Erickson v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: July 28, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-07032
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 BRIDGET ERICKSON, et al., Case No. 24-cv-07032-AMO

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 10 KIMBERLY-CLARK CORPORATION, Re: Dkt. No. 19 Defendant. 11

12 13 Plaintiffs bring this putative class action on behalf of a nationwide and California state 14 class, alleging Defendant’s Huggies-brand baby wipes fail to disclose they contain per- and 15 polyfluoroalkyl substances (“PFAS”). Plaintiffs assert five causes of action: 1) violation of 16 California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq.; 2) 17 violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et 18 seq.; 3) violation of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, 19 et seq.; 4) breach of express warranty; and 5) unjust enrichment. Defendant moves to dismiss the 20 First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (ECF 16)1 in its entirety under Federal Rule of Civil 21 Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. 22 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court 23 finds this motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. Having reviewed the parties’ 24 submissions, and the relevant legal authority, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss, with 25 leave to amend. 26

27 1 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 1 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS? 2 Plaintiff Bridget Erickson purchased Huggies Simply Clean Fragrance Free Baby Wipes in 3 || May and July of 2023 as well as in April 2024. (ECF 16 46.) Plaintiff Erica Stevenson also 4 || purchased Defendant’s baby wipes in February and April of 2024. Ud. 4] 8.) Both Plaintiffs 5 || reviewed the product’s packaging prior to purchase and relied on the representations made therein. 6 || Ud. 6, 8.) Throughout the product packaging, Defendant markets the baby wipes as “simply 7 clean,” and further indicates the product is “Hypoallergenic,” “Dermatologically Tested,” 8 “Alcohol Free,” and “Paraben Free.” (Ud. § 14.) 9 10 11 oe ee a pet 3 12 J AGLAE PRE PARRY —Wr> -— 7S a ————

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1 In March 2024, Plaintiffs’ counsel requested testing of the product, “utilizing a Department 2 of Defense ELAP-certified laboratory.” (Id. ¶ 4.) A randomly selected sample, “representative of 3 the Huggies Simply Clean Fragrance Free Baby Wipe Product line,” was tested using the 4 Environmental Protection Agency’s 537 testing method, and the lab found PFAS in the baby 5 wipes in an amount of 305 parts per trillion. (Id.) PFAS “are man-made chemicals that have been 6 used in industry and consumer products worldwide since the 1940s. They have been used to make 7 nonstick cookware, water-repellent clothing, stain resistant fabrics and carpets, some cosmetics, 8 some firefighting foams, and products that resist grease, water, and oil.” (Id. ¶ 24.) These 9 substances can be toxic and “[t]he EPA has set the health advisory level for PFOA at .004 parts 10 per trillion and for PFOS at .02 parts per trillion, an indication that some negative health effects 11 may occur within concentration of PFOA or PFOS in water that are near zero.” (Id. ¶ 25 (internal 12 quotations omitted).) PFAS have also been linked to severe, negative health outcomes such as 13 “cancer and effects on lipid metabolism” as well as “immune suppression, thyroid disease, and 14 harm to reproduction.” (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiffs further incorporate various scientific research 15 highlighting the unique vulnerability of infants to harmful chemicals. (Id. ¶¶ 30-32.) 16 Plaintiffs find Defendant’s advertising misleading because it omitted and concealed that 17 the product contained “dangerous levels of PFAS,” which could cause serious health 18 repercussions. (Id. ¶ 43.) The representations on the packaging therefore deceive reasonable 19 consumers, and had Plaintiffs known of the PFAS content, they would not have paid as much for 20 the product. (Id. ¶ 48.) 21 LEGAL STANDARD 22 “To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim after the Supreme Court’s 23 decisions in Iqbal and Twombly, plaintiffs’ allegations must suggest that their claim has at least a 24 plausible chance of success.” Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2014) (cleaned 25 up). The district court must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and draw all reasonable 26 inferences in their favor. Shields v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 32 F.4th 1218, 1220 (9th Cir. 2022). 27 However, the court need not construe conclusory statements or unreasonable inferences as true. 1 Further, since Plaintiffs assert claims sounding in fraud, the FAC must comply with the 2 heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Davidson v. Sprout Foods, 3 Inc., 106 F.4th 842, 852 (9th Cir. 2024). To comply with this standard, “the complaint must 4 ‘identify the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false 5 or misleading about the purportedly fraudulent statement, and why it is false.’” Id. (quoting 6 Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2018)). 