LOUGHRY, Justice:
The petitioners, Erie Insurance Property and Casualty Company and the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner (“Erie” and “Commissioner” individually or “petitioners” collectively), appeal a September 12, 2014, order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. By that order, the circuit court' reversed a July 10, 2013, administrative decision of the Commissioner and overruled the Commissioner’s prior approval of a rate, form, and product filing submitted by Erie. In this appeal, the petitioners contend that the circuit court misapplied thé law by failing to afford deference to the Commissioner’s approval authority with respect to insurance rates and forms, made erroneous findings of fact, and improperly substituted its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and arguments,
the submitted record, and pertinent authorities, we find the circuit court erred in reversing the decision of the Commissioner. - Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, the circuit court’s order is reversed, and this case is remanded for entry of .an order reinstating the Commissioner^ decision.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
' In early February 201.0, Erie made a 398-page filing with the Commission'er seeking approval for a new product endorsement entitled “Rate ' Protection Endorsement” (“RPE”).
Erie indicated that the RPE would provide a guarantee that
&
policy owner’s rate would not change once obtained, if three conditions remained static: the car(s), the driver(s), and the garaging address.' In other words, the premium would remain the same even if there-were other' occurrences that .would normally trigger a’ rate increase. Erie stated that the endorsement could be discontinued at any time and was, optional.
The price of the endorsement varied by coverage based upon, an RPE scoring algorithm. The proposed effective date was June 1, 2010. Upon receipt of the filing,- the Commissioner undertook an investigation and review that resulted in several amendments to the filing by Erie. Ultimately, the Commissioner approved the Erie filing, as amended, on April 15, 2010, with an effective date of July 1,2010.
In the spring ,of 2012, the respondent, Vincent J. King (“Mr. King”), traded his 2009 Chevrolet Malibu -for ,a 2pi2 model. Before doing so, Mr. King, an Erie insured, contacted his "Erie insurance agent at the Garlow Insurance Agfency to determine the impact the trade would have on his insurance premium. At that time, Mr. King was advised that the trade would result in less than a $3.00 annual increase. After making the trade, Mr. King notified his agent to substitute vehicles under his Erie policy, stating that he wanted the same coverage on his new car.
Thereafter, Mr. King, who was unaware that Erie had obtained approval for its RPE, received his new policy which reflected a different premium that was actually less than the amount he had been quoted when he inquired about the premium prior to making his trade. Mr. King observed that while his total premium had decreased, the liability premium had increased by forty percent. Mr. King contacted his insurance agent and asked for a detailed explanation. According to Mr. King, he was told that the difference in premium was the result of “rate protection.” -Upon further inquiry, Mr. King received a letter from Erie, dated November 16, 2012, stating, in pertinent part:
The change in premium between the policy renewal on February 2, 2012 and the amendment effective April 26, 2012 was due to the replacement of the 2009 vehicle with a 2012 vehicle and the addition of the Rate Protection Endorsement. Prior to this time, your policy die] not include the Rate Protection Endorsement. With the advent’of this Endorsement, which allows Customers to lock their premium until they make a qualifying change, ERIE introduced a different rating plan with a higher degree of pricing sophistication than exists in our traditional rating plan.
The Garlow Agency confirmed that its standard business practice at the time of a qualifying change, such as the replacement of a vehicle, is to offer the Customer the option of adding the Rate Protection Endorsement, which you elected to do. ERI.E’s private passenger auto rates in West Virginia did not change during this time period, so the premium change you experienced resulted from the change in vehicles and the addition of the Rate Protection Endorsement.
If the replacement of the existing vehicle with the newer vehicle had been the only change, then the premium changes for the individual coverages would have coincided ■with your expectations. Adding the Rate Protection Endorsement provided you with an additional policy feature,, while at the same time reducing the overall premium. Because the rating plan associated with the Endorsement differs from ERIE’S traditional rating plan, the price of a policy endorsed with Rate Protection may be higher, or lower, than it would be without the Endorsement. In your case, the resulting changes by coverage were an increase to the liability premium and a decrease in the physical damages premiums, for an overall premium decrease.
Mr. King was certain that he had not been offered the RPE and had not consented to the addition of the RPE to his policy despite Erie’s assertion to the contrary. Unsatisfied with Erie’s responses to his inquiries, Mr. King sent a letter to Erie on December 5, 2012, requesting a hearing pursuant to West Virginia Code § 33-20-9 (2011).
