Espaillat v. Mousseau, et al.

2004 DNH 112
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedJuly 28, 2004
DocketCV-03-338-SM
StatusPublished

This text of 2004 DNH 112 (Espaillat v. Mousseau, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Espaillat v. Mousseau, et al., 2004 DNH 112 (D.N.H. 2004).

Opinion

Espaillat v . Mousseau, et a l . CV-03-338-SM 07/28/04 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Miguel Espaillat, Plaintiff

v. Civil N o . 03-338-SM Opinion N o . 2004 DNH 112 Sergeant John Mousseau, Sergeant (first name unknown) Guyette, and Sergeant (first name unknown) Trac each in his individual capacity, Defendants,

O R D E R

Miguel Espaillat, a federal inmate, brings this action

against three correctional officers at the Cheshire County

Department of Corrections (“CCDC”). He claims that while he was

housed at CCDC as a pretrial detainee, defendants violated his

constitutionally protected rights by failing to protect him from

an assault by another inmate and by denying him appropriate

medical care for injuries he sustained in the attack.1

1 Because Espaillat was a pretrial detainee when the events in question occurred, the constitutional obligations owed to him by the various defendants flow from the provisions of the Fourteenth, rather than the Eighth Amendment. Nevertheless, the protections available to pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment “are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.” City of Revere v . Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (citing Two of the defendants named in Espaillat’s complaint

(Guyette and Tracy) are no longer employed at CCDC and they have

yet to be served with plaintiff’s complaint. The remaining

defendant, Sergeant John Mousseau, moves for summary judgment,

saying the record establishes that no material facts are in

dispute and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Espaillat has not filed a response to Mousseau’s dispositive

motion and the deadline for doing so has lapsed. There i s ,

however, a possible explanation for plaintiff’s silence.

By letter dated June 2 1 , 2004, counsel for Sergeant Mousseau

notified the court that he had learned of plaintiff’s transfer

from a correctional facility in Massachusetts to one in Texas.2

In his letter, counsel explained that he had served plaintiff

with a copy of the pending motion for summary judgment at

plaintiff’s Massachusetts address, and noted that the motion was

Bell v . Wolfish, 441 U.S. 5 2 0 , 535 (1979)). Thus, at a minimum, defendants had a constitutional duty not to be “deliberately indifferent” to Espaillat’s serious medical (and security) needs. See Estelle v . Gamble, 429 U.S. 9 7 , 106 (1976). 2 To date, however, plaintiff has not notified the court of any change in his mailing address. See Local Rule 83.6(e) (“An attorney or pro se party who has appeared before the court on a matter is under a continuing duty to notify the clerk’s office of any change of address and telephone number.”).

2 not returned for lack of service. Nevertheless, counsel wrote to

plaintiff at his new address and told him that if he had not

received the pending motion for summary judgment, he could

telephone counsel (collect) and request an additional copy.

There is no evidence suggesting that plaintiff made any such

request. Nor, however, is it clear that plaintiff actually

received a copy of defendant’s motion or that it was transferred

with him to Texas when he was relocated (or even that he received

defense counsel’s letter).

Aside from whether plaintiff actually received a copy of

defendant’s pending motion, the record suggests that there is a

fundamental problem with his pending lawsuit: nowhere does he

allege (nor, necessarily, does he demonstrate) that he has

exhausted administrative remedies available to him, as is

required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), as amended by the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). That statute provides:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

3 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Supreme Court has held that section

1997(e) requires an inmate to exhaust all available

administrative processes before filing a federal suit relating to

the conditions of his or her confinement, even if some or all of

the relief the inmate seeks is not available through the

administrative process. Booth v . Churner, 532 U.S. 7 3 1 , 734

(2001) (“The question is whether an inmate seeking only money

damages must complete a prison administrative process that could

provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated, but no

money. We hold that he must.”). In light of that holding, the

Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal, without prejudice, of

Booth’s Eighth Amendment claims for failure to exhaust.

Although the Supreme Court implicitly concluded that Booth’s

Eighth Amendment claims (e.g., assault and deliberate

indifference to medical needs) did relate to “prison conditions”

and, therefore, were subject to the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement, there was some debate in various circuits (much,

though not all, of it preceding the Booth opinion) as to whether

such claims are properly viewed as falling within the scope of

the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement o r , more specifically, the

4 phrase “prison conditions.” That issue was resolved by the Court

less than a year after it issued the Booth opinion, when it held:

[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.

Porter v . Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

Consequently, the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies when

the following three criteria are met: (1) the lawsuit was filed

by a “prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility”; (2) he or she filed that lawsuit after

the effective date of the PLRA (i.e., April 2 6 , 1996); and (3)

the lawsuit is “with respect to prison conditions,” as that

phrase has been defined by the Supreme Court. When an inmate

files suit without properly exhausting his or her administrative

remedies, dismissal (at least of the unexhausted claims) is

ordinarily required. See Medina-Claudio v . Rodriguez-Mateo, 292

F.3d 3 1 , 36 (1st Cir. 2002).

5 When a prison’s administrative remedies include a grievance

process, “strict compliance . . . is required or else dismissal

must follow inexorably.” McCoy v . Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 233,

246 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). See also Houze v . Segarra, 217 F. Supp. 2d

394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Prison officials are entitled to

require strict compliance with an existing grievance procedure.”)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The “strict

compliance” requirement bars an inmate from claiming exhaustion

when he has bypassed steps in the administrative process or

failed to avail himself of available administrative appeals.

See, e.g., Sunn v . Cattell, N o . 02-168-M, 2002 DNH 197 at 11-12

(D.N.H. Oct. 1 0 , 2002).

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Related

United States v. Dieter
429 U.S. 6 (Supreme Court, 1976)
City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital
463 U.S. 239 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Porter v. Nussle
534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Houze v. Segarra
217 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D. New York, 2002)
McCoy v. Goord
255 F. Supp. 2d 233 (S.D. New York, 2003)
Sunn v. NH State Prison Warden
2002 DNH 197 (D. New Hampshire, 2002)

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