1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERIK TALAVERA, Case No.: 23-cv-2162-TWR-SBC
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 13 v. EX PARTE MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 14 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., DISQUALIFY COUNTY COUNSEL 15 Defendants. AND DENYING REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS [DKT. NO. 47]; 16 GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 17 TO FILE RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 18 STRIKE UNDER SEAL [DKT. NO. 19 51]; AND DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO FILE MOTION AND 20 DECLARATIONS UNDER SEAL 21 [DKT NO. 45]
22 Presently before the Court is an Ex Parte Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Motion to 23 Disqualify County Counsel and for Sanctions filed by Defendants County of San Diego, 24 David Lovejoy, and Jonathon Young. (Dkt. No. 47.) Plaintiff Erik Talavera filed a 25 Response in Opposition to Defendants’ motion. (Dkt. No. 52.) The Court held a hearing 26 on April 22, 2026. (Dkt. No. 69.) 27 /// 28 1 Having carefully considered the parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions, as 2 well as the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike 3 Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify County Counsel (“Motion to Strike”) and DENIES 4 Defendants’ request for sanctions. (Dkt. No. 47.) Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify County 5 Counsel from Representing Individual Deputies and Request for Specific Performance and 6 Sanctions (“Motion to Disqualify”) (Dkt. No. 46) shall be STRICKEN in its entirety from 7 the record. Because the Motion to Disqualify is to be stricken, Plaintiff’s motion to file the 8 Motion to Disqualify under seal (Dkt. No. 45) is DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiff’s Motion 9 to file the Response in Opposition to Motion to Strike Under Seal (Dkt. No. 51) is 10 GRANTED. 11 Additionally, as discussed further below, even if the Court did not strike Plaintiff’s 12 Motion to Disqualify, it would summarily deny the motion on the merits. 13 I. BACKGROUND 14 This action arises out of a shooting incident that occurred on February 16, 2022 15 involving Plaintiff and Defendants Lovejoy and Young, Sheriff’s Deputies for Defendant 16 County of San Diego.1 17 The Court held a full-day Mandatory Settlement Conference (“MSC”) on December 18 10, 2025. (Dkt. No. 31.) Plaintiff was represented by Timothy A. Scott and Marcus S. 19 Bourassa, and Defendants were represented by Sylvia Aceves and Steven Inman, II, of the 20 Office of County Counsel for the County of San Diego. (Id.) Plaintiff and the Deputy 21 Defendants also participated in the conference. At the conclusion of the MSC, the Court 22 set an attorneys-only Settlement Status Conference for February 6, 2026 at 9:30 a.m. (Id.) 23 The Court held separate Settlement Status Conferences with counsel on that date (Dkt. Nos. 24 25 1 The parties are referred to the Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary 26 Judgment recently issued by the Honorable Todd W. Robinson in the companion case, 27 Pauu of County of San Diego, et al., Case No. 23-cv-0961-TWR-SBC (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2026), Dkt. No. 94, for additional details. 28 1 31, 32) and on February 9 and 10, 2026. The case did not settle. 2 On April 3, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion to file the Motion to Disqualify under seal, 3 and lodged the Motion to Disqualify for filing under seal. (Dkt. Nos. 45-46.)3 The Motion 4 to Disqualify seeks to disqualify the Office of County Counsel, which represents all 5 remaining defendants in this matter (County of San Diego and Sheriff’s Deputies Lovejoy 6 and Young), from representing the Deputy Defendants due to a conflict of interest between 7 the County’s interests and the deputies’ interests, which allegedly arose out of the County’s 8 conduct following the MSC held on December 10, 2025. (Dkt. No. 46 at 11-15.) The 9 motion also seeks “specific performance” of terms discussed at the MSC, as well as the 10 imposition of sanctions against Defendant County. (Id. at 15-17.) An opposition to the 11 Motion to Disqualify is not presently due.4 12 On April 6, 2026, Defendants filed the Motion to Strike presently before the Court. 13 (Dkt. No. 47.) Plaintiff filed a motion to file an opposition to the Motion to Strike under 14 seal, and lodged the opposition under seal. (Dkt. Nos. 51-52.) The Court did not require a 15 reply. (Dkt. No. 48.) 16 II. MOTION TO STRIKE 17 A. Legal Standard 18 “It is well established that district courts have inherent power to control their 19 dockets.” Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 146 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th 20 21 22 2 The conferences held on February 9 and 10, 2026 are not reflected on the Court’s 23 docket but were continuations of the Settlement Status Conferences held on February 6, 2026. 24
