COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges O’Brien, Russell and Senior Judge Haley Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia
ERMIAS SAMSON MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0528-16-4 JUDGE MARY GRACE O’BRIEN MAY 2, 2017 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA Lisa B. Kemler, Judge
Brian E. Conaway (Rifkind Patrick LLC, on brief), for appellant.
Katherine Quinlan Adelfio, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Ermias Samson (“appellant”) was convicted of possession with intent to sell marijuana in
violation of Code § 18.2-248.1(a)(2). He appeals his conviction, asserting that “[t]he circuit court
erroneously prohibited [him] from introducing exculpatory fingerprint [evidence] under an
incorrect reading of Code of Virginia § 19.2-187.”
BACKGROUND
On April 1, 2015, Officer Jansen Adkins was patrolling the 400 block of North Armistead
Street. Officer Adkins noticed a parked vehicle with two occupants in the parking lot of an
apartment complex. He circled the parking lot, waited in the back of the complex for ten
minutes, and drove around again. Officer Adkins observed the same two individuals in the
vehicle.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. As Officer Adkins walked toward the vehicle, the person in the driver’s seat stepped out of
the car and walked away. The officer approached the passenger side and noticed rolling papers in
the driver’s seat. Appellant, who was sitting in the passenger seat, opened the door, and the
officer immediately smelled a strong odor of marijuana. Officer Adkins observed a white plastic
bag between appellant’s feet. He asked appellant for the bag, but appellant “refused to touch it
and then purposely moved out of the way of it, and stated several times that he didn’t want to
touch it.” The officer searched the vehicle and found that the white plastic bag contained smaller
individual baggies of marijuana. During his search of appellant, Officer Adkins also found a
Ziploc bag containing marijuana, three cell phones, and seven dollars.
Appellant was indicted for possession with intent to sell marijuana. On November 10, 2015,
immediately before the commencement of a jury trial for the offense, the Commonwealth moved to
prohibit appellant from introducing a certificate of analysis from the Virginia Department of
Forensic Science for fingerprint testing that was performed on the white plastic bag and the
baggies found inside. The Commonwealth had provided the certificate to appellant prior to trial
as exculpatory evidence, because the testing indicated that the fingerprints on the bags belonged
to the driver of the vehicle, not appellant.
During the motion, the Commonwealth explained that although the certificate was
provided to appellant, the Commonwealth did not subpoena the forensic scientist because the
analysis did not contain helpful information for the prosecution. The Commonwealth also did
not file the certificate with the clerk’s office because it did not intend to introduce it at trial.
Appellant acknowledged that he did not file the certificate with the clerk prior to trial.
The court held that pursuant to Code § 19.2-187, “unless the certificate was filed seven
days before . . . then under the statute, it’s not admissible, by either party,” and granted the
-2- Commonwealth’s motion to exclude the certificate. The jury found appellant guilty, and this
appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the court erroneously prohibited him from introducing the exculpatory
certificate of analysis because the court incorrectly interpreted Code § 19.2-187.
“A trial court’s exercise of discretion to admit or exclude evidence will not be overturned
on appeal unless the court abused its discretion.” Sprouse v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 488,
491, 673 S.E.2d 481, 482 (2009). However, the court’s interpretation of Code § 19.2-187 is a
question of law that we review de novo. Burns v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 243, 250, 688 S.E.2d
263, 266 (2010); Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177, 180, 639 S.E.2d 227, 229 (2007).
Code § 19.2-187 states, in pertinent part:
In any hearing or trial of any criminal offense . . . a certificate of analysis of a person performing an analysis or examination, duly attested by such person, shall be admissible in evidence as evidence of the facts therein stated and the results of the analysis or examination referred to therein, provided (i) the certificate of analysis is filed with the clerk of the court hearing the case at least seven days prior to the proceeding if the attorney for the Commonwealth intends to offer it into evidence in a preliminary hearing or the accused intends to offer it into evidence in any hearing or trial, or (ii) the requirements of subsection A of § 19.2-187.1 have been satisfied and the accused has not objected to the admission of the certificate pursuant to subsection B of § 19.2-187.1.
(Emphasis added).
In this case, the certificate of analysis was not admissible under Code § 19.2-187(i).
Subsection (i) requires the certificate to be “filed with the clerk of the court hearing the case at
least seven days prior to the proceeding if . . . the accused intends to offer it into evidence in any
hearing or trial.” Code § 19.2-187. Appellant concedes that neither party filed the certificate
prior to trial.