Responding to Mr. King’s request, Erie made Cody Cook, the Vice President and Product Manager of its Personal Lines Division, available for questioning by Mr. King on February 1, 2013. Erie also provided approximately 400 pages of publicly-accessible documents related to Erie’s RPE rate filing for Mr. King to review. According to Mr. King, after eliciting testimony from Mr. Cook, he sought to question Phil Garlow, his insurance agent, but Erie stopped the hearing because Mr. Garlow requested time to obtain counsel. While Mr. King believed the hearing was
going to continue at a later date, Erie instead filed a Petition for Declaratory Ruling with the Commissioner, seeking a declaratory ruling as to, the scope and applicability of the provisions of West Virginia Code §. 33-20-9. In response, Mr. King filed an administrative complaint against Erie titled “Petition for Hearing and Issuance of Subpoenas” pursuant to West Virginia Code §§ 33-20-5(d) (2011),
33-2-13 (2011)
and 33-2-4 (2011),
seeking a hearing before the- Commissioner to determine “whether Erie accurately represented the risk with respect to its Rate Protection Endorsement and corresponding Rate and Rule Manual pages, and whether prior approvals thereof should now be withdrawn.”
Concluding that a hearing would serve no useful purpose, the Commissioner issued a twenty-page order on July 10, 2013, addressing both Erie’s request for a declaratory ruling and Mr. King’s administrative complaint. Denying Mr. King relief,.the order contained detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, declaring that upon re-review, the Commissioner’s prior approval of Erie’s RPE was “in proper accordance with West Virginia law.”
Following the issuance of the Commissioner’s order, Mr. King filed an appeal in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County pursuant to the State Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”),
asserting, inter alia, that the Commissioner was statutorily required to. withdraw the prior approval of Erie’s RPE and that the Commissioner was clearly wrong with respect to certain findings of fact.
- The circuit court heard oral arguments on the matter on August 1, 2014. Thereafter, on September 12, 2014, the circuit court issued its. final order reversing the Commissioner’s decision. The order provides in relevant part:
Ordinarily, the undersigned would be inclined. to -remand this .matter for further proceedings at the administrative level but, at oral argument, counsel for the Commissioner made-clear that the Commissioner’s overriding concern is the perceived ramifications of a private citizen challenging the acts of an insurer, more so than the merits of any such challenge. Remand, therefore, would be an exercise in futility and [Mr. King] would simply -refile his appeal here. Accordingly, this Court having reviewed the same evidence, and having found that Erie’s RPE violates.Chapter 33; contains misleading clauses;. that the title -itself is misleading; that it is being solicited by deceptive marketing; that its benefits are unreasonable in relation to the premium
charged; and is not in the public’s interest, but the Commissioner ■ having failed to withdraw' approval as he was statutorily required to do, the Order appealed from is hereby REVERSED and continued approval of the RPE is OVERRULED. The Court leaves to the discretion of the Commissioner an orderly process by which policies currently subject to RPE are otherwise renewed and “converted to traditional rating also previously approved. Alternatively, nothing herein precludes Erie from agáin seeking approval, with proper- fiscal disclosure, deletion of misleading- clauses and title, neutral rating, proper consumer advertising and agent training, all as'the Commissioner in full compliance with West Virginia law might allow, on <a strictly voluntary basis by the consumer. ■
Upon entry of the circuit court’s order, this appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
This is an administrative appeal arid our review is governed by the same statutory standard that applied to the circuit court’s consideration of this matter.' As we explained in syllabus point one of
Muscatell v. Cline,
196 W.Va. 688, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996):
On appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained in W-Va. Code § 29A-5-4(a) and reviews questions of law presented
de novo;
findings of fact by the administrative officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong.
We further advised in
Muscatell
that
[i]n cases where the circuit court has amended the result before the adminístra-five agency, this Court reviews the final order of the circuit court and the ultimate disposition by it of an administrative law case under ah abuse of discretion standard and reviews questions of law
de novo.
Id.
at 590, 474 S.E.2d at 520, syl. pt. 2. With these standards .in mind, we determine whether the circuit court erred in reversing the decision of the Commissioner and overruling the prior approval of Erie’s RPE.