25 3 As detailed further below, the Court directed Plaintiff to file the Motion to Disqualify under seal at the time Plaintiff’s counsel’s office obtained a hearing date for the motion. 26
27 4 The Court has not issued a briefing schedule on the Motion to Disqualify, and in the absence of a briefing schedule, the deadline for an opposition under the Local Rules is not 28 1 Cir. 1988) (citation modified). Based on its inherent powers, a court may strike filings from 2 the docket “reflecting procedural impropriety or lack of compliance with court rules or 3 orders.” Jones v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. C-08-03971-JW (DMR), 2020 WL 4055928, at 4 *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2010) (collecting cases). More specifically, courts have the inherent 5 power to strike inappropriate materials such as confidential mediation and settlement 6 information from the docket. Id. Additionally, under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of 7 Civil Procedure, “the court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any 8 redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). 9 B. Discussion 10 Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify should be stricken because 11 it violates Civil Local Rule 16.3. (Dkt. No. 47 at 4.) The Court agrees. 12 1. Civil Local Rules 16.1 and 16.3. 13 “The Local Rules are clear and unequivocal as to the nature of Settlement 14 Conference communications. ‘The [Early Neutral Evaluation] Conference will be 15 informal, off the record, privileged and confidential’ and ‘[t]he settlement conference will 16 be off the record, privileged and confidential, unless otherwise ordered by the court.’” 17 Century Sur. Co. v. 350 W.A., LLC, Civil No. 05CV 1548-L(LSP), 2008 WL 1787491, at 18 *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2008) (citing CivLR 16.1(c)(1)(b); CivLR 16.3(h)). “The Local 19 Rules are clear and allow no exception regarding privileged and confidential 20 communication exchanged during Settlement Conferences.” Id. Compliance with Local 21 Rules 16.1 and 16.3 is paramount to the integrity of the settlement conference process and 22 disclosing information obtained in connection with a settlement conference “undermines 23 the trust jurists of this Court have earned in the legal community and diminishes the 24 integrity and effectiveness of the Settlement Conference process.” Id. at 3. 25 The primary purpose of Local Rules 16.1(c)(1)(b) and 16.3(h) is to encourage 26 litigants and their attorneys to be as forthcoming and frank as possible in Early Neutral 27 Evaluation Conferences and Settlement Conferences before the Court. The “off the record, 28 privileged and confidential” nature of these conferences protects settlement 1 communications from being used outside the context of settlement, such as in court filings. 2 Courts have routinely recognized “the substantial interest of preserving confidentiality in 3 mediation proceedings as justifying restrictions on the use of information obtained during 4 the mediation.” Jones, 2010 WL 4055928, at *10 (citing In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 5 634 (4th Cir. 2002)). “Furthermore, where participation is mandatory and the mediation is 6 directed and sanctioned by the court, the argument for protecting confidential 7 communications may be even stronger because participants are often assured that all 8 discussions and documents related to the proceeding will be protected from forced 9 disclosure.” Jones, 2010 WL 4055928, at *10 (citation modified). 10 2. The filing of the Motion to Disqualify has a chilling effect on the Court’s settlement process. 11
