Ernest Joseph Longhini, III v. Ryan Thornell, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: June 18, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00785
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Ernest Joseph Longhini, III, No. CV-24-00785-PHX-DJH

10 Petitioner, ORDER

11 v.

12 Ryan Thornell, et al.,

13 Respondents. 14 15 Before the Court is Petitioner Ernest Longhini’s Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief 16 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and United States Magistrate Judge Camile M. 17 Bibles’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending denial of the same 18 (Doc. 18). Petitioner subsequently filed Objections (Doc. 27) to the Magistrate Judge’s 19 R&R. Respondents have not responded and the time to do so has expired. Petitioner also 20 seeks status updates on his case (Docs. 28 & 29). The Court overrules Petitioner’s 21 objections and will adopt the R&R as the Order of this Court. 22 I. Legal Standards 23 This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 24 recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court 25 “must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection 26 is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 27 2003) (en banc). Indeed, the Court is not required to conduct “any review at all. . . of any 28 issue that is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); 1 see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 2 II. Discussion 3 Petitioner argues four grounds for relief in his federal habeas Petition. He 4 contends (1) his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers was violated when he 5 was unable to question the victims; (2) his right to Due Process was violated because he 6 was unable to present a defense of guilty except insane under A.R.S. § 13-502; (3) that he 7 was denied effective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to raise the guilty 8 except insane defense; and (4) that his constitutional right to enter into a plea knowingly 9 and voluntarily was violated when he was not apprised of the ability to put forth a guilty 10 except insane defense. (Doc. 1 at 13). The R&R recommends that each claim be denied. 11 (Doc. 18). Petitioner’s objections are addressed below in turn. 12 A. Sixth Amendment Right to Confront Victims 13 Magistrate Judge Bibles concluded that Petitioner had waived his Sixth 14 Amendment claim by knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty. (Doc. 18 at 16 (“A 15 federal habeas claim based on the deprivation of a constitutional right, other than a 16 jurisdictional claim, which violation is alleged to have occurred prior to the entry of the 17 petitioner’s guilty plea, is waived by the entry of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.”). 18 In doing so, she specifically rejected the argument Petitioner advanced in his reply brief 19 that his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers was “a non-existent right” that 20 could not be waived when he pled guilty. (Doc. 18 at 18). She explained that 21 Petitioner’s right to confront the victims was “in effect prior to his criminal proceedings” 22 and thus was waived by his subsequent entry of a guilty plea. (Id.) She also 23 distinguished Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Ducey, 638 F. Supp. 3d 1048 (D. 24 Ariz. 2022), cited by Petitioner, noting that the case only applied to the First Amendment 25 rights of criminal defense attorneys and was, in any event, no longer good law. (Id. citing 26 Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Mayes, 127 F.4th 104, 112–13 (9th Cir. 2025) 27 (reversing and remanding)). 28 In his Objection, Petitioner says the R&R erred in finding the district court’s 1 decision in Arizona Attorneys for Justice v. Ducey irrelevant and says despite its 2 subsequent reversal by the Ninth Circuit, it should still control his case. 3 The Court disagrees with Petitioner. First, this Court was never bound by the 4 holding in Arizona Attorneys for Justice. United States District Court rulings like 5 Arizona Attorneys for Justice are only ever persuasive authority on other federal courts, 6 including other district courts. In contrast, United States Court of Appeals rulings from 7 each circuit are binding on the district courts in the same circuit. In its 2025 decision, the 8 Ninth Circuit reversed the Arizona district court’s holding in Arizona Attorneys for 9 Justice that found that A.R.S. § 13-4433 was an unconstitutional restraint of criminal 10 defense attorneys’ First Amendment rights. The district court order is therefore no longer 11 persuasive law. Moreover, even if the district court decision that was reversed by the 12 Ninth Circuit could be considered good law, the Court also agrees with Judge Bibles that 13 the case is irrelevant to Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim. Arizona Attorneys for 14 Justice addressed the First Amendment rights of criminal defense attorneys, not Sixth 15 Amendment rights of criminal defendants like Petitioner. These objections are overruled. 16 B. Inability to Present Defense of Guilty Except Insane Defense 17 Petitioner claims that he was denied due process when he was unable to present a 18 defense of guilty except insane. Petitioner presented this claim to the Arizona Court of 19 Appeals in his post-conviction action, asserting his right to due process was violated 20 because “there is more than enough evidence to support the defense of ‘Guilty except 21 Insane’ set out in A.R.S. §13-502.” (Doc. 13-1 at 308, 325). In that action, Petitioner 22 argued he “had a Constitutional right [to] have this defense presented in his case.” (Id.) 23 The appellate court denied relief and found “[t]he superior court did not abuse its 24 discretion when it found Petitioner waived this issue by pleading guilty. A plea 25 agreement waives all nonjurisdictional defenses, errors, and defects that occurred prior to 26 the plea. . . Thus, we deny relief on this issue.” State v. Longhini, 2022 WL 17684887, at 27 *1–4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec 15, 2022). 