Espino Alarcon v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 23, 2025
• Docket: 23-2180
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 23 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAMARIS MAYBELLI ESPINO No. 23-2180 ALARCON; et al., Agency Nos. A220-501-767 Petitioners, A220-152-446 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 22, 2025**

Before: GRABER, H.A. THOMAS, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Damaris Maybelli Espino Alarcon and her minor son, natives and citizens of

Guatemala, petition pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

(“BIA”) order dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s decision

denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by

8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo the BIA’s legal determinations, including

whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard. Umana-Escobar v. Garland,

69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s

factual findings. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2020).

We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that petitioners

failed to show they were or would be persecuted on account of a protected ground.

See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) (even if membership in a

particular social group is established, an applicant must still show that “persecution

was or will be on account of his membership in such group”); see also Zetino v.

Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s “desire to be free from

harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members

bears no nexus to a protected ground”).

Because petitioners failed to show any nexus to a protected ground,

petitioners also failed to satisfy the standard for withholding of removal. See

Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359–60 (9th Cir. 2017).

The agency did not err in its application of the nexus standards for

petitioners’ asylum and withholding of removal claims. See id. at 360 (“a reason”

nexus standard applicable to withholding of removal is less demanding than the

2 23-2180 “one central reason” standard for asylum).

In light of this disposition, we need not reach petitioners’ remaining

contentions regarding the merits of their claims. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371

F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide issues

unnecessary to the results they reach). Thus, petitioners’ asylum and withholding

of removal claims fail.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection

because petitioners failed to show it is more likely than not they would be tortured

by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if they returned to

Guatemala. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2009) (no

likelihood of torture).

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 23-2180