12 Protecting the Court’s settlement conference process is of paramount concern to the 13 Court. Allowing motion practice about settlement discussions would chill the willingness 14 of litigants to participate in settlement proceedings in a full, frank, and honest manner. 15 Parties and attorneys participating in settlement conferences before the Court must trust in 16 the confidentiality of the proceedings and expect that anything said will not be used against 17 them in a pleading or motion. Here, the mere filing of the Motion to Disqualify based upon 18 off the record, privileged and confidential settlement discussions creates a chilling effect, 19 discouraging parties from engaging in full and frank negotiations with the Court in this and 20 other cases. The motion contravenes Civil Local Rule 16.3(h) and allowing it to remain 21 filed would run counter to the integrity of, and trust in, the Court’s settlement conference 22 process. 23 3. Filing the Motion to Disqualify under seal does not negate any improper use of settlement discussions in the motion. 24
25 Plaintiff argues that the Motion to Disqualify should not be stricken because the 26 motion was submitted to be filed under seal and is before the same judicial officer who 27 conducted the settlement conference, i.e., the undersigned. (Dkt. No. 52 at 3-5.) This 28 argument is without merit. 1 First, filing a motion under seal is not a mechanism for allowing a party to disregard 2 Civil Local Rule 16.3(h). The fact that a settlement conference before the Court is “off the 3 record, privileged and confidential” under Civil Local Rule 16.3(h) means that settlement 4 conference discussions should not be the subject of motion practice, whether the motion is 5 filed under seal or not.5 As stated above, the filing of the Motion to Disqualify itself, even 6 if confidentiality is preserved by filing it under seal, undermines the integrity of the Court’s 7 settlement process. Additionally, the filing of the motion, even if under seal, implicates 8 discussions that are intended to be “off the record.” 9 Second, it is unusual for Plaintiff to now rely upon any protection provided by 10 submitting the Motion to Disqualify under seal when it appears that this was done at the 11 Court’s directive.6 The Court’s instruction to Plaintiff’s counsel to file the Motion to 12 Disqualify under seal should not be construed as the Court’s approval of the basis of the 13
14 15 5 The Court notes that a motion to enforce a settlement reached during a settlement conference before the Court is appropriate if the settlement is placed on the record in open 16 court. Placing a settlement on the record takes settlement discussions out of the realm of 17 being off the record and thus permits the filing of a motion to enforce the on-the-record settlement. See, e.g., Platypus Wear, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., No. 09CV2839 JLS 18 (WVG), 2010 WL 4281805, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010) (differentiating settlement 19 discussions from final settlement terms and recognizing the confidentiality necessary for settlement negotiations under this Court’s Local Rules). No settlement terms were placed 20 on the record during the December 10, 2025 MSC. 21 6 Plaintiff’s counsel’s office staff initially contacted the undersigned’s chambers to 22 obtain a hearing date to file the Motion to Disqualify on March 24, 2026, and indicated that 23 the motion would be ready to be filed by the end of that week. The Court, through its law clerk, advised that Plaintiff’s counsel needed to speak with chambers prior to filing the 24 motion. The undersigned’s law clerk spoke with Plaintiff’s counsel, Marcus Bourassa, on 25 March 30, 2026, and provided the Court’s directive that the Motion to Disqualify be filed under seal, as acknowledged by Mr. Bourassa in his declaration accompanying the motion 26 to seal. (See Dkt. No. 45-1.) Mr. Bourassa indicated his office would need a couple of extra 27 days to file a motion to seal to accompany the Motion to Disqualify; the Court provided a hearing date of May 21, 2026 at 11:00 a.m., and a deadline of April 3, 2026 to file the 28 1 motion. To the contrary, the Court provided this directive because of its deep concern about 2 Plaintiff’s potential intent to disclose off the record, privileged and confidential settlement 3 communications and to rely on those communications to seek to disqualify his opponents’ 4 counsel.7 5 4. Plaintiff’s “expansive privilege” and Federal Rule of Evidence 408 arguments. 6
