Escobedo v. Casa Corona Foods, Inc

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedMay 24, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-00590
StatusUnknown

This text of Escobedo v. Casa Corona Foods, Inc (Escobedo v. Casa Corona Foods, Inc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Escobedo v. Casa Corona Foods, Inc, (E.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 JOSE ESCOBEDO, 9 Case No. 1:24-cv-00590-KES-SKO Plaintiff, 10 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE v. 11 SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

CASA CORONA FOODS, INC. dba Casa 12 Corona, et al., 14 DAY DEADLINE 13 Defendants.

14 15 On May 16, 2024, Plaintiff Jose Escobedo (“Plaintiff”) filed his complaint against 16 Defendants Casa Corona Foods, Inc. dba Casa Corona; Casa Foods, Incorporation dba Casa Corona; 17 and Cedar Pointe Investors, LP (“Defendants”), alleging claims under the American with 18 Disabilities Act (“ADA”), California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), and California’s 19 Health and Safety Code. (Doc. 1). These claims stem from alleged barriers Plaintiff encountered 20 (such as excessive slopes and height changes) while he visited a facility owned, operated, or leased 21 by Defendants—Casa Corona. (See id.) 22 Based upon the Ninth Circuit opinion in Vo v. Choi, the Court will order Plaintiff to show 23 cause why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state 24 law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding the district 25 court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in a joint Unruh Act and ADA case). 26 In the Unruh Act, a state law cause of action expands the remedies available in a private 27 action. California, in response to the resulting substantial volume of claims asserted under the Unruh 28 Act and the concern that high-frequency litigants may be using the statute to obtain monetary relief 1 for themselves without accompanying adjustments to locations to assure accessibility to others, 2 enacted filing restrictions designed to address that concern. Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1211– 3 12 (9th Cir. 2021). These heightened pleading requirements apply to actions alleging a 4 “construction-related accessibility claim,” which California law defines as “any civil claim in a civil 5 action with respect to a place of public accommodation, including but not limited to, a claim brought 6 under Section 51, 54, 54.1, or 55, based wholly or in part on an alleged violation of any construction- 7 related accessibility standard.” Cal. Civ. Code § 55.52(a)(1). The requirements apply to claims 8 brought under the Unruh Act as well as to related claims under the California Health & Safety Code. 9 See Gilbert v. Singh, No. 1:21cv1338-AWI-HBK, 2023 WL 2239335, *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2023). 10 California imposes additional limitations on “high-frequency litigants,” defined as: 11 A plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately preceding the 12 filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation. 13 14 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(1). The definition of “high-frequency litigant” also extends to 15 attorneys. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(2). “High-frequency litigants” are subject to a 16 special filing fee and further heightened pleading requirements. See Cal. Gov. Code § 70616.5; Cal. 17 Civ. Proc. Code § 425.50(a)(4)(A). By enacting restrictions on the filing of construction-related 18 accessibility claims, California has expressed a desire to limit the financial burdens California’s 19 businesses may face for claims for statutory damages under the Unruh Act and the California Health 20 & Safety Code . See Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1206-07, 1212; Gilbert, 2023 WL 2239335, *2. The Ninth 21 Circuit has also expressed “concerns about comity and fairness” by permitting plaintiffs to 22 circumvent “California’s procedural requirements.” Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. Plaintiffs who file these 23 actions in federal court evade these limits and pursue state law damages in a manner inconsistent 24 with the state law’s requirements. See generally, Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211–12; Vo v, 49 F.4th at 25 1171–72. 26 In an action in which a district court possesses original jurisdiction, that court “shall have 27 supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such 28 original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 1 United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, 2 however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 3 § 1367(c). Such discretion may be exercised “[d]epending on a host of factors” including “the 4 circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing 5 state law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims.” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. 6 of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997). 7 A review of Plaintiff Jose Escobedo’s prior cases from this District reveals that he has filed 8 ten or more complaints alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the twelve- 9 month period immediately preceding the filing of the current complaint. See Jacobsen v. Mims, No. 10 1:13-CV-00256-SKO (HC), 2013 WL 1284242, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013) (“The Court may 11 take judicial notice of court records.”). 12 Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED to show cause, in writing, within fourteen (14) days 13 of service of this order, why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 14 over Plaintiff’s state law claims. Plaintiff is warned that a failure to respond may result in a 15 recommendation to dismiss of the entire action without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (stating that 16 dismissal is warranted “[i]f the plaintiff fails to . . . comply with . . . a court order”); see also Hells 17 Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005). An inadequate 18 response may result in the undersigned recommending that supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 19 state law claims be declined and that they be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 20 1367(c). 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22

23 Dated: May 23, 2024 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24

25 26 27 28

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Related

Rafael Arroyo, Jr. v. Carmen Rosas
19 F.4th 1202 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)

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Bluebook (online)
Escobedo v. Casa Corona Foods, Inc, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/escobedo-v-casa-corona-foods-inc-caed-2024.