Erik Palacios-Argueta v. Brian English

• Court: District Court, N.D. Indiana
• Decided: May 15, 2026
• Docket: 3:26-cv-00536
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

ERIK PALACIOS-ARGUETA,

Petitioner,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:26-CV-536-CCB-SJF

BRIAN ENGLISH,

Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER Immigration detainee Erik Palacios-Argueta, a litigant without counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging he is unlawfully confined in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States. (ECF 2.) Mr. Palacios-Argueta is a citizen of El Salvador who entered the United States without inspection. (ECF 8-2 at 3.) He claims, without contradiction by the government, that he has been living in this country since 2016. (ECF 9 at 2.) In 2022, he was encountered by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents in Chicago and served with a Notice to Appear in immigration court. (ECF 8-2 at 4.) In 2025, he was arrested by local law enforcement in Kentucky following a traffic stop, when the officer discovered Mr. Palacios-Argueta had an outstanding warrant in El Salvador for extortion. (Id. at 3-4.) He was then taken into custody by ICE agents and transferred to Miami Correctional Facility, where he remains at present pending the conclusion of his removal proceedings. (ECF 2 at 1-2.) An immigration judge has ordered him removed to El Salvador, and his appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals remains pending. (ECF 8-2 at 4.)

Mr. Palacios-Argueta argues that immigration officials have not given him an opportunity for release on bond because they view him as ineligible for bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (ECF 2 at 6.) He argues this statute does not apply to him because he was arrested within the interior of the United States years after his arrival, and that his detention without an opportunity for bond violates applicable statutes and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Id.) He seeks immediate release from custody or a

prompt bond hearing before an immigration judge. (Id. at 7.) In an order to show cause, the court directed the Respondent to address the petition in light of De Jesús Aguilar v. English, No. 3:25-CV-898 DRL-SJF, 2025 WL 3280219, 8 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 25, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 26-1145 (7th Cir. Jan. 26, 2026), and subsequent cases, which joined the overwhelming majority of other district courts in concluding that

§ 1225(b)(2) does not apply to noncitizens who are not “seeking admission” at a port of entry and are instead arrested within the interior of the United States. (ECF 3.) The parties were instructed only to brief “what is different or new, not what has been decided, and those issues particular to this petitioner.” (Id. at 3.) The Respondent answered the petition (ECF 8), and Mr. Palacios-Argueta filed a reply (ECF 9).

The Respondent repeats his argument from De Jesús Aguilar and other recent cases that this court lacks jurisdiction over the petition and that Mr. Palacios-Argueta is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) because he is an applicant “seeking admission” within the meaning of that statute. (ECF 8.) These arguments were rejected in De Jesús Aguliar and subsequent decisions by judges in this District. See, e.g., Mejia Diaz v. Noem, No. 3:25cv960, 2025 WL 3640419 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 16, 2025) (Brisco, J.); Singh v.

English, No. 3:25cv962, 2025 WL 3713715 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 23, 2025) (Leichty, J.). The court continues to be of the view that jurisdiction is secure and that the statute cannot reasonably be interpreted in the manner urged by the government. Notably, the Seventh Circuit held in deciding a motion for a stay pending appeal that the government was not likely to succeed on its argument that the mandatory detention provision contained in § 1225(b)(2) applies to noncitizens who are arrested in the interior of the United States.1 See

Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025). The court reaffirms its holding that the mandatory detention provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to individuals like Mr. Palacios-Argueta who are arrested within the interior of the country years after their arrival. That leads the court to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the “default rule” for detention of noncitizens who are “already present in the

United States.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018). That statute provides: “On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained” while removal proceedings are pending, and the Attorney General “(1) may continue to detain

1 A split panel of the Seventh Circuit recently affirmed the judgment of the district court in part, but there was no majority consensus on the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) permits the mandatory detention of all noncitizens present in the United States without legal status. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., ___F.4th___, 2026 WL 1223250 (7th Cir. May 5, 2026). One judge rejected the government’s interpretation and another adopted it, while the third judge concluded there was no basis to reach that issue. Id. The Second Circuit and Sixth Circuit recently rejected the government’s interpretation of § 1225(b)(2), whereas the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have approved it. See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, ___F.4th___, 2026 WL 1283891 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026); Cunha v. Freden, ___F.4th___, 2026 WL 1146044 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). These opinions are not binding in this Circuit, and the court remains convinced that its analysis of § 1225(b)(2) is sound until additional guidance comes from the Seventh Circuit. the [noncitizen]; and (2) may release the [noncitizen] on (A) bond . . . or (B) conditional parole” until removal proceedings conclude. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The Supreme Court has

held that a noncitizen detained under § 1226(a) is entitled to an individualized bond hearing. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306. Here, Mr. Palacios-Argueta was arrested pursuant to a warrant, which accords with § 1226(a).2 (ECF 8-2 at 3.) However, he has not been granted an opportunity for bond because the government views him as categorically ineligible for bond under § 1225(b)(2). This was error for the reasons previously explained. The court concludes that the

appropriate remedy in this situation is an order requiring the government to provide him with a prompt bond hearing in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations. See Cornejo Rivera v. Olson, No. 3:25-CV-1090-CCB-SJF, 2026 WL 81753 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 12, 2026) (Brisco, J.). The Respondent argues that the court should not grant Mr. Palacios-Argueta any

relief until he exhausts all available administrative remedies. (ECF 8 at 6.) “[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies is not statutorily mandated” in cases brought under § 2241. Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Therefore,