7 Plaintiff argues that Ninth Circuit case law and Federal Rule of Evidence 408 8 undermine any claim of privilege by Defendants. (Dkt. No. 52 at 5-6.) Specifically, 9 Plaintiff contends that “the Ninth Circuit has made clear that local rules cannot expand 10 evidentiary privileges beyond what already exist under the law.” (Id. at 5.) In doing so, it 11 appears Plaintiff is contesting the validity of Local Rule 16.3(h) to the extent it provides 12 that communications made during settlement conferences with the court are “privileged.” 13 None of the three Ninth Circuit cases cited by Plaintiff (see Dkt. No. 52 at 5) hold 14 that Local Rule 16.3, or any similar local rule, cannot deem settlement conferences before 15 the court to be privileged. Facebook, Inc. v. Pacific Northwest Software, Inc., relied on by 16 Plaintiff for the proposition that a court’s local rules cannot expand the privileges created 17 by federal common law, does not hold as such. Rather, the court’s dicta simply expressed 18 doubt, without further discussion, that a district court could “augment the list of privileges 19 by local rule.” Facebook, Inc. v. Pacific Nw. Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 20 2011). And, notwithstanding this statement, the Ninth Circuit observed that a local rule can 21
22 23 7 Requiring motions disclosing confidential settlement discussions to be filed under seal has been employed by other courts in this district. See, e.g., Williams v. County of San 24 Diego, Case No.: 17-cv-00815-MMA(JLB), 2018 WL 4961523, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 25 2018), objections overruled, 2018 WL 6716630 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018) (directing the Clerk of Court to seal motion papers containing confidential information discussed at an 26 Early Neutral Evaluation Conference); Century Sur. Co., 2008 WL 1787491, at *4 27 (ordering counsel to seek an order sealing the portions of a motion filed before the District Judge disclosing confidential communications made during a settlement conference before 28 1 properly impose a duty of confidentiality. Id. at 1040-41. 2 The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 contains an express statement of 3 federal policy that communications occurring in mediations sponsored by federal district 4 courts should be confidential. Congress directed that “each district court shall, by local rule 5 adopted under [28 U.S.C. § 2071(a)], provide for the confidentiality of the alternative 6 dispute resolution processes and to prohibit disclosure of confidential dispute resolution 7 communications.” 28 U.S.C. § 652(d). Local Rules 16.1 and 16.3 are consistent with this 8 directive. See Transamerica Corp. v. Transamerica Bancgrowth Corp., 627 F.2d 963, 965 9 (9th Cir. 1980) (“28 U.S.C. § 2071 and Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 10 expressly empower district courts to adopt their own local court rules to cover areas not 11 specifically covered by the federal rules.”). 12 Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument addresses only the “privilege” attached to the MSC 13 proceedings and not the “off the record” and “confidential” nature of the MSC as set forth 14 in Local Rule 16.3(h). Parties’ discussions at MSCs are “off the record,” meaning that they 15 are not a part of the court record. See Gurvey v. Legend Films, Inc., No. 3:09-cv-00942 16 AJB (BGS), 2013 WL 754965, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2013). “‘Confidentiality’ refers to 17 a duty to keep information secret.” Molina v. Lexmark Int’l., Inc., No. CV 08-04796 MMM 18 (FMx), 2008 WL 4447678, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008) (citing Scott H. Hughes, The 19 Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85 Marq. L. Rev. 9, 25-34 20 (2001)). “Although ‘confidentiality’ and ‘privilege’ are often used interchangeably in 21 discussions of mediation, the terms refer to two distinct concepts.” Id. “Communications 22 are confidential when the freedom of the parties to disclose them voluntarily is limited; 23 they are privileged when the ability of third parties to compel disclosure of them . . . is 24 limited.” Id. Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that Plaintiff’s assertion against 25 an “expansive privilege” is valid, Plaintiff still used “off the record” and “confidential” 26 settlement discussions as the basis for his Motion to Disqualify, which circumvents Local 27 Rule 16.3(h) and undermines the Court’s settlement process. 28 /// 1 Plaintiff further contends that Federal Rule of Evidence 408(b) permits him to use 2 settlement communications made during the MSC and thereafter in a Motion to Disqualify. 