Espindola v. Jorawar

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Espindola v. Jorawar

228 A.D.2d 243, 643 N.Y.2d 992, 643 N.Y.S.2d 992, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6538

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 11, 1996

StatusPublished

This text of 228 A.D.2d 243 (Espindola v. Jorawar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Espindola v. Jorawar, 228 A.D.2d 243, 643 N.Y.2d 992, 643 N.Y.S.2d 992, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6538 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

Opinion

The IAS Court properly exercised its discretion in vacating the default judgment since plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the default, the filing of opposition papers in the wrong clerk’s office, and a potentially meritorious claim (CPLR 5015 [a]; 2005). Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied with leave to renew since issues of fact exist with respect to defendant Gold’s relationship to the subject premises during the time the infant plaintiff was allegedly exposed to lead paint and since plaintiffs have yet to complete discovery as to material factual issues, knowledge of which is peculiarly within defendant-appellant’s possession [244]*244(CPLR 3212 [f]; Di Miceli v Olcott, 119 AD2d 539). Concur— Milonas, J. P., Rosenberger, Wallach, Ross and Tom, JJ.

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The IAS Court properly exercised its discretion in vacating the default judgment since plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the default, the filing of opposition papers in the wrong clerk’s office, and a potentially meritorious claim (CPLR 5015 [a]; 2005). Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied with leave to renew since issues of fact exist with respect to defendant Gold’s relationship to the subject premises during the time the infant plaintiff was allegedly exposed to lead paint and since plaintiffs have yet to complete discovery as to material factual issues, knowledge of which is peculiarly within defendant-appellant’s possession [244]*244(CPLR 3212 [f]; Di Miceli v Olcott, 119 AD2d 539). Concur— Milonas, J. P., Rosenberger, Wallach, Ross and Tom, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

228 A.D.2d 243, 643 N.Y.2d 992, 643 N.Y.S.2d 992, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6538, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/espindola-v-jorawar-nyappdiv-1996.

Opinion

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