Ervin Domingo-Felipe v. Attorney General United States of America

Opinion

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-2870

ERVIN DOMINGO-FELIPE, PETITIONER V.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _____________________________ Appeal from Board of Immigration Appeals BIA-1: A216-370-963 Immigration Judge: Mary C. Lee

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, RESTREPO, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) June 9, 2026; Decided July 22, 2026 _____________________________

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION *

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Ervin Domingo-Felipe petitions for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order of removal. We will deny the

petition because the BIA and Immigration Judge (“IJ”) properly denied his application for

cancellation of removal.

I. BACKGROUND

Domingo-Felipe, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States on

June 19, 2007, without inspection. On June 23, 2017, the Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”) charged Domingo-Felipe as removable pursuant to Section

212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Domingo-Felipe

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b)(1), 1

arguing that his removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his

two children. 2

On January 27, 2021, the IJ denied Domingo-Felipe’s application for cancellation

of removal, finding that his removal would cause hardship to his children but that the

hardship was not “substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be

expected from the [removal] of [a noncitizen] with close family members here.” App. 14

(first alteration in original) (quoting In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (BIA

2001)).

On appeal to the BIA, Domingo-Felipe argued that the IJ erred because it did not

properly consider the totality of the circumstances, and he demonstrated that his removal

would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his children. App. 6. The

1 For cancellation of removal, an applicant must demonstrate: (1) continuous presence in the United States (“U.S.”) for no less than 10 years; (2) good moral character for 10 years; (3) no prohibited criminal convictions and; (4) that removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying U.S. citizen (“USC”) or Lawful Permanent Resident (“LPR”) spouse, parent, or child. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The IJ found that Domingo-Felipe was eligible under the first three requirements but failed to demonstrate the fourth prong. Accordingly, the IJ did not consider the merits of whether his application warranted an exercise of the court’s discretion. 2 Petitioner’s children are USCs and will remain in the U.S. in the event of Domingo- Felipe’s removal. The oldest child resides with his mother and Domingo-Felipe does not provide financial support for the child. The youngest child resides with both Domingo- Felipe and his undocumented mother who does not work, and the child receives public assistance in the form of WIC and Medicaid.

2 BIA dismissed the appeal, finding that the IJ properly considered all record evidence and

affirming the IJ’s hardship finding.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 3

Because the BIA “adopt[ed] the findings of the [IJ] and discusse[d] some of the

bases for the [IJ’s] decision,” we review both decisions. Saravia v. Att’y Gen., 905 F.3d

729, 734 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004)). Our

review of the IJ’s and the BIA’s applications of the “exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship” standard is deferential and is governed by the substantial-evidence standard.

Wilkinson v. Att’y Gen., 131 F.4th 134, 141–42 (3d Cir. 2025) (courts will uphold hardship

determinations “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary”).

III. DISCUSSION

Domingo-Felipe petitions this Court for review, challenging the IJ’s and BIA’s

hardship determinations and also arguing that the BIA’s reference to Mexico as the country

of removal undermines the agency’s decision. 4 Applying Wilkinson’s deferential

3 The BIA’s decision is a final order of removal. See Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186–87 (3d Cir. 2010). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to review the order. 4 The BIA mistakenly noted “if the respondent were removed from the United States to Mexico, we agree with the Immigration Judge that it does not rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”. App. 7. However, prior to this mistake, the BIA correctly identified Domingo-Felipe as a “native and citizen of Guatemala” and Guatemala as the country of removal. App. 6.

3 substantial-evidence standard, we find no error with respect to the IJ’s and BIA’s hardship

determinations. 131 F.4th at 140–42.

As the agencies correctly noted, the phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship” requires a showing of hardship that is “substantially beyond the ordinary

hardship that would be expected when a close family member leaves this country.” See In

re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 62 (citation modified). As Wilkinson explained,

this showing need not be “unconscionable, [but] it does limit relief to truly exceptional

situations.” 131 F.4th at 142 (internal quotation omitted). The record reflects that the IJ

considered the children’s age and lack of medical conditions as part of a broader,

cumulative hardship analysis that also included country conditions, Domingo-Felipe’s

employment prospects in Guatemala, and the impact of removal on family ties. See id. at

140–42 (finding that courts and agencies consider “the ages, health, and circumstances of

qualifying relatives” when evaluating hardship (internal quotations omitted)). The BIA

adopted the IJ’s reasoning and findings, and we agree.

With respect to the BIA’s reference to Mexico as the country of removal, we find

this error to be harmless. See Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011)

(remand is not required where agency error is harmless). When read in the context of the

BIA’s decision, the reference to “Mexico” does not warrant remand or otherwise

undermine the agency’s analysis, which previously identified Guatemala as the country of

removal, accurately described the procedural posture of the case, and “considered the

testimony of the respondent, and all the evidence of record.” App. 6–7.

*****

4 For the foregoing reasons, we will DENY the petition.