III. Discussion
The primary focus of the arguments in this appeal' concerns whether the circuit court engaged in an improper re-exámination of Erie’s rate and form policy filing for its RPE that was approved by the Commissioner in 2010. In that regard, the petitioners contend the circuit court erroneously conducted a de novo review of the prior approval of the RPE and unequivocally substituted its own judgment for that of the Commissioner contrary to this Court’s decisions in
State ex rel. Citifinancial, Inc. v. Madden,
223 W.Va. 229, 672 S.E.2d 365 (2008)
(“Citifinancial
I”);
West Virginia Employers’ Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bunch Co.,
231 W.Va. 321, 745 S.E.2d 212 (2013)
(“Bunch
”); and
Lightner v. Riley,
233 W.Va. 573, 760 S.E.2d 142 (2014) (“Citi
Financial II
”). By not affording deference to the Commissioner’s decision concerning the validity of the RPE as required by this trilogy of cases, the petitioners assert that the circuit court misapplied the standard of review for administrative appeals set forth in West Virginia Code § 29A-5-4(g).
In addition, the petitioners argue that the circuit court’s decision is clearly wrong because the findings of fact contained therein are contrary to the evidence set forth in the record. By making erroneous findings of fact and failing to afford deference to the Commis
sioner’s decision, the petitioners submit that the circuit court has invaded the Commissioner’s rate making authority thereby violating the separation of powers doctrine set forth in our State Constitution.' The end result according to the petitioners is an obfuscation of the different roles of' the Commissioner and the judiciary that will -have' the effect of destabilizing the regulation of insurance in West'Virginia.
Maintaining this case;:does not implicate the Commissioner’s rate making authority, Mr. King argues that the circuit court applied the appropriate standard of review, correctly finding that several of the Commissioner’s findings of fact were clearly wrong and that the Commissioner encroached upon judicial functions in reaching several of his conclusions of law. Mr. King further contends the circuit court did not err in determining that this Court’s decisions in
Citifi-nancial I,. Bunch,
and
CitiFinancial II
were not relevant tp this matter. In that regard, he states that, this, case is distinguishable from
Citifinancial I
because it is an administrative appeal as opposed to a collateral civil action. He claims that
Bunch
and
CitiFi-nancial II
are distinguishable because those decisions focused upon whether there was a failure to exhaust administrative remedies due to the Commissioner’s refusal to hold a hearing. Mi’. King points out that he did not appeal the Commissioner’s decision because he was denied a hearing but rather simply asserted there was no basis in the record for certain findings of fact and conclusions of law rendered by the Commissioner. In sum, Mr. King argues that the circuit court’s decision to reverse the .Commissioner’s- order was based on the record and, application of the appropriate standard .of reyiew. under the APA. • ,
Despite Mr. King’s claim that this case is “limited to the failure to withdraw approval of the Rate Protection Endorsement, not the rates applicable thereto,” the record in this case shows that from the outset, he has maintained that “the benefits of the RPE are unreasonable in relation to the premium charged.” In fact, it was the resulting forty percent increase in Mr. King’s liability premium through the addition of the RPE to his insurance policy that caused him to first inquire about the changes thereto. Thus, Mr. King’s assertion that this case does not involve rate making rings hollow. Clearly, this is an administrative appeal of a rate and form filing approval. As such, the circuit court committed clear error by refusing to apply the holdings in this court’s trilogy of cases setting forth the parameters of judicial involvement when matters of insurance rate making are at issue. A review of those cases illustrates not only the relevance of that precedent but hów the circuit court’s rulings in this matter are in direct conflict with those decisions.
In
Citifinancial I,
this Court was required to determine whether an individual, Paul W. Lightner, could challenge the reasonableness of an amount charged for credit insurance in connection with certain loans through a civil action.,. The lender, CitiFinancial, initiated the civil action when Mr. Lighter defaulted on another loan. CitiFinancial sought a writ of prohibition, from this Court arguing, inter alia, that whether a charge for insurance is unreasonable or excessive is a decision for the Commissioner and, therefore, the circuit court should be prohibited from allowing Mr. Lighter to pursue the matter in the underlying .civil action. Upon examination of the West .Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act and the relevant insurance statutes, this Court concluded that the. Commissioner’s authority over matters involving insurance rate making and insurance-related forms was unquestionable. Accordingly, we held that “[a]ny challenge to an approved, insurance rate by an aggrieved
person or organization should be raised pursuant to the provisions of West Virginia Code § 33-20-5(d) (1967) (Repl.Vol. 2006) in a proceeding before the Insurance Commissioner.”
