UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOSÉ ESCOBAR MOLINA, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 25-3417
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs B.S.R., N.S., and R.S.M. are former and current D.C. residents with pending
asylum applications. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶¶ 3–5. Along with Plaintiff José Escobar
Molina, they allege that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested each of them
without a warrant and unlawfully detained them for anywhere from ten hours to four weeks. Id.
Plaintiffs now bring this class-action lawsuit challenging I.C.E.’s immigration-arrest policy,
which they describe as a practice of “indiscriminately arresting without warrants and without
probable cause District residents whom [I.C.E.] agents perceive to be Latino.” Id. at 1. B.S.R.,
N.S., and R.S.M. concurrently filed this Motion to proceed pseudonymously, contending that
public disclosure of their identities could subject them and their families to retaliation, abuse, and
harassment. See ECF No. 2 (Mot.). Relatedly, they also seek leave to file declarations related to
their Motion under seal. See ECF No. 10 (Mot. Decl.). The Court will grant both Motions.
I. Legal Standard
Generally, a complaint must identify the plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a);
LCVR 5.1(c)(1), 11.1. That requirement reflects the “presumption in favor of disclosure [of
1 litigants’ identities], which stems from the ‘general public interest in the openness of
governmental processes,’ and, more specifically, from the tradition of open judicial
proceedings.” In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Wash. Legal
Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). A party moving to
proceed pseudonymously thus “bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a concrete need
for such secrecy, and identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if forced to proceed
in its own name.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d 324, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2020). As a result, the court
must “‘balance the litigant’s legitimate interest in anonymity against countervailing interests in
full disclosure’” by applying a “flexible and fact driven” balancing test. Id. (quoting In re Sealed
Case, 931 F.3d at 96). That test assesses “five non-exhaustive factors”:
(1) whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter of a sensitive and highly personal nature; (2) whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting party or[,] even more critically, to innocent non-parties; (3) the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected; (4) whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and relatedly, (5) the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously.
Id. at 326–27 (cleaned up).
II. Analysis
At this stage, Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that their privacy interests
outweigh the public’s presumptive and substantial interest in learning their identities.
The first and second factors, taken together, support granting the Motion. Plaintiffs do
not seek to proceed under pseudonyms “merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may
attend any litigation,” but to “preserve privacy in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal
2 nature” and “avoid retaliatory physical or mental harm.” Id. at 326 (quoting In re Sealed Case,
931 F.3d at 97) (alteration in original). As asylum seekers, Plaintiffs allege that they could face
“grave danger” if persecutors in their countries of origin were to learn of their asylum claims
through this lawsuit. See Mot. at 4. As this Court has previously recognized, “[P]ublicly
associating plaintiffs with the details of their asylum claims put the plaintiffs and their family
members in their country of origin at risk of retaliatory physical harm.” Asylum Seekers Trying
to Assure Their Safety v. Johnson, 2023 WL 417910, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 26, 2023) (citing
Asylumworks v. Wolf, 2020 WL 13460835, at *8–9 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2020)). On the domestic
front, Plaintiffs argue that disclosure of their identities and immigration statuses would expose
them and their families to potential harassment and intimidation in the United States, citing
recent high-profile immigration cases where other litigants have faced similar abuse. Id. at 5–6.
In support of these contentions, Plaintiffs have filed declarations detailing the physical harm and
harassment they fear will unfold if their involvement in this lawsuit were to be revealed. See
ECF Nos. 10-2 (B.S.R. Decl.); 10-3 (N.S. Decl.); 10-4 (R.S.M. Decl.). Because Plaintiffs’
lawsuit implicates privacy concerns of a highly sensitive and personal nature, and because
disclosure carries a serious risk of harm for Plaintiffs and their families, the Court concludes that
the first two factors favor nondisclosure. See Mot. at 4.
As Plaintiffs concede, however, the third factor — “the ages of the persons whose
privacy interests are sought to be protected,” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326 (quoting In re
Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97) — weighs against pseudonymity because none of the Plaintiffs is a
minor.
