Erika Jacobs v. Twin Cities Development Association, Inc., and Katy A. Reichert

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedJanuary 28, 2026
Docket8:25-cv-00549
StatusUnknown

This text of Erika Jacobs v. Twin Cities Development Association, Inc., and Katy A. Reichert (Erika Jacobs v. Twin Cities Development Association, Inc., and Katy A. Reichert) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Erika Jacobs v. Twin Cities Development Association, Inc., and Katy A. Reichert, (D. Neb. 2026).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

ERIKA JACOBS,

Plaintiff, 8:25CV549

vs. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TWIN CITIES DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, INC., and KATY A. REICHERT, Defendants Attorney;

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Erika Jacobs’ motion asking for my recusal. Filing No. 7. Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion objecting to the Court’s September 22, 2025, Judgment, which the Court liberally construes as a motion for reconsideration, Filing No. 8, and her motion requesting review of her motion for reconsideration, Filing No. 9, which she filed along with a duplicate of her motion for reconsideration, see Filing No. 10. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motions for recusal and for reconsideration will be denied, and her motion requesting review and her duplicate motion for reconsideration will be denied as moot. I. MOTION TO RECUSE Plaintiff seeks my recusal claiming that my decision to deny her request to remove her state civil case from the District Court of Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, to this Court was “unethical,” and she asks that her request be reviewed by the Chief Judge. Filing No. 7. However, Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Court’s September 22, 2025, ruling, see Filing Nos. 5 & 6, does not support my disqualification nor does it require review by another judge. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144, Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. Plaintiff’s motion to recuse does not qualify as an “affidavit” within the meaning of § 144, and her allegations here are insufficient to demonstrate personal bias or prejudice. To support judicial disqualification, a legally sufficient affidavit must allege bias or prejudice, and such bias or prejudice must stem from an extrajudicial source. United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1211 (8th Cir. 1984). That is, “bias or prejudice” doesn't include opinions held by judges acquired in the course of the proceedings, nor does it include opinions held as a result of what judges learned in earlier proceedings. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994). A party isn’t entitled to recusal even when a judge is ill- disposed toward him, where the judge’s knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings. In re Steward, 828 F.3d 672, 682 (8th Cir. 2016); see United States v. Rubashkin, 655 F.3d 849, 858 (8th Cir. 2011). And judicial rulings rarely establish a valid basis for recusal. United States v. Melton, 738 F.3d 903, 906 (8th Cir. 2013). Here, Plaintiff’s accusations are substantiated only by this Court’s unfavorable ruling in the September 22, 2025, Memorandum and Order and Judgment, which is neither extrajudicial nor indicative of bias. See United States v. Larsen, 427 F.3d 1091, 1095 (8th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Martin, 757 F.3d 776, 778 (8th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to recuse is denied. II. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION On October 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Object,” which the Court construes as a motion for reconsideration. Because Plaintiff has not indicated which provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure she is relying upon in making the motion, it may be treated either as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment or as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment.1 See Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1988). But whichever rule is applied, the motion fails. Rule 59(e) motions serve the limited function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006). Such motions cannot be used to introduce new evidence, tender new legal theories, or raise arguments which could have been offered or raised prior to entry of judgment. Id. Under Rule 60(b), a court may grant a party relief from a judgment for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.

1 A Rule 59(e) motion “must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). A Rule 60(b) motion “must be made within a reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Plaintiff’s motion was timely filed on October 20, 2025. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Relief under the catchall provision, Rule 60(b)(6), is available only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 777–78 (2017) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005)). Liberally construed, Plaintiff asks the court to reconsider its September 22, 2025, Memorandum and Order and Judgment, Filing Nos. 5 & 6, denying Plaintiff’s request to remove her state case to this Court and remanding the case back to the District Court of Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, because, Plaintiff argues, she “has a right to transfer her case to federal court,” “[t]he judge presented no reason as to why this case should not be docketed other than appeal[, and] [t]his is not an appeal,”2 and “[t]he federal court has jurisdiction.” Filing No. 8. However, as the Court explained in its previous Memorandum and Order, only defendants have the right to remove a case from state court to federal court. See Filing No. 5 at 4. Assuming she could have established this Court’s federal subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff may have been able to initially file her claims against the defendants in this Court, but she chose to file first in state court. And, once she made the choice to file her case in the state district court, “[t]here is no federal law authorizing plaintiff to remove [her] state court action to federal court.” Fonder v. S. Dakota, No.

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Related

Liteky v. United States
510 U.S. 540 (Supreme Court, 1994)
United States v. Rubashkin
655 F.3d 849 (Eighth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Sam Larsen, Also Known as Sammy
427 F.3d 1091 (Eighth Circuit, 2005)
Gonzalez v. Crosby
545 U.S. 524 (Supreme Court, 2005)
United States v. Nathan Melton
738 F.3d 903 (Eighth Circuit, 2013)
United States v. Danial Martin
757 F.3d 776 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
Critique Services, LLC v. LaToya L. Steward
828 F.3d 672 (Eighth Circuit, 2016)
Buck v. Davis
580 U.S. 100 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Erika Jacobs v. Twin Cities Development Association, Inc., and Katy A. Reichert, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/erika-jacobs-v-twin-cities-development-association-inc-and-katy-a-ned-2026.