Erie R. v. United States

197 F. 287, 116 C.C.A. 649, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1290
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit·Decided June 21, 1912·No. No. 1,582·Published·Cited by 11 cases

Opinion

BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge.

In the court below the United States brought suit against the Erie Railroad Company to recover penalties for 26 violations of the Safety Appliance Acts. The verdict was rendered on instructions of the court below, which held that on the facts-shown the railroad was guilty of violating the act. On the imposition of a penalty on each of said counts, the railroad sued out this writ of error.

Eighteen of the counts, which we will first consider, charged that the railroad had moved that number of trains without having at least 75 per cent, of said cars controlled by air brakes, .in violation of the act of 1893, which provides:

“It shall be unlawful for, any common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to use on its line any locomotive engine in moving interstate traffic not equipped with a power driving-wheel brake and appliances for operating the train-brake system, or to run any train in such traffic after said date that has not a sufficient number of cars in it so equipped with power or train brakes' that the engineer on the locomotive drawing such train can control its speed without requiring brakemen to use the common hand brake for that purpose.”

It is conceded by the government that this act does not apply to, or at least has never been enforced as to, switching operations, Manifestly such is the reasonable construction of the act. Its purpose was to compel railroads to equip trains in interstate transit with air brakes, thereby contributing not only to the safety of passengers and crews, but saving brakemen, so far as possible, from the dangers incurred in manipulating hand brakes. That it was meant to apply to train transit as contrasted with switching operations is clear, not only from the essentially different character of the operation, but from the wording of the act itself. Railroad men recognize in the terms “switching crew” and “train crew” the difference between the two occupations. Switching is recognized as the more dangerous work and as calling for the most agile and expert of men, and the language of the act itself, “on its line,” “in moving interstate traffic,” “to run any train in such traffic,” “control its speed without requiring brakemen to use the common hand brake for that purpose,” are all fittingly used in describing a train on its line proper running in such traffic and within such control by its engineer, rather than to describe the sorting • and switching work carried on in a terminal switching yard. Indeed, a court in its observation of the practical operation of [289] railroads takes judicial notice of the fact that the transportation work of a great modern railway covers two distinct fields of operation: One, the hauling of its trains in transit; and, the other, the assemblage and distribution of the cars into such trains at terminal points. Indeed, the spacious and extensive territory required for such terminal facilities have in modern railroad practice brought into existence corporate terminal agencies whereby a single terminal system may be utilized by several roads, and the distinctive character of terminal, as contrasted with transportation, service is recognized in United States v. Terminal, etc., Ass’n, 224 U. S. 383, 32 Sup. Ct. 507, 56 L. Ed. 810, No. 386 Oct. Term, 1911, in the Supreme Court of the United States decided April 22, 1912, where it is said:

“We are not unmindful of the essential difference between terminal systems properly so described and railroad transportation companies. The first are but ‘ instrumentalities which assist the latter in the transfer of traffic between different lines, and in the collection and distribution of traffic.”

Giving then to the act the construction that it was not meant to cover bona fide switching operations, we next inquire whether the car movements here in question were really switching operations of the railroad. The blueprint in evidence in this case shows that Bergen, Weehawken, and Jersey City are outposts of the triangular terminal system of the Erie Railroad-, Jersey City and, Weehawken being situate under four miles apart on the Hudson river and Bergen about 1 y2 miles inland from Jersey City and 3y2 miles from Weehawken. At Weehawken there are about 80 tracks where cars are received by rail and lighter. These tracks are used for the storage and preliminary classification of cars. After this initial classification the cars are either transferred to other terminals by lighter or hauled in trains to Bergen, where they undergo a further and final classification, and where trains are made up to go out over the road. Intercepting these 80 tracks at Weehawken, which run over the docks, there are two main connecting freight tracks or roads which extend from Weehawken to the eastern portal of the Erie tunnel, which is almost a mile long, and which passes under the Palisades. The yard at Jersey City Is used for initial classification in the same way as that at Weehawken for both railroad and lighterage transit, and from it main freight tracks extend to the eastern portal of the Erie tunnel, where they intersect the tracks from Weehawken. Near this tunnel is a cut through which the main Erie tracks run; but the tunnel is used exclusively for the transfer of freight cars between Bergen and Weehawken and between Bergen and Jersey City. Beyond the western end of the tunnel is the yard at Bergen, which contains 110 tracks. In one division of this yard west-bound cars which have been brought from Jersey City and Weehawken are reclassified and drilled into trains which proceed from thence to western destinations. In receiving trains from the west the same process is reversed, viz., reception at the Bergen terminal, classification and distribution into subdivisions for the respective terminals at Weehawken and Jersey City, where they are again classified for docks and other points of destination. The transfers from Weehawken to Bergen and from Jersey [290] City to Bergen are limited to 35 cars in each transfer, since the Bergen tracks in some subdivisions of the yard are each limited to 35 cars’ capacity.

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Erie R. v. United States, 197 F. 287, 116 C.C.A. 649, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1290 (3d Cir. 1912).

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