2 Immigration records reflect that an arrest warrant was issued for Mr. Palacios-Argueta’s arrest by ICE agents in Kentucky, although the actual warrant has not been provided. (See ECF 8-2 at 3.) A presumption of regularity attaches to the immigration records, and Mr. Palacios-Argueta does not provide evidence to rebut this presumption. See United States v. Zuniga, 767 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Under the presumption of regularity doctrine, we will presume that public officers will properly carry out their official duties, so long as there is no evidence to the contrary.”); Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The ‘presumption of regularity’ supports official acts of public officers. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the doctrine presumes that public officers have properly discharged their official duties. . . . The doctrine thus allows courts to presume that what appears regular is regular, the burden shifting to the attacker to show the contrary.”) (citations omitted); see also Varela Martinez v. Warden, No. 3:25-CV-1057-DRL- SJF, 2026 WL 322742, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2026) (Leichty, J.) (immigration detainee did not overcome presumption of regularity that attached to official immigration records). whether to require exhaustion is a matter of “sound judicial discretion.” Id. The court may require administrative exhaustion in § 2241 cases challenging a noncitizen’s detention as a

matter of judicial economy or administrative comity, but “individual interests demand that exhaustion be excused when . . . appealing through the administrative process would be futile because the agency . . . has predetermined the issue.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, the court finds that it would be futile for Mr. Palacios-Argueta to pursue a bond request within the agency in light of In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), holding that noncitizens without legal status are subject to mandatory detention

under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (ECF 6.) It is evident from the record (and from the many other habeas petitions filed in this District in recent months) that the government views individuals like Mr. Palacios-Argueta as categorically ineligible for bond. Recent proceedings in a case out of California further support the conclusion that it would be futile to require him to pursue administrative remedies before granting him

habeas relief. In February 2026, a judge in the Central District of California issued an order vacating Hurtado on behalf of a nationwide class of individuals who were arrested by ICE within the interior of the United States and denied an opportunity for bond. See Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2026 WL 468284 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026), appeal docketed, In re Lazaro Maldonado Bautista, No. 26-1044 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026). The

government has appealed, and, at the government’s request, the Ninth Circuit recently stayed the court’s class certification order and final judgment “insofar as they extend beyond the Central District of California,” and stayed the court’s post-judgment order vacating Hurtado in its entirety. Maldonado Bautista, No. 26-1044 (9th Cir. order dated Mar. 31, 2026). The district judge’s decision vacating Hurtado is thus unlikely to change the outcome of a motion for a custody redetermination filed by an individual like Mr.

Palacios-Argueta, who is outside of California. These recent proceedings also confirm that the government remains committed to its interpretation of § 1225(b)(2), notwithstanding the prior rulings of this court and many others across the country. The court finds that the exhaustion doctrine does not present a barrier to relief in this case. Although Mr. Palacios-Argueta asks for outright release, the court views the opportunity for an individualized bond hearing as the correct remedy. He was detained

pursuant to a warrant issued by an immigration officer in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226, and it is for the Attorney General to decide whether release is warranted under the circumstances presented by this case. See Bolante v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir. 2007) (federal court’s inherent authority to release individuals seeking habeas corpus relief is curtailed by statutory structure that applies in immigration cases). However, if the

government does not provide him with an individualized bond hearing, then he must be released, because his continued detention without an opportunity for bond is unlawful. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306. Because Mr. Palacios-Argueta is entitled to relief as a matter of statutory law, the court does not reach his alternate argument that his detention without an opportunity for bond violates the Due Process Clause. See K.C. v.

Individual Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Indiana, 121 F.4th 604, 631 (7th Cir. 2024) (“Courts should avoid resolving cases on constitutional grounds when they can be fairly resolved on statutory grounds.”). For these reasons, the court: (1) CONDITIONALLY GRANTS the petition (ECF 2) and ORDERS the Respondent to release Erik Palacios-Argueta on or before May 22, 2026, unless he is

provided with an individualized bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and corresponding regulations; (2) DIRECTS the clerk to email forthwith a copy of this order to the Warden of the Miami Correctional Facility at the Indiana Department of Correction to secure compliance with this order; and (3) ORDERS the Respondent to file proof of compliance with this order by May 26,

2026. SO ORDERED on May 15, 2026.

/s/Cristal C. Brisco CRISTAL C. BRISCO, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT