Espinosa-Sanchez v. United States

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided March 18, 1996·No. 95-1671·Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion



March 18, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 95-1671

ORLANDO ESPINOSA-SANCHEZ,

Petitioner, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent, Appellee.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Orlando Espinosa-Sanchez on brief pro se. ________________________
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Rosa E. Rodriguez-Velez ______________ ________________________
and Nelson Perez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorneys, on brief for _________________
appellee.

____________________

____________________

Per Curiam. After carefully reviewing the record __________

and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the

district court for essentially the reasons stated in its

Opinion and Order. We add the following comments.

1. The district court was not required to hold a

hearing on appellant's claim that his attorney provided

ineffective assistance by failing to call as witnesses two of

appellant's codefendants. Conspicuously absent from both of

the affidavits of these codefendants is any statement that

either codefendant would have testified on behalf of

appellant. Also missing are averments that appellant never

knew about the cocaine on board the SHEME and that appellant

never had been told about the drugs. Indeed, neither

affidavit is inconsistent with the government's position at

trial that appellant was part of the conspiracy to possess

with the intent to distribute the cocaine. Thus, even taking

the rest of the allegations in the affidavits as true, the

conclusions appellant draws from these facts are basically

"self-interested characterizations." See United States v. ___ ______________

McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 225 (1st Cir. 1993) (in deciding whether ______

to hold a hearing, the district court must take a

petitioner's factual averments as true but need not credit

"conclusory allegations, self-interested characterizations

[or] discredited inventions").

-2-

Finally, the case upon which appellant primarily

relies, United States v. Yizar, 956 F.2d 230 (11th Cir. ______________ _____

1992), is not to the contrary. In Yizar, there was no doubt, _____

unlike here, that the codefendant actually had said that

defendant was innocent. Here, in contrast, there is no

independent corroboration that Estupinan or Passos-Paternina

possessed exculpatory evidence or that appellant even named

them as potential witnesses. Moreover, the information in

their affidavits hardly amounts to a direct statement of

appellant's innocence.

2. Appellant's claim that his attorney prevented

him from taking the stand is supported by only his allegation

that his attorney led him to believe that he could not

testify. This is insufficent, without more, to require the

district court to hold an evidentiary hearing. Siciliano v. _________

Vose, 834 F.2d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1987) (an affidavit that ____

states only that counsel refused to allow defendant to

testify on his own behalf is insufficient to establish

defendant's entitlement to a hearing on his habeas corpus

petition). See also Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 475-76 ___ ____ _________ _____

(7th Cir. 1991) (a "barebones assertion" that a defendant's

attorney would not let him testify is "too facile a tactic to

be allowed to succeed"; greater particularity and some

substantiation are necessary).

-3-

Again, the cases upon which appellant primarily

relies do not support his position. In one, United States _____________

v.Walker, 772 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1985) (a direct appeal), ______

the defendant had told his attorney that he wished to testify

and the attorney had filed a motion to reopen the case to

allow defendant to take the stand. The court determined that

the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the

motion. Id. at 1176, 1185. In the other case, United States ___ _____________

v. Butts, 630 F.Supp. 1145 (D. Me. 1986) (a new trial _____

motion), there was independent evidence -- courtroom scenes

and counsel's testimony -- that defendant consistently had

demanded to testify on his own behalf. Id. at 1146. As ___

noted above, there is no independent corroboration of

appellant's allegation that his attorney told him that he

could not testify.

3. The remainder of appellant's clai

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