Erin Osmon v. United States

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: February 23, 2026
• Docket: 25-1276
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-1276

ERIN OSMON,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:21-cv-00353-MR-WCM)

Argued: January 28, 2026 Decided: February 23, 2026

Before KING, AGEE, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Jonathan W. Corbett, CORBETT RIGHTS, P.C., Los Angeles, California, for Appellant. Gill Paul Beck, Sr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Russ Ferguson, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

This appeal from the Western District of North Carolina follows a bench trial on

plaintiff Erin Osmon’s civil battery claim, pursued against the United States of America

under the Federal Tort Claims Act (the “FTCA”). 1 Osmon’s battery claim arises from a

July 2019 pat-down inspection that was conducted by an officer of the Transportation

Security Administration (the “TSA”) at the Asheville Regional Airport. In its post-bench

trial verdict of March 2025, the district court weighed and assessed the evidence, including

witness testimony and video footage of the pat-down inspection, determined that the pat-

down of Osmon was objectively reasonable, and ruled in favor of the United States. See

Osmon v. United States, No. 1:21-cv-00353 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 12, 2025), ECF No. 56 (the

“Bench Verdict”). On appeal, Osmon assails the Bench Verdict on various grounds. As

explained herein, we reject Osmon’s appellate contentions and affirm the judgment.

I.

A.

On July 27, 2019, Osmon arrived at the Asheville Regional Airport as a ticketed

and confirmed passenger with a final destination of Los Angeles. As Osmon proceeded

1 We recognize that, although the federal government is generally immune from lawsuits, the FTCA has waived the “sovereign immunity of the United States for certain torts committed by federal employees.” See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Relevant here, the FTCA, as codified in Title 28, authorizes suits for “battery” arising out of “acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). All such claims “shall be tried by the court without a jury.” Id. § 2402 (citation modified).

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through the passenger security screening checkpoint, a scanner alerted the TSA officers to

a possible prohibited item in the area of Osmon’s groin. To that end, the TSA’s screening

procedures mandated that a pat-down inspection be conducted in the event of such an alert.

As a result, a female TSA Officer named Robinson approached Osmon and informed her

that a pat-down of Osmon’s groin area was required. Robinson also offered to conduct the

screening in private, but Osmon declined the offer. Thus, the pat-down inspection took

place in the general passenger screening area.

Video footage of the pat-down inspection was captured from two different angles

on the Airport’s closed-circuit television system (the “Airport video footage”). Relevant

to this appeal, Officer Robinson conducted an “anterior” — i.e., frontal — sweep of

Osmon’s groin area by placing one palm on Osmon’s outer hip and the other on Osmon’s

inner thigh. Robinson then moved her hands up Osmon’s thigh to the point where Osmon’s

leg and torso met — which the TSA designates as the “point of resistance” — causing

Osmon to flinch. See J.A. 239. 2 The pat-down was completed with no prohibited items

being discovered. Osmon — who was visibly upset and crying after the pat-down —

contends in these proceedings that Robinson’s pat-down inspection was a sexual assault.

2 Citations herein to “J.A. ___” refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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B.

1.

In December 2021, Osmon filed her operative complaint against the United States,

pursuant to the FTCA, alleging a single claim of civil battery under North Carolina law. 3

In September 2022, the district court adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation that

Osmon’s complaint be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Osmon appealed

to this Court, and a unanimous panel reversed. See Osmon v. United States, 66 F.4th 144

(4th Cir. 2023). That is, our Court ruled that “the FTCA permits people who allege they

were assaulted by TSA screeners to sue the federal government.” Id. at 147. Osmon’s

complaint was thus reinstated for further proceedings in the district court. The parties then

engaged in discovery, during which Osmon and Officer Robinson were deposed.

2.

The bench trial on Osmon’s battery claim was conducted in Asheville on November

12, 2024. During the trial, Osmon’s lawyer called two witnesses — Osmon and Officer

Robinson. Relevant portions of the Airport video footage were played before the district

court during the testimony of both Osmon and Robinson, and each witness was questioned

about the events captured.

For her part, Osmon testified that the pat-down inspection was a sexual assault under

the guise of a security screening, asserting that Robinson had used her fingertips to touch

3 The FTCA incorporates the law of the place where the act occurred — in these proceedings, that is North Carolina. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

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Osmon’s genital area through and beneath her clothing, and also that Robinson had

improperly touched Osmon’s bare skin. Osmon further said that Robinson had made

inappropriate comments about Osmon’s clothing, and that Robinson asserted that the pat-

down would be repeated if Osmon resisted. 4

Osmon also testified that she had no previous opinions about the TSA, and that she

had never made social media posts concerning the TSA before the July 2019 incident in

Asheville. On cross-examination, however, Osmon was confronted with a 2013 social

media post she had made, which contained critical remarks about the TSA. Specifically,

the post read: “My favorite part of Thanksgiving travel? Being publicly felt up by TSA

due to cough medicine and my vaguely foreign sounding last name.” See Bench Verdict

10. Although Osmon conceded that the picture and username on the social media post

were her own, she related she could not remember making the post.