-3- However, appellant argues that the certificate was admissible under Code § 19.2-187(ii),
because he did not object to its admission. We disagree. Code § 19.2-187(ii) allows admittance
of a certificate when “the requirements of subsection A of § 19.2-187.1 have been satisfied and
the accused has not objected to the admission of the certificate pursuant to subsection B of
§ 19.2-187.1.”
Code § 19.2-187.1(A) states: “[i]n any trial and in any hearing other than a preliminary
hearing, in which the attorney for the Commonwealth intends to offer a certificate of analysis
into evidence in lieu of testimony pursuant to § 19.2-187, the attorney for the Commonwealth
shall” provide a copy of the certificate to defense counsel, give notice to the accused of his right
to object to admittance of the certificate without the forensic scientist’s testimony, and “[f]ile a
copy of the certificate and notice with the clerk.” (Emphasis added).
“A primary rule of statutory construction is that courts must look first to the language of the
statute. If a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court will give the statute its plain meaning.”
Loudoun Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Etzold, 245 Va. 80, 85, 425 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1993).
Interpreting the plain language of the statute, Code § 19.2-187.1 establishes the requirements for
admission of a certificate of analysis only when the Commonwealth intends to offer it into
evidence. In this case, the defense, not the Commonwealth, sought to admit the certificate.
Accordingly, Code § 19.2-187.1 does not apply and appellant could not seek to admit the
certificate pursuant to that code section. Further, Code § 19.2-187.1(A)(3) also requires that the
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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges O’Brien, Russell and Senior Judge Haley Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia
ERMIAS SAMSON MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0528-16-4 JUDGE MARY GRACE O’BRIEN MAY 2, 2017 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA Lisa B. Kemler, Judge
Brian E. Conaway (Rifkind Patrick LLC, on brief), for appellant.
Katherine Quinlan Adelfio, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Ermias Samson (“appellant”) was convicted of possession with intent to sell marijuana in
violation of Code § 18.2-248.1(a)(2). He appeals his conviction, asserting that “[t]he circuit court
erroneously prohibited [him] from introducing exculpatory fingerprint [evidence] under an
incorrect reading of Code of Virginia § 19.2-187.”
BACKGROUND
On April 1, 2015, Officer Jansen Adkins was patrolling the 400 block of North Armistead
Street. Officer Adkins noticed a parked vehicle with two occupants in the parking lot of an
apartment complex. He circled the parking lot, waited in the back of the complex for ten
minutes, and drove around again. Officer Adkins observed the same two individuals in the
vehicle.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. As Officer Adkins walked toward the vehicle, the person in the driver’s seat stepped out of
the car and walked away. The officer approached the passenger side and noticed rolling papers in
the driver’s seat. Appellant, who was sitting in the passenger seat, opened the door, and the
officer immediately smelled a strong odor of marijuana. Officer Adkins observed a white plastic
bag between appellant’s feet. He asked appellant for the bag, but appellant “refused to touch it
and then purposely moved out of the way of it, and stated several times that he didn’t want to
touch it.” The officer searched the vehicle and found that the white plastic bag contained smaller
individual baggies of marijuana. During his search of appellant, Officer Adkins also found a
Ziploc bag containing marijuana, three cell phones, and seven dollars.
Appellant was indicted for possession with intent to sell marijuana. On November 10, 2015,
immediately before the commencement of a jury trial for the offense, the Commonwealth moved to
prohibit appellant from introducing a certificate of analysis from the Virginia Department of
Forensic Science for fingerprint testing that was performed on the white plastic bag and the
baggies found inside. The Commonwealth had provided the certificate to appellant prior to trial
as exculpatory evidence, because the testing indicated that the fingerprints on the bags belonged
to the driver of the vehicle, not appellant.
During the motion, the Commonwealth explained that although the certificate was
provided to appellant, the Commonwealth did not subpoena the forensic scientist because the
analysis did not contain helpful information for the prosecution. The Commonwealth also did
not file the certificate with the clerk’s office because it did not intend to introduce it at trial.
Appellant acknowledged that he did not file the certificate with the clerk prior to trial.