When plaintiffs sue the government, which way the fourth factor cuts depends on the
relief that they seek. If they request programmatic relief that would “alter the operation of public
3 law both as applied to [them] and, by virtue of the legal arguments presented, to other parties
going forward,” then the “public interest” in their case “is intensified” and this factor cuts against
pseudonymity. In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 329. On the other hand, if plaintiffs seek only
individualized relief — say, a judgment that their visas were improperly delayed or that they
were unlawfully denied government benefits — then this factor favors pseudonymity. Doe v.
Blinken, No. 24-1629, ECF No. 3 (Blinken Op.) at 5 (D.D.C. June 11, 2024).
Here, Plaintiffs seek vacatur of Defendants’ arrest policies and a declaration that such
practices “violate 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2),” which amounts to programmatic relief. See Compl. at
30. Any ruling in their favor would “alter the operation of public law both as applied to [them]
and, by virtue of the legal arguments presented, to” all those who have been or will be subject to
Defendants’ arrest practices. In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 329.
This case nonetheless presents the “truly exceptional circumstances” that overcome the
presumption against pseudonymity even for programmatic relief. See Doe v. Hill, 141 F.4th
291, 300 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (“[T]hose who seek to alter public law by using the federal courts
must, in all but truly exceptional cases, reveal their identity.”) (citation omitted). As detailed
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOSÉ ESCOBAR MOLINA, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 25-3417
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs B.S.R., N.S., and R.S.M. are former and current D.C. residents with pending
asylum applications. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶¶ 3–5. Along with Plaintiff José Escobar
Molina, they allege that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested each of them
without a warrant and unlawfully detained them for anywhere from ten hours to four weeks. Id.
Plaintiffs now bring this class-action lawsuit challenging I.C.E.’s immigration-arrest policy,
which they describe as a practice of “indiscriminately arresting without warrants and without
probable cause District residents whom [I.C.E.] agents perceive to be Latino.” Id. at 1. B.S.R.,
N.S., and R.S.M. concurrently filed this Motion to proceed pseudonymously, contending that
public disclosure of their identities could subject them and their families to retaliation, abuse, and
harassment. See ECF No. 2 (Mot.). Relatedly, they also seek leave to file declarations related to
their Motion under seal. See ECF No. 10 (Mot. Decl.). The Court will grant both Motions.
I. Legal Standard
Generally, a complaint must identify the plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a);
LCVR 5.1(c)(1), 11.1. That requirement reflects the “presumption in favor of disclosure [of
1 litigants’ identities], which stems from the ‘general public interest in the openness of
governmental processes,’ and, more specifically, from the tradition of open judicial
proceedings.” In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Wash. Legal
Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). A party moving to
proceed pseudonymously thus “bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a concrete need
for such secrecy, and identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if forced to proceed
in its own name.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d 324, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2020). As a result, the court
must “‘balance the litigant’s legitimate interest in anonymity against countervailing interests in
full disclosure’” by applying a “flexible and fact driven” balancing test. Id. (quoting In re Sealed
Case, 931 F.3d at 96). That test assesses “five non-exhaustive factors”:
(1) whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter of a sensitive and highly personal nature; (2) whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting party or[,] even more critically, to innocent non-parties; (3) the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected; (4) whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and relatedly, (5) the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously.
Id. at 326–27 (cleaned up).
II. Analysis
At this stage, Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that their privacy interests
outweigh the public’s presumptive and substantial interest in learning their identities.
The first and second factors, taken together, support granting the Motion. Plaintiffs do
not seek to proceed under pseudonyms “merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may
attend any litigation,” but to “preserve privacy in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal
2 nature” and “avoid retaliatory physical or mental harm.” Id. at 326 (quoting In re Sealed Case,
931 F.3d at 97) (alteration in original). As asylum seekers, Plaintiffs allege that they could face
“grave danger” if persecutors in their countries of origin were to learn of their asylum claims
through this lawsuit. See Mot. at 4. As this Court has previously recognized, “[P]ublicly
associating plaintiffs with the details of their asylum claims put the plaintiffs and their family
members in their country of origin at risk of retaliatory physical harm.” Asylum Seekers Trying
to Assure Their Safety v. Johnson, 2023 WL 417910, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 26, 2023) (citing
Asylumworks v. Wolf, 2020 WL 13460835, at *8–9 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2020)). On the domestic
front, Plaintiffs argue that disclosure of their identities and immigration statuses would expose
them and their families to potential harassment and intimidation in the United States, citing
recent high-profile immigration cases where other litigants have faced similar abuse. Id. at 5–6.