Citifinancial I,
223 W.Va. at 231, 672 S.E.2d at 367, syl. pt. 3. In so holding, we explained that
factual evidence on issues such .as- loss ratios and rates of return is required to disprove the reasonableness of an established insurance rate. These issues, due to their highly specialized nature, are typically reserved to the Commissioner’s bailiwick.
See
W.Va.Code §§ 33-20-3; 33-20-4, 33-6-30(b). It stands to reason that if .a circuit court is allowed to invade this administrative arena and reexamine the issue of whether a given insurance rate is reasonable or excessive, the judiciary will necessarily be substituting its determinations as to permissible insurance rates for those previously determined by the Commissioner and supplanting its opinion in matters expressly delegated to the Commissioner’s expertise and jurisdiction. A further peril that cannot be overlooked is that judicial intervention in the rate making area would open the door to conflicting decisions amongst the various circuits regarding what constitutes an unreasonable or excessive charge for credit insurance. In this manner then, the uniformity of regulation that the Legislature has established by delegating all matters involving rate making and rate filings to the Commissioner is certain to be infringed if circuit courts or jurors are permitted to second guess the reasonableness of rates previously approved by the Commissioner..
223 W.Va. at 237, 672 S.E.2d at 373. We also observed that in 2002, the Legislature amended West Virginia Code § 33-6-30 adding a presumption of statutory compliance for policy forms and rates approved by the Commissioner.
We determined that
the inclusion of the statutory language that creates a presumption of compliance occurred as part of the Legislature’s attempt to strengthen the rate making powers of the Commissioner.
See
W.Va.Code § 33-6-30(b), (c) (2002 amends). Through its adoption of this statutory language, the Legislature established a procedural mechanism by which insurance rates are presumed to be in compliance with all regulatory requirements upon their approval by the Commissioner. While approved insur-anee rates are still subject to challenge, the burden for disproving the validity of such rates is. placed on the entity who seeks to set the rates aside. . , .
223 W.Va. at 239, 672 S.E.2d at 375. Accordingly, we concluded that
[i]n‘ providing for a cause of action that permits the recovery of excess charges included in a consumer credit transaction pursuant to the provisions of West Virginia Code § 46A-3-109 (1998) (Repl.Vol.2006) and § 46A-5-10Í (1996)' (Repl.Vol.2006), the Legisláture did not authorize the circuit courts to invade the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner and conduct a reexamination of insurance rates previously approved by the Commissioner.
223 W.Va. at 231, 672 S.E.2d at 367, syl. pt. 2.
We, of course, recognized in
Citifinancial I
that “[a]ny ruling issued by the Commissioner on 'the issue of the reasonableness of insurance rates or compliance with statutory provisions is a final order that is subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (‘APA’).”
Id.
at 239, 672 S.E.2d at 375. In other words, “judicial review of a determination by the Commissioner on the issue of whether insurance rates are reasonable and in compliance with statutory requirements-does exist.”
Id.
We proceeded to set forth the parameters of that judicial review in
Bunch,
231 W.Va. 321, 745 S.E.2d 212.
In
Bunch,
the petitioners, the West Virginia Employer’s''Mutual Insurance Company
doing
business as BrickStreet Mutual Insurance Company (“BrickStreet”) and the Commissioner, appealed a decision of the Circuit
Court of Kanawha County that reversed and vacated an administrative order of the Commissioner upholding previously approved workers’ compensation insurance policy rates. Specifically at issue was the expense of an agent commission that was included in the worker’s compensation premium Brick-Street was charging to the Bunch Company (“Bunch”) and other similarly situated .insureds. Complying with the dictates of
Citi-financial I,
Bunch filed a consumer complaint with the Commissioner alleging that BrickStreet was “unlawfully charging an agent commission for its ‘direct write’ business.”
