Errick Lee Mitchell v. Commonwealth
This text of Errick Lee Mitchell v. Commonwealth (Errick Lee Mitchell v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Annunziata, Bumgardner and Frank Argued at Salem, Virginia
ERRICK LEE MITCHELL MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1373-01-3 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE Joseph W. Milam, Jr., Judge
Mark T. Williams (Williams, Morrison, Light and Moreau, on brief), for appellant.
Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
On March 19, 2001, the circuit court convicted Errick Lee
Mitchell of unlawful wounding, in violation of Code § 18.2-51,
and sentenced him to five years in the penitentiary, with one
year suspended. On appeal, Mitchell contends: (1) the trial
court erred in allowing a police officer to testify to the
out-of-court identification by the victim, arguing that the
testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay; and (2) the
erroneous ruling was not harmless error. For the following
reasons, we affirm his conviction.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. Background
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, the party prevailing below, together with
all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it. Ortega v.
Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 779, 786, 525 E.E.2d 623, 627 (2000)
(citing Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d
826, 831 (1997) (additional citation omitted)).
On November 18, 2000, Denise Farmer was visiting the home
of Roscoe Harris. During the early hours of November 19th,
Mitchell arrived at the house and asked to speak with Farmer.
Mitchell and Farmer stepped outside, and an argument ensued.
Mitchell then pulled a box cutter out of a case and cut Farmer
across her left arm. She tried to go back inside the house but
Mitchell threatened to cut her again.
Farmer told Mitchell that he had cut her "real bad."
Mitchell wrapped Farmer's wound in a sheet and accompanied her
to the hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital, Mitchell
instructed Farmer to go inside alone. He waited outside.
Police Officer Jacob Sparks questioned Farmer at the hospital
about her wound and the circumstances surrounding its
infliction. Farmer told him that Mitchell had cut her and was
waiting outside. Officer Sparks brought Mitchell into the
hospital and asked Farmer if he was the individual who had cut
her. Farmer responded that he was.
- 2 - At trial, Farmer testified on direct examination that
Mitchell was the individual who had cut her with the box cutter.
Over Mitchell's hearsay objection, Officer Sparks testified
that, when he brought Mitchell into the hospital, he asked
Farmer if Mitchell "had anything to do with her [injury]."
Officer Sparks testified that Farmer responded, "That's the man
who cut me." After he objected to Officer Sparks' testimony,
Mitchell testified about the officer's conversation with Farmer,
and stated Farmer identified him in response to Officer Sparks'
question.
Analysis
Mitchell argues on appeal that we should reverse his
conviction because the trial court admitted inadmissible
testimony from a police officer regarding an out-of-court
identification by the victim. He contends that the testimony is
only admissible as rebuttal evidence when the in-court
identification is equivocal. See Niblett v. Commonwealth, 217
Va. 76, 82-83, 225 S.E.2d 391, 395 (1976). Since the victim
made an unequivocal in-court identification of Mitchell at trial
and no challenge to this identification was raised, Mitchell
argues the police officer's testimony of the out-of-court
identification was inadmissible. Finally, the Commonwealth
asserts than any error in the admissibility of the officer's
testimony was harmless. We find that Mitchell waived his
- 3 - objection to the Commonwealth's hearsay evidence and affirm on
that ground.
When "an accused unsuccessfully objects to evidence which
he considers improper and then on his own behalf introduces
evidence of the same character, he thereby waives his
objection." Saunders v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 399, 401, 177
S.E.2d 637, 638 (1970); see also Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 243
Va. 1, 9, 413 S.E.2d 875, 879 (1992) (waiving the appellant's
objection to Commonwealth's reconstructed opinion evidence of
vehicle's speed because appellant submitted similar
reconstructed opinion evidence).
Here, Mitchell waived any objection he had to the
Commonwealth's out-of-court identification hearsay evidence
since he introduced the same evidence in his own testimony.
Mitchell testified that the police officer asked the victim, "Do
you recognize . . . do you know him" and that she had stated,
"Yeah that's the guy who cut me." Having testified to the same
hearsay statement that he objected to, Mitchell thus waived his
objection to the evidence. See id.
Affirmed.
- 4 -
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