3 (See Dkt. No. 52 at 5-6, citing Rule 408(b) and two Ninth Circuit cases, Rhoades v. Avon 4 Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2007) and Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 5 837, 840 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff is correct that “[w]hen statements made during 6 settlement [negotiations] are introduced for a purpose unrelated to liability, the policy 7 underlying [Rule 408] is not injured.” Rhoades, 504 F.3d at 1161-62. Here, however, 8 Plaintiff is not seeking to use written settlement communications exchanged between the 9 parties to establish jurisdiction, as in Rhoades or Cohn. Rather, Plaintiff is seeking to 10 disqualify his opposing counsel based on substantive settlement communications made 11 during court proceedings that, pursuant to the Court’s rules, were “off the record, privileged 12 and confidential.” See CivLR 16.3(h). The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that Rule 13 408(b) permits him to breach his obligation to maintain the off the record, privileged and 14 confidential nature of communications made during and in connection with the MSC.8 15 5. Sealing of Plaintiff’s opposition to the Motion to Strike. 16 When deciding whether access is appropriate, the courts must consider “the interests 17 advanced by the parties in light of the public interest and the duty of the courts.” Nixon v. 18 Warner Comm’cns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 602 (1978). Ultimately, the decision to seal is “best 19 left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the 20 relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Id. at 599. Here, any 21 communications made by the parties and the Court during the MSC on December 10, 2025, 22 the Settlement Status Conferences on February 6, 2026 (see Dkt. Nos. 31, 32), and the 23 continuations of the Settlement Status Conferences on February 9 and 10, 2026 (not 24 25 26 8 The issue of whether Mr. Inman’s “meet and confer” conversation with Mr. Scott, 27 during which the events of the settlement conference and subsequent related events were apparently discussed, was off the record, privileged and confidential does not affect the 28 1 reflected on the docket) shall not be publicly disclosed on the Court’s docket. Plaintiff’s 2 opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Strike contains reference to such communications. 3 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to file Response in Opposition to Motion to Strike Under 4 Seal (Dkt. No. 51), is GRANTED. 5 Defendants’ Motion to Strike, which is publicly filed, does not contain any 6 communications made by the parties and the Court during the MSC. (See Dkt. No. 47.) 7 Because the Motion to Strike is publicly filed, the Court finds it appropriate for Plaintiff’s 8 opposition to the motion to also be filed publicly. Accordingly, Plaintiff is required to file 9 a redacted version of the opposition for the public record. By May 4, 2026, Plaintiff must 10 publicly file his Response in Opposition to Motion to Strike with the following 11 redactions: page 2 lines 16-18 and 24-27, page 5 lines 25-27, page 8 lines 9-11, and 12 page 9 lines 2-4. The public document shall be titled “Redacted Copy of Sealed 13 Response in Opposition to County’s Motion to Strike.” 14 C. Conclusion 15 Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify improperly relies upon discussions held before the 16 Court during the December 10, 2025 MSC and thereafter, in contravention of Civil Local 17 Rule 16.3(h). Therefore, pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority to manage its docket, 18 as well as Rule 12(f), Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify is STRICKEN in its entirety. See 19 Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Encore Med. L.P., Case No. 19-CV-970 JLS (AHG), 2021 WL 20 1966124, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 6, 2021) (striking in their entirety filings that did not comply 21 with this Court’s Local Rules); A.C. v. Cortez, Case No. 18-CV-2227-AJB-AGS, 2019 WL 22 3068301, at *1-2 (S.D. Cal. July 11, 2019) (striking paragraph of Plaintiff’s complaint 23 under Rule 12(f) for referencing a statement made at an Early Neutral Evaluation 24 Conference). Because the Motion to Disqualify is to be stricken, Plaintiff’s motion to file 25 the Motion to Disqualify under seal (Dkt. No. 45) is DENIED AS MOOT.9 26 27 9 The Court briefly addresses Defendants’ argument that the Motion to Disqualify 28 1 III. MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 2 Even if the Court did not strike Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify, it would summarily 3 deny the motion on the merits.10 4 A. Legal Standard 5 In determining whether to disqualify counsel, the Court applies California law. In re 6 Cnty. of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2000). Motions to disqualify are generally 7 disfavored. Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. First Data Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 8 2003) (citations omitted). “They are often tactically motivated; they tend to derail the 9 efficient progress of litigation.” In re Marvel, 251 B.R. 869, 871 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2000), 10 aff’d, 265 B.R. 605 (N.D. Cal. 2001). Thus, motions to disqualify “should be subjected to 11 particularly strict judicial scrutiny.” Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int’l Corp. v. Style Cos., Ltd., 12 760 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted); see also CivLR 2.1(a)(3)(k) (“We 13 expect lawyers to refrain from seeking to disqualify opposing counsel for any improper 14 purpose or for any reason not supported by fact or law.”). 15 B. Discussion 16 1. Specific performance is not warranted. 17 As the judicial officer presiding over the settlement conference at issue, with a very 18 clear recollection of the events that transpired, the Court finds that the counsel appearing 19
20 21 counsel prior to filing the motion. The Court agrees that meeting and conferring with opposing counsel prior to filing any motion is advised. However, this Court’s Chambers 22 Rules do not require counsel to meet and confer prior to filing any motion, but rather prior 23 to filing discovery motions. (See Honorable Steve B. Chu, United States Magistrate Judge, Civil Chambers Rules.) And although the District Judge’s Chambers Rules do require that 24 counsel meet and confer prior to filing any motion, (see Honorable Todd W. Robinson, 25 United States District Judge, Standing Order for Civil Cases, Section III(A)(1)), this motion is not before the District Judge. 26
27 10 Magistrate judges are authorized under Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to rule upon motions to disqualify as nondispositive. See Howe Inv., Ltd. v. Perez 28 1 on behalf of Defendants at the MSC complied with the Court’s rules and orders and 2 fulfilled any agreement made during the MSC. The Office of County Counsel also did not 3 violate any of the Court’s rules and orders. No further action is required by the Office of 4 County Counsel. Specific performance is not warranted.11 5 2. Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a conflict of interest. 6 Plaintiff does not have standing to complain about any conflict of interest between 7 the County and the Deputy Defendants. “The standing requirement protects against the 8 strategic exploitation of the rules of ethics long disfavored by the Courts.” Colyer v. Smith, 9 50 F. Supp. 2d 966, 973 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Optyl Eyewear, 760 F.2d at 1050); see 10 also McPhearson v. Michaels Co., 96 Cal. App. 4th 843 (2002) (citation modified): 11 [W]here, as here, the persons who are personally concerned with the alleged conflict of interest are not objecting, and disqualification is sought by a 12 litigation adversary who is not personally interested in the alleged conflict, 13 courts must be skeptical. This is so because motions to disqualify counsel often pose the very threat to the integrity of the judicial process that they 14 purport to prevent. They can be used to harass opposing counsel, to delay the 15 litigation, to intimidate an adversary into accepting settlement on otherwise unacceptable terms, or for other strategic purposes. 16
17 McPhearson, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 849-50. 18 The Court finds that strictly enforcing the standing requirement is appropriate and 19 would deny the Motion to Disqualify based on Plaintiff’s lack of standing to assert a 20 conflict of interest between the County and the Deputy Defendants. 21 3. The Office of the County Counsel did not violate the Court’s rules and orders. 22
