Esmerehildo Pardo v. Department of Homeland Security

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 23, 2024
DocketDA-0432-16-0114-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Esmerehildo Pardo v. Department of Homeland Security (Esmerehildo Pardo v. Department of Homeland Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Esmerehildo Pardo v. Department of Homeland Security, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ESMEREHILDO G. PARDO, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-0432-16-0114-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND DATE: April 23, 2024 SECURITY, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Christina Borgobello , Esquire, Joshua N. Archer , Esquire, and Nathan M. Rymer , Esquire, Houston, Texas, for the appellant.

Daniel N. Vara, Jr. , Esquire, Coral Springs, Florida, for the appellant.

Judith Homich , Esquire, Tampa, Florida, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which affirmed his demotion. For the reasons set forth below, the appellant’s petition

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

for review is DISMISSED as untimely filed without good cause shown. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), (g).

BACKGROUND The appellant filed an appeal of the agency’s action demoting him for unacceptable performance from the position of Supervisory Immigration Services Officer, GS-1801-14, to the position of Immigration Services Officer III, GS-1810-13, effective November 15, 2015. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1, Tab 8 at 17-20, 151-56. After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued a March 8, 2017 initial decision in which she found that the agency established the unacceptable performance charge and that the appellant failed to prove his affirmative defenses of disparate treatment based on his race and sex, and retaliation for prior equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity. IAF, Tab 24, Initial Decision (ID) at 16-22. The administrative judge also found that the appellant failed to establish that the agency violated his due process rights and affirmed the agency’s action. ID at 22-25. The initial decision became the Board’s final decision when neither party filed a petition for review by April 12, 2017. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113 (providing that initial decisions generally become final 35 days after issuance absent a petition for review). 2 On July 6, 2018, the appellant filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. Because he filed his petition for review more than 35 days after the issuance of the initial decision, the Clerk of the Board gave the appellant notice of the Board’s requirement for him to file a motion to either accept the filing as timely or waive the time limit for good cause. PFR File, Tab 2. The appellant filed a Motion to Waive Time Limit for Good Cause, in 2 The initial decision erroneously indicates a finality date of April 17, 2017, which is 40 days past the March 8, 2017 issuance date of the initial decision. ID at 1, 25. Based on the date that the administrative judge issued the initial decision, it became the Board’s final decision 35 days later, on April 12, 2017. ID at 1; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. The administrative judge’s error is of no legal consequence because the difference of 5 days does not affect our finding, below, that the petition for review was untimely filed. Karapinka v. Department of Energy, 6 M.S.P.R. 124, 127 (1981). 3

which he asserts that he had discovered new evidence during the litigation of related Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaints filed by him and two coworkers. PFR File, Tab 5 at 3. He contended that the evidence, which he set forth in his petition for review, was new, material, and established good cause for the Board to reopen the appeal. Id. at 3-4. The agency filed a response in opposition to the appellant’s petition for review and motion seeking a waiver of untimeliness, and the appellant replied. PFR File, Tabs 6-7.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The appellant bears the burden of proof with regard to timeliness, which he must prove by preponderant evidence. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(B). A petition for review must be filed within 35 days after the date of issuance of the initial decision or, if the party shows that he received the initial decision more than 5 days after it was issued, within 30 days of his receipt. Williams v. Office of Personnel Management, 109 M.S.P.R. 237, ¶ 7 (2008); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). The appellant concedes that his petition for review is untimely. PFR File, Tab 5 at 3. We agree. The record shows that the administrative judge issued his initial decision on March 8, 2017. ID at 1. The appellant alleges that he received the initial decision on March 21, 2017. PFR File, Tab 5 at 3. However, because the appellant and one of his attorneys were e-filers, they are deemed to have received the initial decision on the date of electronic submission, March 8, 2017. IAF, Tab 3 at 2, Tabs 16, 25; see Palermo v. Department of the Navy, 120 M.S.P.R. 6, ¶ 3 (2014). Thus, the decision became final 35 days later, on April 12, 2017, when neither party filed a petition for review. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. The appellant filed his petition for review on July 6, 2018, making it 451 days late. PFR File, Tab 1. Because the appellant’s explanation for the untimeliness of his petition for review is not submitted in the form of an affidavit or a statement signed under penalty of perjury, it is insufficient to establish the assertions it contains. 4

PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-13; see Wyeroski v. Department of Transportation, 106 M.S.P.R. 7, ¶ 8, aff’d per curiam, 253 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(f). An attorney who did not represent the appellant below, but does on review, has provided an affidavit with the appellant’s motion for waiver of the time limit. PFR File, Tab 5 at 6. However, we do not find this affidavit sufficient. The attorney does not assert that he has any personal knowledge of the relevant facts. Id.; see Anderson v. Government Printing Office, 55 M.S.P.R. 548, 550 n.1 (1992) (finding that an affidavit that was not based on personal knowledge could not support the facts alleged therein). Further, the “facts” to which he attests are, for the most part, statements that the appellant met his legal burden for waiving the time limit. PFR File, Tab 5 at 3-4. For example, he states without explanation that the appellant “discovered new evidence” based on information obtained during his EEOC litigation and that of his coworkers. Id. at 3. As another example, he asserts that the “evidence could not have reasonably been discovered” during the proceedings below. Id. at 4. Even assuming the appellant’s unsworn assertions were sufficient to satisfy the Board’s regulations at 5 C.F.R. § 1201

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Wyeroski v. Merit Systems Protection Board
253 F. App'x 950 (Federal Circuit, 2007)
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582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Esmerehildo Pardo v. Department of Homeland Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/esmerehildo-pardo-v-department-of-homeland-security-mspb-2024.