28 On federal habeas review, Judge Bibles concluded that Petitioner could not show 1 that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Petitioner had waived his due process 2 claim by pleading guilty was clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 3 clearly established federal law. (Doc. 18 at 20). She found that Petitioner could not meet 4 his burden of establishing that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, and said he failed 5 to cite to any authority showing that a similar Sixth Amendment right is not waived by 6 pleading guilty. (Id.) 7 In his Objection, Petitioner contends, without citation to controlling authority, that 8 guilty except insane proceedings are considered post-trial proceedings under Arizona law 9 and therefore are exempt from the plea waiver. (Doc. 27 at 6). He also contends that 10 “the magistrate’s application of [Harrington v. Richter and Tallett v. Henderson] is 11 misguided.” (Id. at 9). 12 Federal review of a state prisoner’s grounds for habeas relief is highly deferential 13 when the same grounds for relief have been rejected by the state court. In such 14 circumstances, a federal habeas court can only grant relief if the petitioner shows the state 15 court’s decision denying the claim “was contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of 16 federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court at 17 the time of the state court decision, or the petitioner establishes that the decision “was 18 based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 19 the State court proceeding.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97-98 (2011). See also 20 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 21 Through this lens, the R&R assessed the state court’s decision on Petitioner’s due 22 process claim and found that he had not met his burden of showing that the state court’s 23 decision that he had waived his right to make this claim when he pled guilty was contrary 24 to any controlling law. Petitioner’s objections do not show error in this conclusion. His 25 argument that guilty except insane proceedings are post-trial proceedings under Arizona 26 law and therefore are exempt from the plea waiver is unsupported by authority and only 27 gleaned from Petitioner’s own novel and protracted interpretation how the defense can be 28 substantiated under Arizona law. When the Supreme Court’s precedents do not “squarely 1 address” the petitioner’s situation or give a “clear answer to the question presented,” 2 federal habeas relief must be denied because the state’s decision cannot be found to be an 3 unreasonable application of “clearly established” federal law as expounded by the United 4 States Supreme Court. E.g., Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122–23 (2009); 5 Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 20, 125–26 (2008). 6 Petitioner also objects to the R&R’s citations to Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 7 86, 97-98 (2011) and Tollett v. Hendersen, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) and distinguishes the 8 factual situations in those cases from Petitioner’s own. (See e.g., Doc. 27 at 9 (saying 9 Tollett “has no relevance to the instant proceedings nor does it address such a post- 10 conviction challenge to proceedings that encompass several different points in the 11 criminal justice process”) and 10 (saying “similar logic applies” as to the inapplicability 12 of Hendersen “since Petitioner has now established that the proceeding for which is 13 challenging is not in fact a due process claim that can be waived via a plea agreement”). 14 Petitioner says “the issue in this case turns on the determination of whether the 15 establishment of a guilty except insane defense under Arizona law is waived by a guilty 16 plea, even though it encompasses proceedings post-verdict.” But the R&R did not err in 17 its reliance on these cases, which it cited for general propositions that apply despite the 18 specific factual differences between Petitioner’s case and those cases. 19 These objections are also overruled. 20 C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 21 Petitioner argued before the Arizona Court of Appeals that he was denied his right 22 to effective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure “to raise the guilty except insane 23 defense during pretrial proceedings.” (Doc. 1 at 13). The Arizona appellate court 24 concluded that the claim lacked merit: Petitioner could neither substantiate his assertion 25 that his counsel “failed to ‘find’ A.R.S. § 13-502 or that the result ‘would have been 26 different’ had counsel presented the affirmative defense of guilty except insane under 27 A.R.S. § 13-502.” (Doc. 18 at 21). The Arizona court said the only evidence in the 28 record that supported Petitioner’s claim of a “mental defect” was “a 2018 psychologist’s 1 report prepared at the request of Petitioner’s trial counsel.” (Doc. 18 at 21). The court 2 found stated that contrary to a suggestion of deficiency, 3 the psychologist’s report. . . shows counsel investigated Petitioner’s mental health as part of counsel’s investigation of potential defenses to the charges. 4 The superior court found Petitioner competent after a Rule 11 evaluation by 5 two medical professionals. Petitioner’s counsel later filed a motion for a court-appointed expert to evaluate Petitioner’s mental health for possible 6 mitigation purposes and ‘to meet the state’s allegations.’ The superior 7 court granted the motion and ordered that counsel be provided funds to retain an expert. Counsel retained a psychologist that evaluated Petitioner 8 over three different dates and later prepared a report for counsel. 