Ernest McDonald v. United States

D.C. Circuit

Ernest McDonald v. United States

284 F.2d 232, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 98, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 3409

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedNovember 3, 1960

Docket15782

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 284 F.2d 232 (Ernest McDonald v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ernest McDonald v. United States, 284 F.2d 232, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 98, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 3409 (D.C. Cir. 1960).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was indicted for first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder. One Davis shot and killed one Jenkins. Testimony regarding appellant’s participation was in dispute. There was evidence that appellant and Davis engaged in a violent scuffle with Jenkins, and that after Davis had fired one shot appellant held Jenkins while Davis fired another.

The court did not charge the jury on the presumption of innocence. This was error. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481; Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 51-52, 17 S.Ct. 235, 41 L.Ed. 624. The charge on reasonable doubt did not dispense with the necessity of charging on burden of proof. The court did not define “malice aforethought” which is an element of second degree murder. D.C. Code (1951) § 22-2403. There was no charge on involuntary manslaughter. Trial counsel, who was not appellant’s present counsel, did not request these changes, but we think their omission was plain error. It follows that appellant’s conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant was indicted for first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder. One Davis shot and killed one Jenkins. Testimony regarding appellant’s participation was in dispute. There was evidence that appellant and Davis engaged in a violent scuffle with Jenkins, and that after Davis had fired one shot appellant held Jenkins while Davis fired another.

The court did not charge the jury on the presumption of innocence. This was error. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481; Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 51-52, 17 S.Ct. 235, 41 L.Ed. 624. The charge on reasonable doubt did not dispense with the necessity of charging on burden of proof. The court did not define “malice aforethought” which is an element of second degree murder. D.C. Code (1951) § 22-2403. There was no charge on involuntary manslaughter. Trial counsel, who was not appellant’s present counsel, did not request these changes, but we think their omission was plain error. It follows that appellant’s conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

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284 F.2d 232, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 98, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 3409, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ernest-mcdonald-v-united-states-cadc-1960.

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