23 Plaintiff contends that the Office of County Counsel violated the Court’s rules and 24 25 26 11 The Court has intentionally omitted any reference in this Order to any substantive 27 matters, including communications, agreements, and actions, pertaining to the MSC and follow-up Settlement Status Conferences. 28 1 orders relating to the MSC. The Court disagrees. 2 The Court issued the original scheduling order for this case and the related case, 3 Pauu v. County of San Diego, et al., on September 13, 2024. Pauu, Case No. 23-cv-0961- 4 TWR-SBC (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2024), Dkt. No. 37.12 As relevant here, that order set an 5 MSC before the undersigned on October 1, 2025 at 10:00 a.m. (Id. at 3.) With respect to 6 the MSC, the scheduling order stated, “The parties are ordered to read and to fully comply 7 with the Chamber Rules of the assigned magistrate judge.” (Id.) On July 8, 2025, the Court 8 issued an Order Granting Joint Motion to Modify Scheduling Order, which reset the MSC 9 to December 10, 2025 at 10:00 a.m., to be held by video conference. (Id., Dkt. No. 57.) 10 The order directed that “[a]ll other guidelines, deadlines, and requirements remain as 11 previously set.” (Id., citing Dkt. No. 37.) The MSC was converted to an in-person 12 conference in an order dated August 12, 2025; this order also instructed that “[a]ll other 13 guidelines, deadlines, and requirements remain as previously set.” (Id., Dkt. No. 66.) On 14 December 5, 2025, the undersigned issued the following order regarding the MSC: “In- 15 person Mandatory Settlement Conference set for 12/10/2025 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 16 2D. All counsel, parties, and client representatives with full settlement authority must 17 participate and shall set aside the full day for the conference.”13 (Dkt. No. 30.)14 18 19 12 The original scheduling order was docketed in the related Pauu case pursuant to the 20 Order Granting Joint Motion to Consolidate Related Cases Pursuant to Federal Rule of 21 Civil Procedure 42(a) and Designating Lead Case, which designated the Pauu action as the lead case. Pauu, Case No. 23-cv-0961-TWR-SBC (S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2024), Dkt. No. 24. 22
23 13 This order was issued only on the Talavera docket because the undersigned had deferred proceeding with the MSC in Pauu until after resolution of the pending motion for 24 summary judgment in that case. Pauu, Case No. 23-cv-0961-TWR-SBC, Dkt. No. 74. 25 14 The parties, through the Court’s previous orders, had already been provided with the 26 date of the MSC and all requirements relating to the MSC. See Pauu, Case No. 23-cv-0961- 27 TWR-SBC, Dkt. No. 37 (ordering the parties to read and to fully comply with the undersigned’s Chambers Rules); Dkt. Nos. 57, 66 (referring to original scheduling order). 28 1 This Court’s Civil Chambers Rules provide: 2 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 16.3(b), all parties and party representatives other than counsel must have complete authority to negotiate and enter into a 3 binding settlement agreement at the time of the ENE or MSC. This 4 requirement eliminates the need for any intervention from a superior who is not otherwise a participant to the settlement conference and thus ensures 5 efficiency in the parties’ negotiations. Counsel for a government entity may 6 be excused from this requirement so long as the government attorney who attends the settlement conferences (1) has primary responsibility for 7 handling the case; and (2) may negotiate settlement offers which the 8 attorney is willing to recommend to the government official who has ultimate settlement authority. 9
10 Hon. Steve B. Chu, Civil Chambers Rules, Section III(iii) (emphasis added). 11 Ms. Aceves and Mr. Inman properly participated in the MSC on behalf of 12 Defendants as they met both requirements in the Court’s Chambers Rules: they are the lead 13 attorneys on the case, and they were able to negotiate settlement offers that they were 14 willing to recommend to the government official with full settlement authority. No further 15 appearances were required by the Court’s rules and orders, and nothing that transpired after 16 the MSC violated the Court’s rules and orders. The Office of County Counsel did not 17 violate the Court’s rules and orders in relation to the MSC. 18 C. Conclusion 19 For the foregoing reasons, even if the Court did not strike Plaintiff’s Motion to 20 Disqualify, it would summarily deny the motion on the merits. 21 IV. SANCTIONS 22 Defendants seek the imposition of sanctions of $846.00 in attorney’s fees, based on 23 three hours spent preparing their Motion to Strike at an internal billing rate of $282.00 per 24 hour. (Dkt. No. 47 at 6.) 25
