Erik Valdez v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 17, 2020
• Docket: 19A-CR-1011
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Dec 17 2020, 8:41 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Andrew J. Baldwin Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Baldwin, Perry & Kamish P.C. Attorney General of Indiana Franklin, Indiana Benjamin J. Shoptaw Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Erik Valdez, December 17, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-1011 v. Appeal from the Clark Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Vicki L. Appellee-Plaintiff Carmichael, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 10C04-1601-F3-3

Weissmann, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1011 | December 17, 2020 Page 1 of 5 [1] Erik Valdez claims the trial court should have instructed the jury to view the

evidence against him through the lens of presumed innocence. As the jury

received such direction, albeit not through Valdez’s instruction rejected by the

trial court, we find no error. Accordingly, we affirm Valdez’s convictions.

Facts [2] Valdez was charged with Battery and Neglect of a Dependent arising from

serious injuries he inflicted on his four-month-old son. At Valdez’s trial, from

which he was absent, Valdez’s counsel requested the trial court instruct the jury:

If the conduct of the accused, Erik Valdez[,] could be interpreted reasonably in more than one fashion, at least one of which is innocent, then you should presume his conduct was in fact innocence (sic).

App. Vol. III pp. 139-40.

[3] The trial court rejected Valdez’s tendered instruction. Instead, the court

instructed the jury:

Under the law of this State, a person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent. To overcome the presumption of innocence, the State must prove the Defendant guilty of each element of the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Defendant is not required to present any evidence to prove innocence or to prove or explain anything. You should fit the evidence to the presumption that the defendant is innocent if you can do so.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1011 | December 17, 2020 Page 2 of 5 App. Vol. IV p. 67.

[4] The jury found Valdez guilty, and the trial court imposed a nine-year sentence.

Discussion and Decision [5] Valdez claims he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court chose its own

instruction over his. He relies exclusively on our Supreme Court’s decision in

McCowan v. State, 27 N.E.3d 760 (Ind. 2015), where the Court ruled a criminal

defendant is entitled to the following jury instruction upon his request:

The presumption of innocence continues in favor of the defendant throughout the trial. You should fit the evidence to the presumption that the defendant is innocent if you can reasonably do so.

A trial court has discretion to reject any tendered instruction which offers

different or supplemental language. Id.

[6] Valdez’s proposed instruction differs from the mandatory instruction in

McCowan. Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court abused its

discretion in rejecting Valdez’s version. An abuse of discretion occurs when the

rejected instruction correctly stated the law, was supported by the evidence

presented at trial, and contained directives not covered by other jury

instructions. Id. at 763-764, 766.

[7] Valdez contends his instruction correctly stated the law, was supported by the

evidence, and was not covered by other instructions. We find that last issue

dispositive because the substance of Valdez’s proposed instruction was covered Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1011 | December 17, 2020 Page 3 of 5 by the trial court’s instruction. According to Valdez, none of the instructions

informed the jury how to “treat multiple interpretations of the evidence.”

Appellant’s Brief, p. 11. Valdez is incorrect. The court specifically charged the

jury to “fit the evidence to the presumption that the defendant is innocent if you

can do so.” A jury would not need “to fit the evidence to the presumption of

innocence” unless that evidence were capable of more than one interpretation.

By its very nature, evidence of culpability susceptible to only one interpretation

can support either guilt or innocence—but not both.

[8] Furthermore, the trial court’s presumption of innocence instruction contained

language identical to the McCowan model instruction. The trial court’s

instruction simply contained an additional paragraph, which correctly stated

the law. See McCowan, 27 N.E.3d at 762, 767 (finding jury properly instructed

when the instructions included the additional language found in the trial court’s

instruction in Valdez’s case). We conclude Valdez received what he sought: an

instruction directing the jury to view the evidence through a presumption of

innocence lens.

[9] No instructional error occurred. Even if it had, our decision would be

unchanged because the evidence against Valdez was overwhelming. We

reverse only where the defendant is prejudiced by the improper rejection of a

tendered instruction. Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376 (Ind. 2015). The

child’s injuries first became apparent while Valdez cared for the child alone.

Valdez admitted grabbing the infant’s face and causing bruising. Valdez further

admitted shaking the baby. Valdez offered up a medically implausible

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1011 | December 17, 2020 Page 4 of 5 explanation to explain his son’s rib fractures. Although Valdez believed the

child was dying, he did not call an ambulance or take the child to the hospital

for eleven hours after the baby became unresponsive. Valdez even advised the

infant’s mother that they should not take their baby to the hospital due to the

bruising.

[10] We are confident regardless of which instruction the jury received, the result

would have been the same. See Hancock v. State, 585 N.E.2d 1371, 1372-1373

(Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no prejudice from improper jury instruction where

evidence of guilt was overwhelming). Accordingly, we find no error.

[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Altice, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1011 | December 17, 2020 Page 5 of 5