Ernest Pedro Romero v. Asif Mahmood

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
• Decided: April 30, 2026
• Docket: 01-25-00949-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued April 30, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00949-CV ——————————— ERNEST PEDRO ROMERO, Appellant V. ASIF MAHMOOD, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1261633

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal arises from a forcible detainer action initiated in Justice Court by

Appellee Asif Mahmood against Appellant Ernest Pedro Romero. The Justice Court

entered a final judgment in favor of Mahmood and Romero appealed to County Court. After a de novo bench trial, the County Court awarded Mahmood possession

of the subject property.

Romero, pro se, filed a notice of appeal challenging the County Court’s final

judgment of possession. Mahmood argues the appeal should be dismissed because

there is no longer a justiciable controversy between the parties. Romero vacated the

subject property and Mahmood has regained possession. The appeal is thus moot.

We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Forcible Detainer Action

As a threshold matter, we must consider whether the issue of possession has

become moot and whether we have subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal.

Strange v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. as Tr. for Registered Holders of Long Beach

Mortg. Loan Tr. 2004-4, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-4, No. 01-23-

00575-CV, 2024 WL 1862860, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 30, 2024,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating appellate courts “lack subject matter jurisdiction to

decide a moot controversy”).

If a defendant in a forcible entry and detainer action does not file a supersedeas

bond following an adverse judgment, the judgment “may be enforced and a writ of

possession may be executed, evicting the defendant from the property.” Id. at *2

(quoting Richardson v. Daka Investments, LLC, No. 02-20-00360-CV, 2021 WL

4621762, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 7, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)). After

2 eviction, an appeal from a forcible entry and detainer action becomes moot. Id. at

*2, 5 (holding after eviction, appeal was moot and dismissal was warranted because

appellate court lacked jurisdiction); De La Garza v. Riverstone Apartments, No. 04-

06-00732-CV, 2007 WL 3270769, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 7, 2007, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (“When possession changes hands and there is no basis for a claim

of right to possession, the issue of possession becomes moot.”) (citing Marshall v.

Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006)).

An evicted appellant, however, may still pursue an appeal if he advances “a

potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the property.”

Strange, 2024 WL 1862860, at *4; see also Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787 (holding

that appellant giving up possession of premises did not moot appellant’s appeal in

forcible detainer action “so long as appellate relief was not futile; that is, so long as

[appellant] held and asserted a potentially meritorious claim of right to current,

actual possession” of premises); Gallien v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 01-

07-00075-CV, 2008 WL 4670465, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 23,

2008, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.) (“If the evicted party claiming possession has a

potentially meritorious claim to possess the residential premises, [] displacement by

eviction does not render the appeal moot.”).

3 Motion to Dismiss

In his motion to dismiss, Mahmood explains that following entry of final

judgment, he requested a writ of possession. The writ of possession was executed,

and Romero was removed from the property. In response to Mahmood’s motion to

dismiss, Romero does not dispute that he is no longer in possession of the property.

We must thus dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction unless he has asserted a

potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the property.

See Holloway v. Revelstoke Venture, LLC, No. 02-23-00375-CV, 2024 WL 191221,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 18, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Because

[appellant] no longer has possession of the property, h[is] appeal is moot, and we

have no jurisdiction over h[is] appeal.”).1

A meritorious defense can be established only when a potential right to

possession is established. See, e.g., Barnes v. Stone Way Ltd. P’ship, 330 S.W.3d

925, 929 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, no pet.) (holding meritorious defense

established by appellant’s allegations that apartment owner violated lease, as well as

state and federal law, including federal regulation that forbids owner from

1 A forcible detainer judgment “is a final determination only ‘of the right to immediate possession;’ it is not ‘a final determination of whether the eviction is wrongful’ or whether the tenant’s continued possession was a trespass.” Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 919 (Tex. 2013) (citing and quoting Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006)).

4 terminating or refusing to renew lease of housing procured with government-

subsidized funds, with certain exceptions, and by retaliating against her, the latter of

which is “an absolute defense” to eviction suit); Kennedy v. Andover Place

Apartments, 203 S.W.3d 495, 497 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.)

(holding meritorious defense established when tenant had basis for claiming current

right to possession because landlord was required to show good cause to terminate

lease, and landlord did not present evidence of good cause).

Romero does not advance a meritorious claim of right to current, actual

possession of the property. Romero contends that there are “[c]ollateral legal

consequences arising from the judgment preserv[ing] a live controversy between the

parties,” but he does not identify any such consequences, nor does he cite any

authorities to support his argument. Romero also states that he sought to supplement

the appellate record with “relevant” material, but he fails to identify the material or

explain how this material would be relevant to the question of possession.

In short, none of Romero’s arguments raise a meritorious defense to

Mahmood’s right to possession of the property. Romero’s appeal from the trial

court’s final judgment of possession is thus moot. See Holloway v. Revelstoke

Venture, LLC, 2024 WL 191221, at *2 (dismissing appeal as moot where appellant

no longer in possession of property and did not raise meritorious claim of right to

possession).

5 Because the issue of possession is moot, we must dismiss the appeal and

vacate the trial court’s final judgment of possession. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at

785 (holding that when appeal of forcible detainer action becomes moot, proper

course is to dismiss appeal and vacate lower court’s judgment of possession).

Conclusion

We grant Mahmood’s motion to dismiss. We dismiss the appeal and vacate

the trial court’s judgment of possession.2

Veronica Rivas-Molloy Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.

2 All other pending motions are dismissed as moot.