Espinosa-Hernandez v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 10, 2025
• Docket: 24-5328
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 10 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HERMES EDUARDO ESPINOSA- No. 24-5328 HERNANDEZ; et al., Agency Nos. A240-742-783 Petitioners, A240-742-784 A240-742-781 v. A240-742-785

PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 7, 2025**

Before: OWENS, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Hermes Eduardo Espinosa-Hernandez and his family, citizens of Colombia,

petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing

their appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioners

failed to demonstrate a nexus between the harm they suffered and a statutorily

protected ground. Although the IJ found Espinosa credible and acknowledged

serious harm—including threats, an assault, and the murder of his father—the record

does not compel the conclusion that this harm occurred “on account of” Espinosa’s

family membership. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An

alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random

violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”). The BIA

reasonably concluded that the threats and violence were motivated by greed and by

a desire to stop Espinosa’s efforts to investigate the murder of his father and the

disappearance of his cousins, not by his familial relation to his father. For example,

Espinosa’s six siblings, including the mother of his missing nephews, safely reside

in Columbia.

2. To qualify for withholding of removal, Petitioners must prove it is

“more likely than not” that they will be persecuted on account of a statutorily-

protected ground. See Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2001). Because

substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding of a lack of nexus on the asylum

claim, the record does not compel a finding of nexus on the withholding of removal

2 claim. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a

petitioner who fails to satisfy the lower standard of proof for asylum necessarily fails

to satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal).

3. Substantial evidence also supports the denial of CAT relief. To qualify

for CAT protection, an applicant must show that it is more likely than not that they

would be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of a public official. See 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1). Petitioners failed to meet this burden. Although

they submitted country-conditions evidence describing generalized violence and

corruption in Colombia, they offered no evidence showing that they personally face

a particularized risk of torture or that government officials would be complicit in

such harm. Generalized country conditions, without more, are insufficient. See

Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (holding

that “petitioners’ generalized evidence of violence and crime in Mexico is not

particular to Petitioners and is insufficient” to establish eligibility for relief under

CAT).

PETITION DENIED.