7 DISCUSSION 8 I. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 9 Defendant requests judicial notice of six documents. (ECF 19-1.) Plaintiffs do not oppose. 10 These documents include certain articles already incorporated by reference into the FAC as well as 11 documents sourced from the EPA and FDA websites. (Id. at 3.) 12 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a “court may judicially notice a fact that is not 13 subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial 14 jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 15 reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Courts often take judicial notice of “matters of 16 public record” and court filings. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 17 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court may also take judicial notice of the content of government websites. 18 See, e.g., Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). 19 For those documents already cited within the FAC, the Court considers them incorporated 20 by reference. As to the remaining exhibits attached to Defendant’s request, such as the articles 21 from the EPA and FDA websites, the request for judicial notice is GRANTED. 22 II. FRAUD CLAIMS 23 Plaintiffs assert the Defendant’s representations on the Huggies-brand baby wipes’ 24 packaging, as well the omission of any information regarding PFAS content, violated the CLRA, 25 FAL, and the UCL’s fraudulent prong. California’s UCL “prohibits any ‘unlawful, unfair or 26 fraudulent business act or practice.’ The false advertising law prohibits any ‘unfair, deceptive, 27 untrue, or misleading advertising.’” Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1 competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.’” Id. (citation omitted). All three statutes 2 are governed by the “reasonable consumer test,” whereby the plaintiff “must show that members 3 of the public are likely to be deceived.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Because the same 4 standard for fraudulent activity governs all three statutes, courts often analyze the three statutes 5 together.” In re Plum Baby Food Litig., No. 4:21-CV-00913-YGR, 2024 WL 1354447, at *4 6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2024), aff’d, No. 24-2766, 2025 WL 1200700 (9th Cir. Apr. 25, 2025); see 7 also Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2016) (analyzing California consumer 8 protection statutes together since they share the same “reasonable consumer” test). “[I]n federal 9 court, dismissals of UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims at the pleadings stage have ‘occasionally been 10 upheld,’ but such cases are ‘rare.’ Dismissal is appropriate when ‘the advertisement itself [makes] 11 it impossible for the plaintiff to prove that a reasonable consumer [is] likely to be deceived.’” 12 Whiteside v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 108 F.4th 771, 778 (9th Cir. 2024) (internal citations omitted) 13 (alterations in original). 14 The parties do not present individualized arguments unique to the CLRA, FAL or the UCL 15 fraudulent prong, so the Court proceeds by analyzing the three claims under the same standard. 16 Here, Plaintiffs advance two theories of alleged deception by Defendant—misrepresentation and 17 omission. The Court considers Defendant’s challenge to each in turn. 18 A. Misrepresentation Theory 19 Under the reasonable consumer test, “[w]hether an advertisement is misleading is 20 determined by asking whether a reasonable consumer would likely be deceived.” Hodsdon v. 21 Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2018). Plaintiffs assert two kinds of misrepresentation 22 present on the Huggies-brand baby wipes’ packaging: 1) Defendant advertises the product as 23 “plant-based,” which reasonable consumers would assume means free of PFAS, since such 24 chemicals are “non-natural” (ECF 25 at 17-18); and 2) Defendant’s combination of representations 25 that the baby wipes are “gentle,” “simply clean,” “hypo-allergenic,” “dermatologically tested,” 26 “alcohol free, “ and “paraben free,” would lead a reasonable consumer to believe the product is 27 “free of harmful toxins like PFAS chemicals” (id. at 19). On the current allegations, neither claim 1 As to the first alleged misrepresentation, Plaintiffs focus on the term “plant-based,” but 2 ignore the remainder of the statement on the packaging, which includes a prominent asterisk that 3 notes the product is “70% +” plant-based by weight. (ECF 16 ¶ 18.) This disposes of the notion 4 that a reasonable consumer could plausibly think the wipes contained zero “non-natural” 5 ingredients. Though Plaintiffs rely on Whiteside v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 108 F.4th 771 (9th Cir. 6 2024), to support their position—it does the opposite. The Whiteside court held that a product 7 which was advertised as “plant-based,” but included synthetic ingredients, was not misleading 8 because it featured a prominent asterisk on the packaging, noting