Erna Dwirapita v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 14, 2025
• Docket: 17-72215
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 14 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERNA DWIRAPITA, No. 17-72215

Petitioner, Agency No. A099-357-555

v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 7, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: NGUYEN and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT,*** District Judge.

Erna Dwirapita, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of the

decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her motion to reopen

her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States Senior District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation. Against Torture. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen under the

“highly deferential” abuse of discretion standard and reverse only if the BIA acted

“arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32

F.4th 696, 703 (9th Cir. 2022). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we

deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Dwirapita’s motion as

untimely because she failed to show materially changed country conditions.

Although an applicant generally must move to reopen within 90 days of the final

administrative decision, she may seek reopening at any time “based on changed

country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is

material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at

the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)–(ii); 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). “[T]he changed country conditions exception is concerned with

two points in time: the circumstances of the country at the time of the petitioner’s

previous hearing, and those at the time of the motion to reopen.” Salim v. Lynch,

831 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016). To satisfy this exception, the petitioner must

present evidence of worsening country conditions “‘qualitatively different’ from”

that submitted in her previous application. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987

(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004)).

Where the record already reflects significant mistreatment of the relevant group,

2 “generalized evidence suggesting a relatively high level of mistreatment and abuse”

is inadequate. Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2014). A change “need not

be ‘dramatic’” to establish worsening conditions, Reyes-Corado v. Garland, 76 F.4th

1256, 1262 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Joseph v. Holder, 579 F.3d 827, 833 (7th Cir.

2009)), but evidence that merely describes current conditions is not sufficient to

show change, see Rodriguez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 2021).

Dwirapita filed her motion to reopen five years after the final agency decision,

and she has not shown materially changed conditions relative to her previous

application. She argues that worsening risks of terrorism and violence by extremist

Islamic groups against Indonesian Christians like herself constitute materially

changed conditions. Nevertheless, her new evidence of the risk posed by domestic

terrorist groups almost exactly mirrors that in her original application. Similarly,

her evidence regarding ISIS fails to demonstrate “changed country conditions”

because it reflects that (1) Indonesia continues to face the same risk of religiously

motivated terrorism discussed in her previous application; and (2) the Indonesian

government has made efforts to respond to any risk from ISIS. Rodriguez, 990 F.3d

at 1210 (citing Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 989). These general reports that conditions

have remained the same for Christians in Indonesia are insufficient to demonstrate

material change. See id. (citing Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 989). Accordingly,

Dwirapita did not meet her burden to establish materially changed country

3 conditions, and the BIA acted within its discretion to deny her motion as untimely.

PETITION DENIED.