Escobedo v. El Rinconcito Mexican Grill, LLC

Opinion

1 2 3 4 7 8 JOSE ESCOBEDO, Case No. 1:24-cv-01457-JLT-SKO 9 Plaintiff, 10 ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE v. 11 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 TO DECLINE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF’S EL RINCONCITO MEXICAN GRILL, LLC. and FLIPSIDE CHRISTIAN

CHURCH, 14 (Docs. 1, 4, 5)

Defendants. 15 14 DAY DEADLINE

____________________________________/ 16

18 19 On November 27, 2024, Plaintiff Jose Escobedo (“Plaintiff”) filed his complaint against 20 Defendants El Rinconcito Mexican Grill, LLC and Flipside Christian Church (“Defendants”), 21 alleging claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), California’s Unruh Civil 22 Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), and California’s Health and Safety Code. (Doc. 1). These claims stem 23 from alleged barriers Plaintiff encountered (such as lack of designated accessible parking spots and 24 uneven paths of travel) while he visited “El Rinconcito Mexican Grill,” a facility owned, operated, 25 or leased by Defendants. (See id.) 26 On December 3, 2024, the undersigned ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the Court should 27 not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims considering the Ninth 28 Circuit’s decision in Vo v. Choi. (See Doc. 4); Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022) (affirming 1 a district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim); see 28 2 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Plaintiff timely filed a response on December 17, 2024. (Doc. 5.) For the reasons 3 discussed below, the undersigned shall discharge the order to show cause and recommend that 4 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims be declined and those claims be dismissed 5 without prejudice. 7 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), a court that has original jurisdiction over a civil action “shall 8 have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within 9 such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 10 United States Constitution.” The Ninth Circuit has concluded that ADA and Unruh Act claims that 11 derive from a common nucleus of operative fact “form part of the ‘same case or controversy’ for 12 purposes of § 1367(a).” Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 2021). 13 However, even where supplemental jurisdiction over a claim exists under § 1367(a), the 14 Court may decline jurisdiction over the claim under § 1367(c) if: 15 (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the 16 district court has original jurisdiction, 17 (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or 18 (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining 19 jurisdiction. 20 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(4). 21 A court deciding whether to apply § 1367(c)(4) must make “a two-part inquiry.” Arroyo, 19 22 F.4th at 1210. “First, the district court must articulate why the circumstances of the case are 23 exceptional within the meaning of § 1367(c)(4).” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks 24 omitted). “Second, in determining whether there are compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction 25 in a given case, the court should consider what best serves the principles of economy, convenience, 26 fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine articulated in [United Mine 27 Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)].” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks 28 omitted). 1 After considering § 1367(c)(4) and California’s requirements for bringing Unruh Act claims, 2 “[n]umerous federal district courts across California have declined to exercise supplemental 3 jurisdiction over Unruh Act . . . claims brought alongside ADA claims.” Rutherford v. Nuway Ins. 4 Agency Inc., No. SACV 21-00576-CJC-JDE, 2021 WL 4572008, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2021). 5 Underlying these decisions is “the recent confluence of several California-law rules [that] have 6 combined to create a highly unusual systemic impact on ADA-based Unruh Act cases that clearly 7 threatens to have a significant adverse impact on federal-state comity.” Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211. 8 Congress adopted the ADA to address the discrimination encountered by persons with 9 disabilities, providing a private cause of action to seek injunctive, but not monetary, relief. See 10 Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2021) (discussing background and relief available 11 under the ADA). The Unruh Act likewise prohibits disability discrimination, containing a provision, 12 Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f), stating that a violation of the ADA also violates the Unruh Act. However, 13 unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act allows a plaintiff to recover “up to a maximum of three times the 14 amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). 