The court held that pursuant to Code § 19.2-187, “unless the certificate was filed seven
days before . . . then under the statute, it’s not admissible, by either party,” and granted the
-2- Commonwealth’s motion to exclude the certificate. The jury found appellant guilty, and this
appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the court erroneously prohibited him from introducing the exculpatory
certificate of analysis because the court incorrectly interpreted Code § 19.2-187.
“A trial court’s exercise of discretion to admit or exclude evidence will not be overturned
on appeal unless the court abused its discretion.” Sprouse v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 488,
491, 673 S.E.2d 481, 482 (2009). However, the court’s interpretation of Code § 19.2-187 is a
question of law that we review de novo. Burns v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 243, 250, 688 S.E.2d
263, 266 (2010); Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177, 180, 639 S.E.2d 227, 229 (2007).
Code § 19.2-187 states, in pertinent part:
In any hearing or trial of any criminal offense . . . a certificate of analysis of a person performing an analysis or examination, duly attested by such person, shall be admissible in evidence as evidence of the facts therein stated and the results of the analysis or examination referred to therein, provided (i) the certificate of analysis is filed with the clerk of the court hearing the case at least seven days prior to the proceeding if the attorney for the Commonwealth intends to offer it into evidence in a preliminary hearing or the accused intends to offer it into evidence in any hearing or trial, or (ii) the requirements of subsection A of § 19.2-187.1 have been satisfied and the accused has not objected to the admission of the certificate pursuant to subsection B of § 19.2-187.1.
(Emphasis added).
In this case, the certificate of analysis was not admissible under Code § 19.2-187(i).
Subsection (i) requires the certificate to be “filed with the clerk of the court hearing the case at
least seven days prior to the proceeding if . . . the accused intends to offer it into evidence in any
hearing or trial.” Code § 19.2-187. Appellant concedes that neither party filed the certificate
prior to trial.
-3- However, appellant argues that the certificate was admissible under Code § 19.2-187(ii),
because he did not object to its admission. We disagree. Code § 19.2-187(ii) allows admittance
of a certificate when “the requirements of subsection A of § 19.2-187.1 have been satisfied and
the accused has not objected to the admission of the certificate pursuant to subsection B of
§ 19.2-187.1.”
Code § 19.2-187.1(A) states: “[i]n any trial and in any hearing other than a preliminary
hearing, in which the attorney for the Commonwealth intends to offer a certificate of analysis
into evidence in lieu of testimony pursuant to § 19.2-187, the attorney for the Commonwealth
shall” provide a copy of the certificate to defense counsel, give notice to the accused of his right
to object to admittance of the certificate without the forensic scientist’s testimony, and “[f]ile a
copy of the certificate and notice with the clerk.” (Emphasis added).
“A primary rule of statutory construction is that courts must look first to the language of the
statute. If a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court will give the statute its plain meaning.”
Loudoun Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Etzold, 245 Va. 80, 85, 425 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1993).
Interpreting the plain language of the statute, Code § 19.2-187.1 establishes the requirements for
admission of a certificate of analysis only when the Commonwealth intends to offer it into
evidence. In this case, the defense, not the Commonwealth, sought to admit the certificate.
Accordingly, Code § 19.2-187.1 does not apply and appellant could not seek to admit the
certificate pursuant to that code section. Further, Code § 19.2-187.1(A)(3) also requires that the
certificate be filed with the clerk “on the day that the certificate and notice are provided to the
accused.” In this case, neither party filed the certificate.
“The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always preferred to any curious,
narrow or strained construction; a statute should never be construed so that it leads to absurd
results.” Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 839, 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992). Code
-4- § 19.2-187 clearly states that for a certificate of analysis to be admissible in lieu of testimony, the
moving party must file it with the clerk at least seven days prior to the proceeding. Allowing the
defendant to admit the certificate under Code § 19.2-187.1 without meeting the filing requirement
under Code § 19.2-187 would lead to a contrary, absurd result. Further, a general principle of
statutory construction requires this Court to apply “the more specific enactment . . . over the
more general.” Eastlack v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 120, 126, 710 S.E.2d 723, 726 (2011).
Accepting appellant’s interpretation of the statutes would eviscerate the specific requirement
under Code § 19.2-187(i) that the defendant must file the certificate with the clerk seven days
before trial.
CONCLUSION
Because appellant did not comply with the filing requirement under Code § 19.2-187, and
Code § 19.2-187.1 is not applicable when the defendant seeks to admit a certificate of analysis,
the trial court did not err in excluding the certificate at trial. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s
ruling.
Affirmed.
-5-