26 27 start time of the MSC from 10:00 AM to 9:30 AM, (2) the location of the MSC, and (3) the fact that all conference participants were to set aside the full day for the conference. 28 1 The Local Rules permit the Court to sanction attorneys for the failure to comply with 2 a local rule or court order. CivLR 83.1(a). Sanctions may be imposed as “authorized by 3 statute or rule or within the inherent power of the Court,” and may include “imposition of 4 monetary sanctions or attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. Other courts in this district have 5 imposed sanctions for violating Local Rule 16.1 or 16.3. See Century Sur. Co., 2008 WL 6 1787491, at *3-4 (imposing monetary sanction of $500.00 against counsel, payable to the 7 Clerk of the Court, under Local Rule 83.1(a) and the court’s inherent power for disclosing 8 confidential communications made during a settlement conference before the Court); 9 Williams, 2018 WL 4961523, at *8 (finding, subject to an opportunity to be heard, that 10 plaintiff was required to pay defendant the reasonable expenses incurred, including 11 attorney’s fees, for opposing a motion that disclosed confidential statements made at an 12 Early Neutral Evaluation Conference); see also Williams v. County of San Diego, Case No.: 13 17-cv-00815-MMA(JLB), 2021 WL 3619876, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2021) (awarding 14 the defendant’s attorney’s fees in the prior-cited case in the amount of $8,942.50). 15 “Because of their very potency, [a federal court’s] inherent powers must be exercised 16 with restraint and discretion.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991). “[A]n 17 assessment of attorney’s fees is undoubtedly within a court’s inherent power.” Id. at 45. An 18 attorney’s fees award under the Court’s inherent power is meant to vindicate judicial 19 authority, rather than provide a substantive remedy to the aggrieved party: “The wrong 20 done was to the court.” Mark Indus., Ltd. v. Sea Captain’s Choice, 50 F.3d 730, 733 (9th 21 Cir. 1995). 22 Before awarding sanctions under its inherent powers, “the court must make an 23 explicit finding that counsel’s conduct constituted or was tantamount to bad faith.” Primus 24 Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997). “The bad faith 25 requirement ensures that the district court’s exercise of its broad power is properly 26 restrained.” Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2006). “A finding of bad 27 faith is warranted where an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, 28 or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent.” Primus, 115 F.3d 1 |} at 649 (citation modified). “A party also demonstrates bad faith by delaying or disrupting 2 || the litigation or hampering enforcement of a court order.” Jd. 3 Here, the Court, as expressed above, is deeply concerned about any breach of the 4 ||obligation to respect the off the record, privileged and confidential nature of 5 |}communications made during the MSC and Settlement Status Conferences before the 6 ||Court. The Court, however, does not find that any counsel acted in bad faith, and thus 7 || declines to impose sanctions. 8 Vv. CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Ex Parte Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Motion 10 Disqualify County Counsel (Dkt. No. 47) is GRANTED. Defendants’ Request for 11 || Sanctions (Dkt. No. 47) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify County Counsel from 12 ||Representing Individual Deputies and Request for Specific Performance and Sanctions 13 ||}(Dkt. No. 46) is STRICKEN in its entirety from the record. Because the Motion to 14 || Disqualify is to be stricken, Plaintiff's motion to file the Motion to Disqualify under seal 15 || (Dkt. No. 45) is DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiff’s Motion to file Response in Opposition 16 ||to Motion to Strike Under Seal (Dkt. No. 51) is GRANTED. 17 Plaintiff shall file a redacted version of his opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 18 || Strike (Dkt. No. 52) for the public record in accordance with the directives provided above 19 May 4, 2026. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: April 27, 2026 22 Ke FA. 24 See ee) eee Hon. Steve B. Chu 25 United States Magistrate Judge 26 27 28