwise respond. 16 I. DISCUSSION 17 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 18 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 19 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 20 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 21 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 22 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 23 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 24 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 25 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 26 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 27 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 28 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 2 Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). 3 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 4 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Espinoza’s 5 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 6 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 7 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 8 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 9 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 10 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 11 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 12 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 13 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 14 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 15 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 16 “implicitly accepted pursuit of last drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 17 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 18 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 19 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 20 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 21 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 22 unless Espinoza files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second 23 order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often 24 only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances 25 here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Espinoza 26 needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s screening order. 27 Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So 28 the fifth factor favors dismissal. 1 |/ I. CONCLUSION 2 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 3 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that THIS ACTION IS DISMISSED for 4 || failure to file an amended complaint by the court-ordered deadline, leaving no claims 5 || pending. 6 It is further ordered that Espinoza’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 7 || No. 5) is GRANTED. This status doesn't relieve plaintiff of his obligation to pay the full 8 || $350 filing fee under the statute; it just means that he can do it in installments. And the 9 || full $350 filing fee remains due and owing even though this case is being dismissed. 10 To ensure that the plaintiff pays that fee, it is further ordered that under 28 U.S.C. 11 || § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Nevada Department of 12 || Corrections must forward from the account of Jesus Espinoza, #77515 to the Clerk of 13 || the United States District Court, District of Nevada, 20% of the preceding □□□□□□□ 14 || deposits (in months that the account exceeds $10) until the full $350 filing fee has been 15 || paid for this action. 16 The Clerk of the Court is directed to: 17 e ENTER JUDGMENT accordingly and CLOSE THIS CASE; and 18 e SEND a copy of this order to (1) the Finance Division of the Clerk’s Office and 19 (2) the attention of Chief of Inmate Services for the Nevada Department of 20 Corrections, P.O. Box 7011, Carson City, NV 89702. 21 No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. 22 23 DATED THIS 18th day of January 2022. 24 A, - 25 R? HICKS 26 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28