Escobedo v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMarch 8, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-00099
StatusUnknown

This text of Escobedo v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Escobedo v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Escobedo v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, (D. Ariz. 2024).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Renee Escobedo, No. CV-23-00099-PHX-SMB

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 At issue is the denial of Renee Escobedo’s Application for Social Security Disability 16 Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under the 17 Social Security Act (the “Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint, (Doc. 1), and an Opening 18 Brief, (Doc. 8), seeking judicial review of that denial. Defendant SSA filed an Answering 19 Brief, (Doc. 13), to which Plaintiff replied, (Doc. 14). After reviewing the parties’ briefs, 20 the Administrative Record, (Doc. 7), and the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) 21 decision, (Doc. 7-3 at 16–24), the Court will affirm the ALJ’s decision for the reasons 22 addressed herein. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiff protectively filed an Application for SSDI benefits in on August 18, 2017, 25 alleging disability beginning July 12, 2017. (Doc. 7-4 at 32.) Plaintiff’s claim was initially 26 denied on October 26, 2017. (Id.) After reconsideration, Plaintiff’s claim was again denied 27 on July 26, 2018. (Id.) A hearing was held before ALJ Allen Erickson on June 23, 2020. 28 (Id.) After considering the medical evidence and opinions, the ALJ determined that 1 Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 41.) Plaintiff appealed, and the SSA Appeals Council 2 remanded the decision to a different ALJ. (Doc. 7-3 at 16.) 3 A second hearing was then held before ALJ Ted Armbruster on October 19, 2021. 4 (Id.) After considering the medical evidence and opinions, he determined that Plaintiff 5 suffered from several medically determinable impairments but did not have a severe 6 impairment or combination of impairments. (Id. at 19.) The ALJ concluded that the 7 impairments did not significantly limit Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities, 8 and that therefore she was not disabled. (Id. at 23–24.) Thereafter, the Appeals Council 9 denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review of the ALJ’s decision—making it the SSA 10 Commissioner’s (the “Commissioner”) final decision—and this appeal followed. (Id. at 11 2–4.) 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 14 follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 15 proof on the first four steps, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett 16 v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether 17 the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If 18 so, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines 19 whether the claimant has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental 20 impairment. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. 21 Id. 22 At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination 23 of impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart 24 P of 20 C.F.R. pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to 25 be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the 26 claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant can 27 perform past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled, and 28 the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, which addresses 1 whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the claimant’s RFC, age, 2 education, and work experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. 3 Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. 4 An ALJ’s factual findings “shall be conclusive if supported by substantial 5 evidence.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019). The Court may set aside 6 the Commissioner’s disability determination only where it is not supported by substantial 7 evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 8 Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 9 to support a conclusion when considering the record as a whole. Id. Generally, “[w]here 10 the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports 11 the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 12 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, district 13 courts review only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. 14 Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Plaintiff solely argues that the ALJ erred by not considering her stroke or ejection 17 fracture to be a severe impairment. (Doc. 8 at 4–5.) Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not 18 fully or fairly evaluate the record on this issue. (Id.; Doc. 14 at 3.) The Commissioner 19 argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 13 at 2.) After 20 reviewing the administrative record, the Court agrees with the Commissioner. 21 Here, the ALJ began his analysis at step one. (Doc. 7-3 at 19.) The ALJ found that 22 while Plaintiff had engaged in substantial gainful activity, no further information, evidence 23 or medical records were submitted. (Id.) Therefore, the ALJ noted there was “some 24 question” as to the amount earned and the degree of activity performed. (Id.) Viewing this 25 in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the ALJ found that Plaintiff satisfied step one and 26 continued with the inquiry. (Id.) 27 At step two, the ALJ noted several medically determinable impairments, but found 28 that none of these impairments, either solely or in combination, significantly limited 1 Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work-related activities for twelve consecutive months. 2 (Id.) Therefore, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have a “severe” impairment and 3 ended his analysis. (Id. at 19–24.) 4 In making this determination, the ALJ appropriately relied on the medical evidence. 5 (Id.) Specifically, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, 6 persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent.” (Id. at 20.) 7 Moreover, the ALJ referenced that Plaintiff was treated conservatively, and that her 8 respiratory, cardiovascular, neurological and musculoskeletal exam findings were 9 minimal. (Doc. 7-3 at 21.) Lastly, the ALJ found the opinions of the state agency medical 10 consultants persuasive. (Id. at 23.) The ALJ noted that these examiners offered detailed 11 summaries of their findings, which were also consistent with the overall record and medical 12 evidence. (Id.) The ALJ further found that these findings were generally normal and did 13 not indicate any severe impairment. (Id.) Notably, his analysis included Plaintiff’s 14 complaints regarding the ejection fracture and her stroke. (Id. at 19–23.) These findings 15 directly contradict Plaintiff’s similar complaints in her brief. (See Doc. 8 at 4–5.) 16 Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision on this issue is supported by 17 substantial evidence. Orn, 495 F.3d at 630. 18 Plaintiff also argues that her ejection fracture may potentially meet the severity 19 criteria in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R.

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Orn v. Astrue
495 F.3d 625 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Richard Kennedy v. Carolyn W. Colvin
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Biestek v. Berryhill
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Tackett v. Apfel
180 F.3d 1094 (Ninth Circuit, 1999)

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Bluebook (online)
Escobedo v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/escobedo-v-commissioner-of-social-security-administration-azd-2024.