ES Ex Rel. BS v. KATONAH-LEWISBORO SCHOOL

742 F. Supp. 2d 417, 2010 WL 3835008
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 30, 2010
Docket09 Civ. 4770
StatusPublished

This text of 742 F. Supp. 2d 417 (ES Ex Rel. BS v. KATONAH-LEWISBORO SCHOOL) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
ES Ex Rel. BS v. KATONAH-LEWISBORO SCHOOL, 742 F. Supp. 2d 417, 2010 WL 3835008 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

Opinion

742 F.Supp.2d 417 (2010)

E.S. and M.S. o/b/o B.S., Plaintiffs,
v.
KATONAH-LEWISBORO SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

No. 09 Civ. 4770.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

September 30, 2010.

*422 Giulia Frasca, Peter David Hoffman, Law Office of Peter D. Hoffman, PC, Katonah, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Mark Craig Rushfield, Shaw, Perelson, May & Lambert, LLP, Poughkeepsie, NY, for Defendant.

ORDER AND OPINION

LORETTA A. PRESKA, Chief Judge:

Plaintiffs, on behalf of their minor child, plaintiff student B.S., bring an action as against the defendant Katonah-Lewisboro School District ("the District" or "KLSD"), setting forth a claim for relief under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). Both parties have made motions for summary judgment, which is the common procedural method in an IDEA action to request that the Court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record.[1]

Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the decision of the Impartial Hearing Officer ("IHO")—affirmed by the New York State Review Officer ("SRO")—that the defendant District had provided B.S. with a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") in the least restrictive environment ("LRE") for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 school years and denied Plaintiffs' request for *423 tuition reimbursement for their unilateral placement of B.S. in a day program at the Maplewood School for those two school years. Defendants request that the Court affirm the decisions of the IHO and SRO. For the following reasons, the Court finds in favor of Plaintiffs for the 2007-2008 school year only, reverses the decisions of the IHO and SRO with respect to that year, and awards tuition reimbursement to Plaintiffs for the 2007-2008 school year.

I. Legal Standard under IDEA

The IDEA was enacted to promote the education of children with disabilities. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). Under the statute, "states receiving federal funds are required to provide `all children with disabilities' a `free appropriate public education [(FAPE)].'" Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A)); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034. To meet this requirement, the FAPE must provide "special education and related services" tailored to meet the unique needs of the particular child, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18), and be "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034.

The "centerpiece of the statute's education delivery system is the IEP [Individualized Education Plan], an educational program tailored to provide appropriate educational benefits to individual disabled students." Viola v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 414 F.Supp.2d 366, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quotation omitted). The IEP must be developed annually, by a "school official qualified in special education, the child's teacher, the child's parents, and, where appropriate, the child." Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir.1998) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20)). An IEP is "a written statement that `sets out the child's present education performance, establishes annual and short-term objectives for improvements in that performance, and describes the specially designed instruction and services that enable the child to meet those objectives.'" D.D. ex rel. V.D. v. N. Y. City Bd. of Educ., 465 F.3d 503, 508 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)).

The law is clear that a school district is not required to "furnish ... every special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child's potential," Rowley, 458 U.S. at 199, 102 S.Ct. 3034, but rather "fulfills its substantive obligations under the IDEA if it provides an IEP that is `likely to produce progress, not regression,' and if the IEP affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere `trivial advancement.'" Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 195 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130). Thus, the education provided must be "sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child," Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200, 102 S.Ct. 3034, but it need not "provide[] everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents." Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132 (quotation omitted).

Another requirement under IDEA is that "special education and related services must be provided in the least restrictive setting consistent with a child's needs" since the "law expresses a strong preference for children with disabilities to be educated, `to the maximum extent appropriate,' together with their non-disabled peers, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)." Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122 (2d Cir.1998).

In New York, responsibility for developing IEPs rests with local Committees *424 on Special Education ("CSEs"), the members of which are appointed by school boards or the trustees of school districts. Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 107. The CSE is required to consider four factors in developing an IEP: "(1) academic achievement and learning characteristics, (2) social development, (3) physical development, and (4) managerial or behavioral needs." Id. at 107-108. As discussed in Walczak, New York's regulations require that each child's IEP must identify a specific class placement, and noted:

Children may be grouped together in a special education class if they have "the same disabilities" or if they have "differing disabilities [but] ... similar individual needs for the purpose of being provided a special education program." 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.1(jj); see also 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.6(g)(3). Thus, the students in a class must have sufficiently similar academic levels and learning characteristics that each child will have the opportunity to achieve his or her annual goals. See 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.6(a) (3)(i). A CSE must also strive to "assure that the social interaction within the group is beneficial to each student, contributes to each student's social growth and maturity, and does not consistently interfere with the instruction being provided." 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.6(a)(3)(ii). Nevertheless, the regulation cautions that the "social needs of a student shall not be the sole determinant" of his or her class placement. See id.

Walczak, 142 F.3d at 123.

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