Ertz v. Murray

19 P.2d 1092, 142 Or. 219, 1933 Ore. LEXIS 249
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 24, 1933
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 19 P.2d 1092 (Ertz v. Murray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ertz v. Murray, 19 P.2d 1092, 142 Or. 219, 1933 Ore. LEXIS 249 (Or. 1933).

Opinion

KELLY, J.

For some time prior to September 17, 1927, The Bank of Freewater was actively engaged in business at Freewater, Umatilla county, Oregon. Two notes held by said bank had been disapproved by the bank examiner; and, to afford approved assets for said bank in lieu of those two notes, the defendants executed the note in suit, which is a joint and several note, dated September 17, 1927, to become due six months thereafter in the sum of $539 bearing interest at 8 per cent from date.

*220 In Ms amended complaint, plaintiff alleges the execution and delivery of said note; and further alleges:

“That thereafter and for valuable consideration, The Bank of Freewater, by and through its president, David Harris, duly transferred said note to the plaintiff herein who ever since that time has been and now is the holder and owner thereof”.

The execution of the note is admitted, but the transfer thereof is denied.

Plaintiff’s evidence in chief discloses that in May, 1930, at Portland, Oregon, plaintiff and David Harris made a trade. In this trade plaintiff received the note in suit and other property and as the consideration therefor plaintiff made a deed of conveyance to Mr. Harris of plaintiff’s interest in the Bungalow Court, the same being an apartment house in Portland.

It is admitted that Mr. Harris was then president of The Bank of Freewater.

The note bears the following endorsement:

“Pay to Chas. W. Ertz, without recourse on The Bank of Freewater, Freewater, Oregon, by David Harris, Pres.”

It is admitted that the signature thereto is that of Mr. Harris.

At the conclusion of plaintiff’s case in chief, defendants moved for an order of involuntary nonsuit, which was denied and an exception allowed.

The question is thus presented whether the foregoing evidence shows, or tends to show, that Mr. Harris was authorized by The Bank of Freewater to transfer the note in suit to plaintiff.

It will be noted that express authority from the board of directors or the stockholders of the bank is not shown. It is not disclosed that, at the time of the *221 transfer, Mr. Harris was the managing agent of said bank, or the custodian of its funds, or that said bank was then engaged- in business. It is shown that the transaction did not take place in the office or place of business of the bank, and it is shown that the consideration for the transfer passed to Mr. Harris individually. It is not shown that the bank ever received any part of it.

The cases cited by plaintiff upon this point are readily distinguishable from the case at bar.

State ex rel. Carroll, Auditor, v. Corning Savings Bank, 139 Iowa 338 (115 N. W. 937), is a case wherein it is shown that the transferring bank was actively engaged in-the banking business, the transferee was its correspondent bank, the president, who negotiated the transfer and made the endorsements in transferring the papers, “did not undertake to act for himself, but solely for the bank for which he was the chief executive officer”.

State Bank of Westport v. Magraw, Kerfoot & Co., 159 Minn. 153 (198 N. W. 422), recognizes the rule that the implied authority of the president of a bank to endorse negotiable paper of the bank is limited to the endorsement of such paper for the purposes of the bank. In that case, too, a provision of the bylaws is part of the record, to the effect that-—

“The president and cashier shall be responsible for all moneys, funds and valuables of the bank intrusted to their care by the board of directors, or which otherwise may come into their hands as president or cashier”.

In commenting upon the fact that the check given by the purchasing bank ran to Turrittin (the president) as payee and he was named in the sales bill of *222 the liberty bond, which constituted the remaining part of the consideration, as the one to whom it was sold, the court speaking through Mr. Justice Holt say:

“This merely relates to the manner of paying for the draft. It does not show that Turrittin intended to use what he obtained for his own purposes. Under the bylaw referred to, he was the custodian of the bank’s funds, and defendants, in dealing with him as such, were justified in paying for the draft in such medium and form as he might request, so long as it did not appear that he wrongfully sold the draft or was intending to appropriate the proceeds for his own use”.

In McDaniel v. Altoona State Bank et al., 126 Kan. 719 (271 P. 394), it appears that the president and cashier, whose authority is in question, were the active managing officers of the bank. This significant statement appears in the opinion:

“Even if the acts of the officers were ultra vires, the bank, having received the benefit of the transaction, is hardly in position to raise that question”.

In Schwehm v. Chelten Trust Co., 257 Pa. 76 (101 Atl. 93), the bylaws of the Federal Loan Society are in the record disclosing that the president was made the chief executive officer and the general active man-lager of the business of the company.

In People’s Bank of Belleville v. Manufacturers’ National Bank of Chicago, 101 U. S. 181 (25 L. Ed. 907), it appears that the defendant was the plaintiff’s correspondent at Chicago. The question there was as to the validity of a guaranty. The vice president, who was also one of the directors of defendant, with the knowledge and consent of the president and cashier of defendant, transmitted the notes and guaranty thereof to plaintiff. Thereupon the plaintiff’s account *223 with defendant was debited in the amount and on account of the notes. At the same time the maker’s paper in defendant’s hands was cancelled to the same amount.

We quote from that opinion:

“All the parties engaged in the transaction and the privies were agents of the defendant. If there were any defect of authority on their part, the retention and enjoyment of the proceeds of the transaction by their principal constituted an acquiescence as effectual as would have been the most formal authorization in advance, or the most formal ratification afterwards. These facts conclude the defendant from resisting the demand of the plaintiff”.

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Bluebook (online)
19 P.2d 1092, 142 Or. 219, 1933 Ore. LEXIS 249, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ertz-v-murray-or-1933.