Officer Robinson was then called to testify. Robinson explained that the TSA’s

mandated pat-down inspection is very methodical, and that the pat-down she performed on

Osmon was entirely consistent with the TSA protocol. Robinson also denied making any

threatening or inappropriate comments to Osmon.

In its defense, the government called three witnesses, each employed by the TSA:

Training Specialist Sanchez, who gave expert testimony about TSA pat-down inspection

procedures; Officer Diller, Robinson’s supervisor; and Officer Atchison, who was present

4 During the pat-down events, Osmon was wearing shorts with about a 3-to-4-inch inseam. See Bench Verdict 7. Osmon testified at the bench trial that her shorts were not skin-tight, but “belled out at the bottom a little bit.” See J.A. 125.

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at the TSA checkpoint during the pat-down. 5 Following the testimony of the government’s

witnesses, Osmon was recalled in rebuttal. When the evidence had been completed, the

district court adjourned the proceedings and requested “post-trial briefs in the form of

closing arguments” from the parties. See J.A. 310. Those post-trial briefs were then

submitted.

C.

On March 12, 2025, the district court filed its Bench Verdict, ruling in favor of the

United States. That is, the Bench Verdict concluded that Osmon had not proven her battery

claim by a preponderance of the evidence. In that regard, the Bench Verdict weighed and

assessed the Airport video footage and the evidence of the trial witnesses. The Bench

Verdict accorded little weight to Osmon’s testimony, ruling that Osmon’s “attempts to

deny” her 2013 social media post “revealed her bias against TSA and substantially

undermined her credibility.” See Bench Verdict 10-11.

By contrast, the district court found Officer Robinson’s testimony to be “credible”

and “persuasive.” See Bench Verdict 11, 12. In so ruling, the Bench Verdict described

Robinson as a “woman of rather small stature and relatively meek in appearance and

5 During the bench trial, Osmon objected to and moved to strike Atchison’s testimony, arguing that it had not been adequately disclosed. Atchison had been identified in pre-trial disclosures as being present at the TSA checkpoint at the time, but her last name was misspelled in the disclosures and her contact information was not provided. The court denied a motion to strike Atchison’s testimony, ruling that multiple disclosures had “obliquely but sufficiently” identified Atchison as a person with relevant knowledge, and observing that Osmon had failed to track Atchison down or take her deposition. See J.A. 304-05.

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demeanor.” Id. at 11. The Bench Verdict observed that Robinson “appeared on the video

and in court as one taking her responsibilities as a LTSO very seriously.” Id. 6 As a result,

the Bench Verdict credited Robinson’s testimony and found that Robinson had not

threatened Osmon, that Robinson had not made any comments about Osmon’s clothing,

and that Robinson had not touched Osmon inappropriately or in a manner inconsistent with

the TSA protocols. Id. at 15 (reciting that “[t]here is no credible evidence that LTSO

Robinson intended to touch [Osmon’s] genitals, that she did so in reality, or that she

intended to sexually assault [Osmon] under the guise of routine screening”).

Finally, the Bench Verdict conducted a “careful examination” of the Airport video

footage and concluded that Osmon’s account of the events — that is, that Officer Robinson

had inappropriately touched Osmon’s bare skin and genital area during the pat-down

inspection — was “unsupported” by the trial evidence. See Bench Verdict 13-14. The

Bench Verdict also determined that “any alleged incidental and brief touching of a

passenger’s thigh during a required groin pat-down would not constitute battery under

North Carolina law.” Id. at 13; see also id. at 13-14 (confirming that observation as also

relevant to “incidental and brief touching of a passenger’s pelvic area”).

Based on the totality of the district court’s evaluation, the Bench Verdict ruled that

“[t]he evidence presented at trial . . . conclusively demonstrated that the pat-down of

[Osmon] was objectively reasonable and proper” and entered judgment for the government.

The acronym “LTSO” stands for a “Lead Transportation Security Officer” of the 6

TSA. See Bench Verdict 1.