Id.
at 325, 745 S.E.2d at 216. Denying Bunch relief, the Commissioner’s administrative order provided:
5. The Insurance Commissioner finds there is no factual dispute concerning the filing and approval of the rates and forms of BrickStreet ... and as a matter of law the rate filings and BrickStreet’s use of the same should.be upheld,
6. The Insurance Commissioner finds that the rates charged by BrickStreet were reasonable in relation to the benefits provided due to the fact that certain administrative costs and/or expenses are incurred by BrickStreet in handling direct written business which would otherwise be handled by appointed agents.
Id.
The Commissioner also found that Bunch had not provided any ■ information to rebut the presumption of statutory compliance that attaches to insurance rates pursuant to West Virginia Code § 33-6-30(c). 231 W.Va. at 325, 745 S.E.2d at 216.
Bunch appealed the decision, and the circuit court reversed and vacated the Commissioner’s order. The circuit court ruled that “the Commissioner erred by allowing Brick-Street to charge Bunch a commission when no correlative expense had been incurred” and that “the Commissioner erred'in finding the subject insurance rates were reasonable.”
Id.
at 325-26, 745 S.E.2d at 216-17. Upon review, we agreed with the petitioners’ assertion that the circuit'court had “engaged in a rexamination of approved insurance rates and wrongly supplanted its opinion for that of the Commissioner in area that has been expressly delegated to the Commissioner’s expertise.”
Id.,
at 328, 745 S.E.2d at 219. We noted,
Judge Kaufman, during the hearing on this matter, was quick to recognize two fundamental concerns presented by this case: encroachment on' the regulatory rate making process and separation of powers. Notwithstanding the trial court’s appreciation of these issues, it proceeded to breach established precepts pertaining to both of those juridical areas. Specifically failing to heed this Court’s recognition in
State ex rel. Crist v. Cline,
219 W.Va. 202, 632 S.E.2d 358 (2006), “that we ... give deference to [the Insurance Commissioner’s] interpretation, so long as it is consistent with the plain meaning of the governing statute,” the trial court substituted its judgment for that of the Commissioner on a matter that clearly fell within the rate making area of the Commissioner’s expertise. I
d.
at 211, 632 S.E.2d at 367. As we recognized in
Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep’t,
195 W.Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995), “[a]n inquiring court— even a court empowered to conduct
de novo
review — must examine a regulatory inteipretation of a statute by standards that include appropriate deference to agency expertise and discretion.”
Id.
at 582, 466 S.E.2d at 433. Ignoring the deference that the Commissioner was entitléd to in connection with the interpretation of "its own regulation, the trial court encroached upon a matter that has been expressly delegated to the executive branch of our state government.
See Citifinan
c
ial,
223 W.Va. at 237, 672 S.E.2d at 373. In doing so, the trial court neglected to regard this Court’s admonition in
Citifi-nancial
that “the uniformity of regulation that the Legislature has established by delegating all matters involving rate making and rate filings to the Commissioner is certain to be infringed if circuit courts or jurors are permitted to second guess the reasonableness of rates previously approved by the Commissioner.”
Id.
231 W.Va. at 331-32, 745 S.E.2d at 222-23 (footnote omitted).
Less than a year after
Bunch
was decided, Mr. Lightner and CitiFinancial returned to
this Court along with Triton Insurance Company, the entity that issued the credit insurance policies sold to Mr. Lightner by CitiPi-nancial. Pursuant to the decision of this Court in
.Citifinancial I,
Mr. Lightner had filed a consumer complaint with the Commissioner challenging the rates for the credit insurance he bad purchased and seekipg to have the Commissioner withdraw approval for the rate, filings of Triton over a period of fourteen years. 233 W.Va. at 576, 760 S.E.2d at 145. Upon receipt of Mr. Lightner’s consumer complaint, the Commissioner undertook an extensive investigation of his allegations, as well as all of Triton’s rate filings in West Virginia.
Id.
at 577, 760 S.E.2d at 146. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Commissioner issued a decision concluding
(1) that Triton did comply with W.Va.Code § 33-20-3. (2006) in its filings and that Triton’s rate filings did ..not violate W.Va. Code § 33-20-3; (2) that there is “no factual dispute as concerning the. filing and approval of the rates and forms of Triton Insurance Company” and that the rates charged by Triton were reasonable in relation to the benefits provided; and (3) that a hearing upon the administrative complaint would serve no useful purpose and, therefore, the request for a hearing was denied.