15 In response to perceived abuses of the Unruh Act, California has enacted requirements for 16 bringing such claims, which the Ninth Circuit has assumed, without deciding, “apply only in 17 California state court.” Vo, 49 F.4th at 1170. For example a provision was added (1) regarding the 18 contents of demand letters, Cal. Civ. Code § 55.31; (2) imposing heightened pleading requirements, 19 Cal. Civ. Code § 425.50(a); and (3) requiring an additional filing fee of $1,000 for so called “high- 20 frequency litigants,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 70616.5(b), see Cal. Civ. Code § 425.55(b) (defining a high- 21 frequency litigant to include “[a] plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints alleging a 22 construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately preceding the 23 filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation.”). 24 These heightened pleading requirements apply to actions alleging a “construction-related 25 accessibility claim,” which California law defines as “any civil claim in a civil action with respect 26 to a place of public accommodation, including but not limited to, a claim brought under Section 51, 27 54, 54.1, or 55, based wholly or in part on an alleged violation of any construction-related 28 accessibility standard.” Cal. Civ. Code § 55.52(a)(1). The requirements apply to claims brought 1 under the Unruh Act as well as to related claims under the California Health & Safety Code. See 2 Gilbert v. Singh, No. 1:21cv1338-AWI-HBK, 2023 WL 2239335, *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2023). By 3 enacting such restrictions, California has expressed a “desire to limit the financial burdens 4 California’s businesses may face from claims for statutory damages under the Unruh Act.” Arroyo, 5 19 F.4th at 1209 (internal quotations omitted). However, “Unruh Act plaintiffs have evaded these 6 limits by filing in a federal forum in which [they] can claim these state law damages in a manner 7 inconsistent with the state law’s requirements.” Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1213 (internal quotation marks 8 omitted). Consequently, “the procedural strictures that California put in place have been rendered 9 largely toothless, because they can now be readily evaded.” Id. 10 The Ninth Circuit provided substantial guidance on this issue in Vo v. Choi in affirming a 11 district court’s order denying supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim under § 1367(c)(4). 12 Vo, 49 F.4th at 1168. In that case, the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the 13 Unruh Act claim after giving the plaintiff the opportunity to respond and before addressing the 14 merits of the case. Id. at 1168-69. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court sufficiently 15 explained why the circumstances of the case were exceptional under § 1367(c)(4), agreeing with the 16 district court that “it would not be ‘fair’ to defendants and ‘an affront to the comity between federal 17 and state courts’ to allow plaintiffs to evade California’s procedural requirements by bringing their 18 claims in federal court.” Id. at 1171. The Court also affirmed the district court’s finding that the 19 balance of the Gibbs values—economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—provided compelling 20 reasons to decline supplemental jurisdiction, stating that “the district court [properly] analyzed Vo’s 21 situation under the Gibbs values and determined that the values of fairness and comity favored not 22 retaining jurisdiction over the claim.” Id. at 1172. Accordingly, “[g]iven these very real concerns, 23 in addition to the deferential standard of review, [the Ninth Circuit saw] no reason to hold that the 24 district court abused its discretion in determining there were compelling reasons to decline 25 jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim.” Id. 27 The Court begins with the first part of the two-step inquiry under § 1367(c)(4)—whether the 28 circumstances here are exceptional. Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. 1 As discussed above, California has enacted various requirements that apply to claims 2 alleging a construction-related accessibility violation. If the Court were to exercise jurisdiction over 3 Plaintiff’s state law claims, Plaintiff would be permitted to avoid these requirements. See Arroyo, 4 19 F.4th at 1213 (noting that potential evasion of California’s requirements met exceptional- 5 circumstances prong of § 1367(c)(4)). Further, such evasion would undermine California’s policy 6 interests in enforcing its requirements—providing monetary relief but limiting burdens on small 7 businesses and disincentivizing plaintiffs’ attorneys from obtaining “monetary settlements at the 8 expense of forward-looking relief that might benefit the general public.” Id. Plaintiff offers no 9 argument for why such circumstances should not be deemed exceptional, and there is “little doubt 10 that the first prong [under § 1367(c)(4)] is satisfied here.” Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. See also Garcia v. 11 Maciel, No. 21-CV-03743-JCS, 2022 WL 395316, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2022) (collecting cases). 12 Turning to the second part of the inquiry—whether there are other compelling reasons for 13 declining jurisdiction—the Court considers the Gibbs values of economy, convenience, fairness, 14 and comity. Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. Importantly, this case is an early stage of the litigation—none of 15 the defendants have appeared in this case—and thus, the merits of Plaintiff’s claims have not yet 16 been addressed. See Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1214 (noting that the Gibbs values did not support declining 17 supplemental jurisdiction where the case was at a “very late stage”). This is not a case “where it 18 makes no sense to decline jurisdiction . . . over a pendent state law claim that that court has 19 effectively already decided.” Id. Notably, Plaintiff makes no argument that the stage of this case 20 warrants exercising jurisdiction. 21 Moreover, considering the above discussion of California’s requirements for Unruh Act 22 claims, it would not be fair, nor would comity be served, by allowing Plaintiff’s state law claims to 23 proceed without the state court being able to enforce its policy interests as reflected in its various 24 procedural requirements. Id. at 1213 (noting “comity-based concerns that California’s policy 25 objectives in this area were being wholly thwarted” by plaintiffs being able to bring Unruh Act 26 claims in federal court). Plaintiff concedes in his response to the show cause order that he would 27 be considered a high-frequency litigant and would otherwise have to meet certain California 28 1 requirements, such as paying the $1,000 filing fee in state court.1 (Doc. 5 at 2 (“Plaintiff 2 acknowledges that he would be considered a high-frequency litigant under California law as he filed 3 more than ten construction-related accessibility claims in the twelve months preceding the filing of 4 the instant action.”).) 5 Plaintiff contends that requiring him to bring a second action in state court “would be 6 duplicative and would only increase the ultimate burden on the subject businesses, as Plaintiff would 7 be entitled to seek recovery of the additional attorney’s fees and costs spent bringing the second 8 action.” (Doc. 5 at 3.) As an initial matter, this argument assumes that Plaintiff will be successful 9 in this action. Even accepting such an assumption, the fact that the litigation could prove duplicative 10 or increase costs does not, in light of the other considerations, warrant retaining jurisdiction. As one 11 court has concluded, “if plaintiff legitimately seeks to litigate this action in a single forum, plaintiff 12 may dismiss this action and refile it in a state court in accordance with the requirements California 13 has imposed on such actions.” Garibay v. Rodriguez, No. CV 18-9187 PA (AFMX), 2019 WL 14 5204294, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2019). Moreover, it is California’s prerogative to impose a 15 heightened filing fee for high-frequency litigants to curb abuses of the Unruh Act at the risk of the 16 fee being ultimately paid by defendants. It would undermine comity and fairness were Plaintiff 17 permitted to proceed with his state law claims considering California’s policy concerns. 18 Accordingly, considering the two-step inquiry under § 1367(c)(4), the undersigned 19 concludes that this case presents “exceptional circumstances” such that “there are other compelling 20 reasons for declining [supplemental] jurisdiction” over Plaintiff’s state law claims. 22 The Court’s order to show cause (Doc. 4) is hereby DISCHARGED. For the reasons set 23 forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows: 24 1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) and Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022), 25 the Court DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act 26 claim and Plaintiff’s Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19955 and § 19959 claims; and 27 1 While the Court acknowledges Plaintiff’s concession, it need not determine whether he is in fact a high-frequency 28 litigant. Vo, 49 F.4th at 1174 (noting that court was not required to determine whether the plaintiff was in fact a high- 1 2. Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19955 and § 19959 claims be 2 DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 3 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 4 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen 5 (14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 6 objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 7 Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 8 specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 9 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11

12 Dated: December 18, 2024 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13

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