it was “70% + by weight.” Id. at 9 785. Moreover, other courts have recognized that reasonable consumers do not conflate similar 10 representations such as “natural” or “filtered” with a complete absence of chemicals. See, e.g., 11 Castillo v. Prime Hydration LLC, 748 F. Supp. 3d 757, 772 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (noting the term 12 “filtered water” did not indicate the sports drink was completely free of any incidental impurities 13 or chemicals); Hawyuan Yu v. Dr Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 18-CV-06664-BLF, 2020 WL 14 5910071, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2020) (reviewing analogous cases to determine use of the word 15 “natural” was not deceptive when the product included trace amounts of pesticides). So, Plaintiffs 16 have not plausibly alleged the term “plant-based” misleads consumers into thinking the product is 17 free from trace amounts of PFAS. 18 Regarding the second alleged misrepresentation, the statements on the package—when 19 considered together—plausibly suggest to a reasonable consumer that the product is free from 20 harmful or toxic ingredients. See Mullins v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 178 F. Supp. 3d 867, 889 21 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“The California statutes [the plaintiff] invokes recognize claims even where 22 representations may not be misleading in isolation, but are deceptive when considering the 23 package and advertisement as a whole.” (citing Williams, 552 F.3d at 939 n. 3)). However, 24 Plaintiffs’ theory of misrepresentation only survives if the amount of PFAS present in the baby 25 wipes is harmful or toxic, thus contradicting the label. On this point, Plaintiffs have not met their 26 pleading burden under Rule 9(b). 27 Plaintiffs allege the randomly selected, representative sample of “Huggies Simply Clean 1 PFAS present in the amount of 305 parts per trillion. (ECF 16 ¶ 4.) They further allege PFAS are 2 toxic “at doses as low as parts per trillion or quadrillion,” and that the Environmental Protection 3 Agency has set levels of exposure “for PFOA at .004 parts per trillion, and for PFOS at .02 parts 4 per trillion.” (Id. ¶¶ 24-25.) But Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to permit a reasonable 5 inference that these levels indicate toxicity in a product like baby wipes. The documents cited by 6 Plaintiffs at paragraphs 24 and 25 of the FAC state these levels were set by the EPA for drinking 7 water and refer to specific subsets of PFAS—namely PFOS and PFOA. (Id. ¶ 24 n.16, ¶ 25 8 n.17.)3 Plaintiffs do not allege the presence of PFOS or PFOA in the tested baby wipes, and they 9 offer no basis for asserting these levels apply to a completely different product, which is used on 10 the skin rather than consumed. Though the FAC provides various reasons why infants are more 11 susceptible to chemicals (id. ¶¶ 30-35), it does not plausibly allege the levels found in the wipes 12 are harmful, even if infants are uniquely vulnerable to dermal transmission of toxins. To assert 13 Defendant misled reasonable consumers into believing the product did not contain harmful 14 substances, Plaintiffs must allege—plausibly and with specificity—that the product could cause 15 harm. They have not yet done so. 16 B. Omission Theory 17 Fraud based on omission requires either that the omission was “contrary to a representation 18 3 The Court may consider unattached evidence on which a complaint necessarily relies if the 19 complaint refers to the document, the document is central to the plaintiff’s claim, and no party questions the authenticity of the document. United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 20 999 (9th Cir. 2011). Neither party questions the authenticity of the articles cited in the FAC, and they are central to Plaintiffs’ cause of action, so the Court considers them incorporated by 21 reference. Turning to the substance of the cited documents: the article referenced at footnote 16 of the 22 FAC does not cite directly to a study for the claim that “PFAS are extremely toxic at doses as low as parts per trillion or quadrillion.” See Jeffrey Kluger, All The Stuff In Your Home That Might 23 Contain PFAS ‘Forever Chemicals, Time (May 19, 2023), https://time.com/6281242/pfas-forever-chemicals-home-beauty-bodyproducts/. 24 Rather, it relies on a quote from Erik Olson, senior strategic director for the Natural Resources Defense Council. Id. From the context provided by other sources cited in the FAC, it is clear 25 Olson is relying on the EPA’s guidance as to levels of PFOA and PFOS in drinking water. See, e.g., Kevin Loria, EPA Says Even Extremely Low Levels of PFAS in Drinking Water May Be 26 Unsafe, Consumer Reports (June 15, 2022), https://www.consumerreports.org/water- quality/evenextremely- 27 low-levels-of-pfas-in-drinking-water-unsafea1147585461/#:~: 1 actually made by the defendant,” or “the defendant was obliged to disclose” the information. 2 Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2018). Plaintiffs argue omission claims based 3 on both theories, namely that Defendant’s omission of the PFAS content in the baby wipes was 4 contrary to its representations, and separately, it was obligated to disclose that information. 