233 W.Va. at 578, 760 S.E.2d at 147 (footnote omitted).
Mr. Lighter appealed the 'decision to the circuit court, which upheld the Commissioner’s rulings. He then sought relief from this Court. While Mr. Lightner’s primary assignment of error in
CitiFinancial II
concerned the Commissioner’s refusal to conduct a hearing on his complaint, he also challenged the circuit court’s decision to uphold the Commissioner’s finding that the insurance charges were not excessive and were reasonable in relation to the benefits provided.
Id.
at 579, 760 S.E.2d at 148. Mr. Lightner maintained that the Commissioner had offered ho data or evidence to support his conclusion that the lenders rates were reasonable in relation to the benefits provided. and that the circuit court’s order added nothing to the Commissioner’s'findings.
Id.
Noting that our review was controlled by the provisions of West Virginia Code § 29A-5-4(g),
we found that “the Commissioner performed due diligence and questioned the rate filings, but he received adequate documentation and explanation from Triton prior to approving the rates from 1994 through 2003.” 233 W.Va. at 582, 760 S.E.2d at 151. Accordingly, we affirmed the finding that the rates charged for the credit insurance were reasonable.
Id. <
As
in CitiFinancial II,
before rendering a decision in this matter, the Commissioner undertook another review of Erie’s rate and form filing for the RPE. Finding the prior approval to be proper and in accordance with West Virginia law, the Commissioner concluded:
4. Pursuant to W.Va.Code § 33-6-30(c) (2002), “[w]here any insurance policy form, includifig any -endorsement' thereto, has been approved by the commissioner, and the corresponding rate has been approved by the commissioner, there is a presumption that the 'policy forms and rate structure are in full compliance with- the requirements of this chapter,” the Insurance Commissioner finds that the rates, forms and/or products were approved by the Insurance Commissioner and, therefore, presumed to be in compliance with Chapter 33 of.the W.Va. Code. Further, the Commissioner ha? been .provided with no information that would in fact rebut such a presumption .despite the voluminous filings and argument of [Mr. King],
5. The Insurance Commissioner finds there is no factual dispute concerning the filing and approval of the rates, forms and/or products of Erie as referenced herein this Order and the subject of [Mr. King’s] administrative complaint and as a matter of law the rate, form and/or product filings and Erie’s use of the same should be upheld.
9. The Insurance Commissioner finds that .the rates charged by Erie were reasonable in relation to the premium charged in .that the benefits provided and
the fact that the filing took into account the ramifications and usage of the optional endorsement known as the Rate Protection Endorsement and that sufficient and adequate if not substantial benefits are provided to policyholders who have purchased this product and stay within the confines of the program.
15. The Insurance Commissioner finds and concludes that there are no violations of the West Virginia Code in regard to the Erie RPE filing and its implementation of the same to this policyholder, [Mr!] King.
16. The Insurance Commissioner finds and concludes that the filing does not contain or incorporate by reference any inconsistent, ambiguous or misleading clauses, or exceptions and conditions which deceptively affect the risk to be assumed in the •general coverage contract.
17. The Insurance Commissioner finds and concludes that there are no other provisions of the filing that are misleading or were misleading in how it was implement ed to this policyholder, [Mr.] King.
18. The Insurance Commissioner finds and concludes that the policies sold to [Mr.] King were not procured through deceptive advertising.
19. The Insurance Commissioner finds and concludes that the benefits of the RPE and the filing are reasonable in relation to the premium charged.
20. The Insurance -Commissioner finds and concludes that the coverage provided therein the filing by Erie concerning the RPE product was sufficiently broad to be in the public interest.
In reversing the Commissioner’s decision, the circuit court’s order reflects that no deference was accorded to the Commissioner’s determination as to the validity of Erie’s rate and form filing for its RPE as required by West Virginia Code § 33-6-30(c) and our decisions in
Citifinancial I, Bunch,
and
Citi-Financial II.
Failing to mention the presumption of statutory compliance embedded in West Virginia Code § 33-6-30(c) and dismissing the trilogy of cases in a summary fashion, the circuit court proceeded by express admission to “conduct[] its own research and analysis.” The end result was a reversal of the Commissioner’s' decision-based upon misapplication of the law, a complete disregard of the record, and an improper substitution of-the circuit court’s opinion.