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See Bench Verdict 20. Osmon then timely noted her appeal from the Bench Verdict, and

we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

An appeal from a judgment entered after a bench trial is “subject to a mixed standard

of review, pursuant to which we review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for

clear error.” See Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Bransen Energy, Inc., 850 F.3d 645, 654 (4th

Cir. 2017). Importantly, “we may not reverse the district court’s findings simply because

we would have decided the case differently.” See Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.

Cohen, 423 F.3d 413, 418 (4th Cir. 2005). Rather, findings of fact can only be clearly

erroneous if “the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” See HSBC Bank USA v. F&M Bank N.

Va., 246 F.3d 335, 338 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation modified). Finally, we review evidentiary

rulings for abuse of discretion, and we “will not overturn” such a “ruling unless the decision

was arbitrary and irrational.” See Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. W. Pocahontas Props.

Ltd. P’ship, 918 F.3d 353, 362 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation modified).

III.

Osmon raises various issues on appeal, including (1) that the Bench Verdict

misstated and misapplied North Carolina law; (2) that the Bench Verdict made biased and

unsupported factual findings; and (3) that district court improperly admitted evidence

during the trial. As explained herein, we reject each of Osmon’s contentions and are

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satisfied they do not undermine the Bench Verdict’s controlling conclusion — that is, that

the TSA pat-down of Osmon was objectively reasonable and proper.

In the Old North State, the elements of civil battery are “intent, harmful or offensive

contact, causation, and lack of privilege.” See Hawkins v. Hawkins, 400 S.E.2d 472, 475

(N.C. Ct. App. 1992). As to the intent element, the required “intent with which tort liability

is concerned is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm. Rather it is an

intent to bring about a result which will invade the interests of another in a way that the

law forbids.” See Andrews v. Peters, 330 S.E.2d 638, 640 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (citation

modified).

In resolving Osmon’s battery claim, the Bench Verdict concluded, inter alia, as

follows:

• “The evidence presented at trial — including LTSO Robinson’s testimony, the video evidence, and the testimony from other TSA witnesses — conclusively demonstrated that the pat-down of the Plaintiff was objectively reasonable and proper”;

• “LTSO Robinson did not have the subjective intent to touch the Plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner”; and

• “Because LTSO Robinson did not intentionally touch the Plaintiff in an objectively offensive manner without her consent, the Plaintiff’s battery claim fails.”

See Bench Verdict 20 (citation modified). In other words, based on its assessment of the

evidence, the Bench Verdict ruled that Osmon’s battery claim failed for lack of an

objectively harmful or offensive contact.

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Osmon resists this straightforward application of law by arguing that the Bench

Verdict “appeared to hold that North Carolina battery law requires intent to offend as an

element.” See Br. of Appellant 16. But Osmon overstates the import of the Bench

Verdict’s observations concerning Robinson’s subjective intent because, as recited above,

the Bench Verdict explicitly ruled that Osmon’s “battery claim fails” because “Robinson

did not intentionally touch [Osmon] in an objectively offensive manner[.]” See Bench

Verdict 20. And that ruling forecloses any viable battery claim under North Carolina law,

as well as Osmon’s argument that reversible legal error occurred in that respect. 7

To the extent Osmon challenges the Bench Verdict’s factual findings on the

objective reasonableness of the pat-down inspection, there was no error in the district

court’s decision to credit Officer Robinson’s testimony over that of Osmon. As the

Supreme Court has made clear, “where there are two permissible views of the evidence,

the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” See Anderson v. City

of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). In these circumstances, Robinson’s credited

testimony was buttressed by the Airport video footage, witness testimony, and the court’s

perception that Osmon was biased against the TSA. See also U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Allied

7 We also reject Osmon’s contention that the district court committed reversible error by allowing Officer Robinson to testify about how she was impacted by Osmon’s allegations. See Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1994) (“For a bench trial, we are confident that the district court can hear relevant evidence, weigh its probative value and reject any improper inferences.”).

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Towing Corp., 966 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Because this determination by the

district court was based upon assessments of witness credibility, it is deserving of the

highest degree of appellate deference.”). And on our assessment of the trial record, those

factual determinations were not clearly erroneous. 8

IV.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we are satisfied to reject Osmon’s appellate contentions.

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED

8 Finally, we reject Osmon’s claim that Atchison’s testimony should have been stricken because she was a “surprise witness.” See Br. of Appellant 27. The district court reasonably considered the parties’ arguments, including the fact that Atchison was identified in multiple of the government’s disclosures, and properly exercised its discretion to allow Atchison to testify. And, in any event, Osmon conceded in her post-bench trial briefing that “Atchison adds nothing of value to this case.” See J.A. 383 (citation modified).