9 The psychologist’s report does not suggest that the result after trial “would have been different.” The report addresses Petitioner’s “emotional 10 and social deficiencies” at length, but nowhere in the report does the 11 psychologist express the opinion or otherwise suggest that, at the times Petitioner committed the offenses, Petitioner “was afflicted with a mental 12 disease or defect of such severity that [Petitioner] did not know the criminal act was wrong,” i.e., that Petitioner was legally insane. A.R.S. § 13-502(A); 13 see also State v. Malone, 247 Ariz. 29, 31, ¶ 8 (2019) (noting that under 14 Arizona law a mental disease or defect that does not rise to legal insanity is not admissible to challenge the mens rea of a charged offense). 15 (Doc. 18 at 21–22). 16 On federal habeas appeal, Judge Bibles found that Petitioner had failed to establish 17 that the state appellate court’s conclusion that counsel did not provide deficient 18 performance was unreasonable. (Doc. 18 at 24). She also found that Petitioner could not 19 show that the state court’s conclusion that Petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel’s 20 advice to take the plea rather than proceed to trial and assert a defense of guilty but 21 insane was unreasonable. (Id. at 25). 22 Petitioner objects to the R&R’s reliance on Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958 23 (9th Cir. 2006). Petitioner says unlike his case, Weaver “did not rely on any, let alone a 24 significant background of development and mental health issues.” (Doc. 27 at 12). He 25 also says the case is distinguishable because of differences between Arizona and Oregon 26 criminal procedures, the former which “has a multi-step process for pleading the 27 affirmative defense of guilty except insane.” (Id.) The R&R cited to Weaver as an 28 example of a case where the court found that the plaintiff could not establish Strickland 1 prejudice where the plaintiff’s proposed defense was unlikely to succeed or Strickland 2 deficient performance where the plea agreement was advantageous to the defendant and 3 where there was substantial evidence of guilt. (Doc. 18 at 25). The case was not 4 analogized factually but cited for general propositions. As the case law instructs, Judge 5 Bibles assessed the particular circumstances and facts of this case (see Doc. 18 at 23–25) 6 in reaching her well-reasoned conclusions. See also Woods v. Etherton, 578 U.S. 113, 7 117 (2016) (“When the claim at issue is one for ineffective assistance of counsel. . . 8 AEDPA review is ‘doubly deferential”). Moreover, the Court agrees with those 9 conclusions. This objection is overruled. 10 D. Knowing and Voluntary Plea 11 Petitioner argued before the state court that his plea was defective because his 12 attorney failed to make him aware of the possibility of a guilty-except-insane defense. 13 (Doc. 18 at 26). The state court rejected that claim on the merits because it was 14 unsubstantiated and because Petitioner could not show that but for his attorneys’ errors 15 there was a reasonable probability he would not have pled guilty and insisted on going to 16 trial. (Id.) In concluding that the state court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to or 17 an unreasonable application of federal law, the R&R stated in part that “[t]he Supreme 18 Court’s decisions do not suggest that a conscious waiver is necessary for each potential 19 defense relinquished by a guilty plea” and cited to United States v. Chavez-Diaz, 949 20 F.3d 1202 (2020) and United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989). 21 Petitioner objects to the R&R’s “heavy reliance” on Chavez-Diaz and Broce, and 22 distinguishes them factually and procedurally. (Doc. 27 at 14–15). Petitioner says that 23 “the term ‘knowing’ as established by the United States Supreme Court implies that the 24 petitioner would have had at least some conversation about possible defenses, and at the 25 time of plea negotiations, should have included advice about the waiver of GEI.” (Id. at 26 15). He says that because this was his “only foreseeable trial defense, counsel’s failure to 27 discuss it constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Id.) 28 Petitioner’s objections are overruled. First, Petitioner again fails to show how he 1 || substantiated to the state court his claim that he was unaware of the defense or that he || would have rejected the plea if he had known of it. Second, Petitioner fails to cite to any || controlling case law that says a plea is only considered knowing when trial counsel has 4|| discussed a guilty except insane defense with a defendant prior to plea negotiations. On 5 || habeas review, Petitioner has the obligation to show that the state court’s denial of relief 6 || was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. The R&R correctly found 7 || that Petitioner had failed to meet his burden here. 8 Accordingly, 9 IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Objections (Doc. 27) are OVERRULED and the R&R (Doc. 18) is ADOPTED as the Order of the Court in its entirety. Petitioner’s 11 || Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) is DENIED. || Petitioner’s Motions for Status (Docs. 28 & 29) seeking updates on this case are 13 || GRANTED, as stated in this Order. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING a requires for a certificate of 15 || appealability because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 16 || constitutional right. 17 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall terminate this 18 |} action and enter judgment accordingly. 19 Dated this 18th day of June, 2026. 20

22 norable'Diang4. Hunietewa 3 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28

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