Despite our admonition in
Bunch
that a court may not reexamine, matters that clearly fall within the Commissioner’s rate making authority and substitute its judgment for that of 'the Commissioner, the trial court proceeded to do that very thing in this case by concluding that the benefits of the RPE are “unreasonable in relation to the premium charged.” Relegating its finding in this regard to a footnote, the circuit court discredited the Commissioner’s determination on this issue on the basis that the
RPE resulted in a .40% increase in [Mr. King’s], personal liability rate_RPE has resulted in a net gain, to ERIE_ The Court has not found any cost-benefit analysis or any other entry in the Record to support the Commissioner’s' finding that the benefits provided by the RPE hre reasonable in relation to the increased liability premium.
The circuit court’s conclusion that the benefits of the RPE are unreasonable in relation to the premium charged overlooked the fact that Mr. King’s overall premium actually decreased by the addition of the RPE to his policy. More importantly, the circuit court failed to recognize that when Erie sought approval for its RPE, the Commissioner made the decision based on 398 pages of documentation, which included experience data and( projections that Erie had available to it at that time. In
Bunch,
we explained that “[b]y design, insurance rate setting involves the prospective use of proposed rates which are calculated based on cost projections derived from past experience combined with a reasonable expectation of future losses and expenses.” 231 W.Va. at 323, 745 S.E.2d at 214, syl. pt. 5. Rather than acknowledging the highly complex nature of insurance rate setting and this Court’s recognition that the Legislature has madé clear that “rate making [is] not a matter intended
for the courts,”
the circuit court second guessed the reasonableness of the rates previously approved by the Commissioner.
In addition to erroneously injecting itself -into a rate making matter, the circuit court made findings of fact that were contrary to overwhélmirig evidence in the record below. In particular, the circuit court found that the RPE violates Chapter 33; is misleading based on its title and clauses contained within; is being solicited by deceptive marketing practices; and is not in the public’s interest. The circuit court made these findings by relying, in part, upon portions of Mr. Cook’s testimony elicited by Mr. King that were clearly taken out of context or simply misunderstood. Contrary to the circuit court, the Commissioner found the RPE was not ambiguous, unclear, or in any way misleading nor was the product deceptively marketed. The Commissioner pointed out in his decision that Mr. King was given the ability to remove the RPE -from his policy on more than one occasion, yet he declined to so. Further, the evidence indicated that Mr. King had been provided the “Important Notice” issued by Erie that detailed the implementation of the product. This Court has held that “‘[t]he “clearly wrong” and the “arbitrary and capricious” standards of review are deferential ones which presume an agency’s actions are valid as long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence or by a rational basis.’ Syllabus Point 3,
In re Queen,
196 W.Va. 442, 473 S.E.2d 483 (1996).” Syl. Pt. 5,
Dale v. Oakland,
234 W.Va. 106, 763 S.E.2d 434 (2014). In this instance, the Commissioner’s decision was clearly supported by substantial evidence, and the circuit court abused, its discretion in substituting its judgment, i
Through the trilogy of cases discussed above, this Court has clearly prescribed the role of a reviewing court tasked with' an administrative appeal of a matter that implicates the rate making authority of the Commissioner. Further, the Legislature had mandated by express statutory directive that “[wjhere any insurance policy form, including any endorsement thereto, has been approved by the commissioner, and the corresponding rate has been approved by the commissioner, there is a presumption that the policy forms and rate structure are in full compliance with the requirements of this chapter.” W.Va. Code § 33-6-30(c). In addition, we have made clear that under the APA, a reviewing court must accord deference to the findings of fact made by an administrative agency unless that court believes the findings to be clearly wrong.
Muscatell,
196 W.Va. at 590, 474 S.E.2d at 520, syl. pt. 1. That deference presumes that the agency’s actions are valid if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Dale,
234 W.Va. at 107, 763 S.E.2d at 435, syl. pt. 5. In this instance, the circuit court acted independent of these established precepts and substituted its judgment for that of the Commissioner.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we reverse the September 12, 2014, order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County and remand this case for entry of an order reinstating the July 10, 2013, decision of the Commissioner.
Reversed and remanded.