5 (ECF 25 at 21-25.) Plaintiffs do not allege the wipes were labeled “PFAS-free,” and for the 6 reasons stated in the Court’s analysis of the misrepresentation claims, the presence of PFAS is not 7 contrary to labeling that the wipes are “plant-based” or “gentle.” See Part I.A., supra. Therefore, 8 Plaintiffs have not plausibly stated an omission claim “contrary to a representation actually made 9 by the defendant.” Hodsdon, 891 F.3d at 861. 10 Turning to the second theory of omission, “a defendant only has a duty to disclose when 11 either (1) the defect at issue relates to an unreasonable safety hazard or (2) the defect is material, 12 central to the product’s function, and the plaintiff alleges one of the four LiMandri factors.” In re 13 Trader Joe’s Co. Dark Chocolate Litig., 726 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1169 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (cleaned 14 up). Plaintiffs do not argue the defect posed an unreasonable safety hazard; rather, they assert 15 Defendant was obligated to disclose the PFAS content because it is material, central to the baby 16 wipes’ function, and one of the four LiMandri factors is present. (ECF 25 at 23-25.) However, 17 Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege the presence of PFAS in the wipes affects their central 18 functionality. 19 A defect goes to the central functionality of a product when it “prevent[s] the product from 20 ‘performing a critical or integral function,’ or render[s] the product ‘incapable of use.’” 21 Hammerling v. Google LLC, 615 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (citing Knowles v. 22 ARRIS Int’l PLC, 847 F. App’x 512, 513-14 (9th Cir. 2021), and Ahern v. Apple Inc., 411 F. Supp. 23 3d 541, 567 (9th Cir. 2019)). “[T]he central functionality of the product is not based on subjective 24 preferences about a product,” but rather the effect on a core function of the product. Hodsdon, 891 25 F.3d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting examples of central functionality such as “[a] computer chip 26 that corrupts the hard drive, or a laptop screen that goes dark”). Since Plaintiffs do not plausibly 27 allege the presence of PFAS prevents the use of the baby wipes or inhibits their cleaning function, 1 To counter, Plaintiffs contend that “a defect relating to a product’s central function will not 2 always render the product incapable of use.” (ECF 25 at 24 (quoting Bettles v. Toyota Motor 3 Corp., 2022 WL 1619337, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2022)). Here, the Court disagrees. The 4 Bettles opinion did not cite any authority for that assertion, but regardless, the statement of law 5 does not ultimately cut in Plaintiffs’ favor. Even if the alleged defect need not render a product 6 completely incapable of use, it must go to the central function. See Hammerling, 615 F. Supp. 3d 7 at 1086. Plaintiffs only argue the presence of PFAS poses a risk to infants because of repeated 8 exposure and their inherent susceptibility to chemicals. (ECF 25 at 24.) But concerns about a 9 product’s safety differ from effects on its central function, and indeed comprise a separate theory 10 of omission, i.e. the “unreasonable safety hazard” theory. See Trader Joe’s, 726 F. Supp. 3d at 11 1169. But that is not the theory Plaintiffs have advanced, and even if it were, the Court’s analysis 12 of the misrepresentation claims explains why the Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged the PFAS 13 levels in the wipes were harmful. 14 * * * 15 For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the CLRA, FAL, 16 and UCL fraudulent-prong claims. 17 III. UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 18 Plaintiffs further assert claims under the UCL’s unlawful and unfair prongs. The unlawful 19 prong “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair 20 competition law makes independently actionable.” Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 21 1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 22 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999)). “Accordingly, to state a claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL, 23 a plaintiff must sufficiently plead a predicate violation.” MacDonald v. Ford Motor Co., 37 F. 24 Supp. 3d 1087, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see also People ex rel. Bill Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. 25 Co., 104 Cal.App.4th 508, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 463 (2002) (“[V]irtually any state, federal or local law 26 can serve as the predicate for an action under section 17200.”). Since the Court has dismissed the 27 FAL, CLRA, and UCL fraudulent-prong claims, there is no remaining basis for a UCL unlawful- 1 To invoke the unfair prong, a plaintiff must plausibly allege her “injury is substantial, is 2 not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition, and is not an injury 3 the consumer[] [herself] could reasonably have avoided.” Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 4 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 839 (2006), as modified (Nov. 8, 2006). Separately, the Ninth Circuit has 5 articulated three more specific theories of unfair practice: “(1) whether the challenged conduct is 6 ‘tethered to any underlying constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision, or that it threatens an 7 incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of an antitrust law,’; (2) 8 whether the practice is ‘immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to 9 consumers,’; or (3) whether the practice’s impact on the victim outweighs ‘the reasons, 10 justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer.’” Doe v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 982 F.3d 11 1204, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2020). Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged a separate basis for an unfair- 12 prong claim beyond the allegations of misleading advertisement. To the extent Plaintiffs allege 13 Defendant’s “conduct is substantially injurious to consumers, offends public policy, and is 14 immoral unethical, oppressive, and unscrupulous as the gravity of the conduct outweighs any 15 alleged benefits,” such statements are conclusory. (ECF 16 ¶ 82.) Plaintiffs must allege facts to 16 support their theory of unfair conduct if it differs from the alleged false advertising. 17 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the remaining claims under the 18 UCL’s unlawful and unfair prongs. 19 IV. BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY 20 Next, Plaintiffs allege Defendant’s failure to disclose the presence of PFAS in the baby 21 wipes breached an express warranty that the product was “free of toxic chemicals.” (ECF 1 ¶ 99; 22 ECF 25 at 29.) Though Plaintiffs do not state the statutory basis for their cause of action, from 23 their citations, it appears they rely on the California Uniform Commercial Code § 2313. (See ECF 24 25 at 29 (citing Maisel v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. 21-CV-00413-TSH, 2021 WL 1788397, at 25 *11 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2021), which relies on Weinstat v. Dentsply Internat., Inc., 180 Cal. App. 26 4th 1213, 1227 (2010))). Section 2313 provides the following:

27 (1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 1 (a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to 2 the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform 3 to the affirmation or promise. (b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the 4 basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description. 5 (c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of 6 the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model. 7 (2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as “warrant” or “guarantee” or that he 8 have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be 9 merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. 10 11 Cal. Com. Code § 2313. Plaintiffs must therefore allege: “(1) the seller’s statements constitute an 12 ‘affirmation of fact or promise’ or a ‘description of the goods’; (2) the statement was ‘part of the 13 basis of the bargain’; and (3) the warranty was breached.” Weinstat, 180 Cal. App. 4th at 1227 14 (citation omitted) (cleaned up). Assuming, arguendo, Defendant’s packaging constitutes an 15 “affirmation of fact or promise” or a “description of the goods,” Plaintiffs’ claim still cannot 16 advance. Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege the baby wipes contain PFAS at levels that 17 would be toxic to infants, and so the FAC fails to state a breach of an express warranty that the 18 wipes are non-toxic. 19 Consequently, the Court GRANTS to motion to dismiss the breach of express warranty 20 claim. 21 V. UNJUST ENRICHMENT 22 The factual basis for Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim is the same as the fraud-based 23 claims, namely that Defendant misrepresented its product as being free from toxic chemicals, like 24 PFAS. (ECF 16 ¶ 114.) Since Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege any wrongful conduct as to the 25 advertising of Defendant’s product, there is no basis for an unjust enrichment claim. See, e.g., 26 Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 152 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1557 (2007) (holding unjust 27 enrichment claim based on the same facts that failed to state a UCL claim must also fail). 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the First 3 || Amended Complaint, with leave to amend all claims. Should Plaintiffs choose to amend, the 4 || Second Amended Complaint must be filed within 21 days of this Order. Having found the motion 5 appropriate for determination on the papers, the Court VACATES the July 31, 2025 hearing. See 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 7 This Order disposes of Docket No. 19. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: July 28, 2025 10 Wed □ = 11 CL ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN 12 United States District Judge

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