ESLICK v. REAGLE

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedJuly 15, 2024
Docket1:22-cv-02415
StatusUnknown

This text of ESLICK v. REAGLE (ESLICK v. REAGLE) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
ESLICK v. REAGLE, (S.D. Ind. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

RYAN LEE ESLICK, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 1:22-cv-02415-TWP-KMB ) DENNIS REAGLE being sued in his individual ) and official capacities, ) T. GREATHOUSE, Supervisor of all UTM & ) Case Work Managers, in his individual capacity, ) SHAVER, Mr., Current unit team manager of ) G Cellhouse, in his individual capacity, ) A. VCKOV1, Ms., Previous Case Work Manager, in ) her individual capacity, ) M. PFLEEGER2, Mr., Previous LT, in his ) individual ) capacity, ) BOWMAN, Mr., Capt. Previous Capt., in his ) individual capacity, ) GOODNIGHT, Mr., Caseworker, in his individual ) capacity, ) T. SOLOMON, Mr., Caseworker, in his individual ) capacity, ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER SCREENING ORDER AND TO EXTEND DEADLINES

This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff, Ryan Lee Eslick's ("Eslick") Motion to Reconsider Order Screening Complaint, Dismissing Certain Claims and Defendants, and Directing Further Proceedings, (Dkt. 72) and the parties' Joint Motion for Extension of Discovery and Dispositive Motions Deadlines, (Dkt. 75). For the reasons explained below, the Motion to Reconsider is denied, and the joint request to extend certain deadlines is granted in part. I. DISCUSSION On December 16, 2022, pro se Plaintiff Eslick, an Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC") inmate, initiated this action by filing a Complaint. (Dkt. 2.) After screening the Complaint as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court concluded that Eslick had stated viable

claims under the Eighth Amendment regarding his conditions of confinement and under the Fourteenth Amendment regarding the procedures that led to his indefinite or prolonged confinement in segregation. (Dkt. 23 at 4-5.) The Court allowed individual capacity claims for damages to proceed against Defendants Reagle, Vckov, Greathouse, Goodnight, Solomon, Pfleeger, and Bowman (the "Defendants"). Id. at 4. The Court also allowed an official capacity claim for injunctive relief to proceed against only Reagle, the Warden of Pendleton Correctional Facility where Eslick was confined at the time the Complaint was filed. Id. at 5. The Court dismissed Eslick's claims against Jack Hendrix, IDOC Adult Facilities Classification Director ("Hendrix"), because he did not allege facts plausibly suggesting that Hendrix was personally involved in any of the constitutional violations at issue. Id. at 6. Eslick was later transferred to

Westville Correctional Facility and is now at New Castle Correctional Facility, apparently still in segregation. (Dkt. 73.) The Court's Screening Order was issued on April 12, 2023. After the non-dismissed Defendants answered and withdrew the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the Magistrate Judge issued a scheduling order for this case. The scheduling order specified that the deadline for amending pleadings was November 20, 2023. (Dkt. 40 at 3.) On December 19, 2023, the Court recruited counsel to represent Eslick in this matter. (Dkt. 54.) During a telephonic status conference on January 29, 2024, the parties jointly moved to extend the discovery deadline in this case to July 29, 2024, and the dispositive motions deadline

to August 29, 2024, which was granted. (Dkt. 59.) The parties did not otherwise move to amend any deadlines. At the next telephonic status conference on June 3, 2024, recruited counsel indicated that he might seek leave to file an amended complaint. (Dkt. 68.) On June 26, 2024, Eslick instead filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's screening order. (Dkt. 72.) The motion does not contend that the Court's screening order, as based on the

allegations in Eslick's original pro se Complaint, was erroneous. Rather, it asserts that recently discovered information, discovered during Reagle's deposition, indicates that Hendrix is, in fact, the person who personally decided to keep Eslick in IDOC-wide segregation for several years. The motion seeks an order "rejoin[ing]" Hendrix as a defendant in this action. (Dkt. 72-3.)3 Also, Eslick seeks to dismiss his Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims. Id. The Defendants have filed notice that they do not object to Eslick's motion. (Dkt. 74.) Eslick's Motion to reconsider cites, in part, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) as its basis: "any other reason that justifies relief" from an order. It also relies upon the Court's inherent ability to reconsider previous orders. See, e.g., U.S. v. Ligas, 549 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 2008). The Court acknowledges that reconsideration of screening of a prisoner's pro se complaint may be

appropriate in some instances. See Terry v. Spencer, 888 F.3d 890, 893–94 (7th Cir. 2018). But here, unlike in Terry, Eslick does not allege that the Court "misread" the original complaint or otherwise erred in screening it. Moreover, this case has now been pending for over a year and a half. Hendrix has not yet been served with process. He must first be served and allowed to answer before the case can proceed if he is to be added as a defendant. Eslick's current Motion is, in substance, a motion to amend the complaint. But he has not submitted a proposed amended complaint as required by Local Rule 15-1. Additionally, the case

3 Plaintiff's proposed order also refers to reinstating "John Safford" as a defendant in this action. (Dkt. 72-3.) No person by that name was mentioned in Eslick's original Complaint. management deadline for amending pleadings expired many months ago. Therefore, if Eslick wishes to file a motion for leave to amend the complaint, he must first show that there is good cause to allow a deviation from the case management deadlines under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), and second that an amendment should be allowed under Rule 15(a)(2). See

Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court will then be required to screen the amended complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. By its plain terms, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A applies to any complaint "in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity" and is not limited to pro se complaints. For these reasons, the Motion to Reconsider is denied, however, Eslick shall have thirty days from the date of this Order, within which to file a motion for leave to file an Amended Complaint, accompanied by a proposed amended complaint. The parties have also filed a joint motion to extend the current discovery and dispositive motions deadlines. (Dkt. 75.) The parties request a 60-day extension of the discovery and motions for summary judgment deadlines. In light of the pending addition of a new defendant, both parties

agreed that a 60-day extension is necessary to litigate this case. Id. The parties ask the Court to extend the discovery deadlines to September 27, 2024, and motions for summary judgment deadline to October 28, 2024. This motion is granted so far as the Court vacates the current deadlines and the Court will extend those deadlines by 90 days. II.

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Related

United States v. Ligas
549 F.3d 497 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Kendale L. Adams v. City of Indianapolis
742 F.3d 720 (Seventh Circuit, 2014)
Damien Terry v. Mark Spencer
888 F.3d 890 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)

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Bluebook (online)
ESLICK v. REAGLE, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eslick-v-reagle-insd-2024.