In support of these contentions, Plaintiffs have filed declarations detailing the physical harm and
harassment they fear will unfold if their involvement in this lawsuit were to be revealed. See
ECF Nos. 10-2 (B.S.R. Decl.); 10-3 (N.S. Decl.); 10-4 (R.S.M. Decl.). Because Plaintiffs’
lawsuit implicates privacy concerns of a highly sensitive and personal nature, and because
disclosure carries a serious risk of harm for Plaintiffs and their families, the Court concludes that
the first two factors favor nondisclosure. See Mot. at 4.
As Plaintiffs concede, however, the third factor — “the ages of the persons whose
privacy interests are sought to be protected,” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326 (quoting In re
Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97) — weighs against pseudonymity because none of the Plaintiffs is a
minor.
When plaintiffs sue the government, which way the fourth factor cuts depends on the
relief that they seek. If they request programmatic relief that would “alter the operation of public
3 law both as applied to [them] and, by virtue of the legal arguments presented, to other parties
going forward,” then the “public interest” in their case “is intensified” and this factor cuts against
pseudonymity. In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 329. On the other hand, if plaintiffs seek only
individualized relief — say, a judgment that their visas were improperly delayed or that they
were unlawfully denied government benefits — then this factor favors pseudonymity. Doe v.
Blinken, No. 24-1629, ECF No. 3 (Blinken Op.) at 5 (D.D.C. June 11, 2024).
Here, Plaintiffs seek vacatur of Defendants’ arrest policies and a declaration that such
practices “violate 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2),” which amounts to programmatic relief. See Compl. at
30. Any ruling in their favor would “alter the operation of public law both as applied to [them]
and, by virtue of the legal arguments presented, to” all those who have been or will be subject to
Defendants’ arrest practices. In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 329.
This case nonetheless presents the “truly exceptional circumstances” that overcome the
presumption against pseudonymity even for programmatic relief. See Doe v. Hill, 141 F.4th
291, 300 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (“[T]hose who seek to alter public law by using the federal courts
must, in all but truly exceptional cases, reveal their identity.”) (citation omitted). As detailed
above, Plaintiffs’ participation in this litigation implicates their asylum applications and
immigration statuses during a period of intense public scrutiny of immigration matters. The
convergence of these privacy interests, concrete safety risks, and the sensitive nature of the
underlying personal information creates the type of “truly exceptional circumstances” that courts
have recognized may justify pseudonymous litigation even when programmatic relief is sought.
Id.
Finally, the last factor — whether letting Plaintiffs proceed pseudonymously would
prejudice Defendants — is not implicated because Defendants will know Plaintiffs’ identities.
4 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326 n.1 (explaining that this factor is “not implicated”
where defendant knows plaintiff’s identity); Doe v. ICE, No. 24-617, ECF No. 9 (Mem. Op.) at 5
(D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2024) (fifth factor supports motion where defendant already knows plaintiff’s
identity). Plaintiffs have stated that they “are prepared to disclose their true identities” to the
Defendants and the Court under seal. See Mot. at 7.
In sum, because the factors ultimately weigh in favor of permitting Plaintiffs to proceed
pseudonymously, the Court will grant the Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonyms. Similarly,
because Plaintiffs’ Declarations include their true names, the Court will also grant their Motion
for Leave to File Under Seal. The Court accordingly ORDERS that:
1. Plaintiffs’ [2] Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonyms is GRANTED, subject to any
further consideration by the United States District Judge to whom this case is
randomly assigned;
2. All parties shall use the pseudonyms listed in the Complaint in all documents filed in
this action;
3. Plaintiffs’ [10] Motion for Leave to File Document Under Seal is GRANTED and
deemed filed; and
4. Within seven days of this Order, Plaintiffs shall file a sealed declaration containing
their real names and residential addresses, which Defendants may access.
/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: October 1, 2025