Erickson v. Erickson

409 N.W.2d 898, 1987 Minn. App. LEXIS 4597
CourtCourt of Appeals of Minnesota
DecidedJuly 28, 1987
DocketC1-87-399
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 409 N.W.2d 898 (Erickson v. Erickson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Erickson v. Erickson, 409 N.W.2d 898, 1987 Minn. App. LEXIS 4597 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

OPINION

CRIPPEN, Judge.

Thomas E. Erickson appeals the trial court order granting Nancy E. Luloff an increase in child support and ordering the full amount of the increased obligation to remain in effect until the youngest of the parties’ three children reaches the age of 18 or becomes emancipated. Luloff filed a notice of review on the issue of whether the trial court applied the correct statutory law when it acted according to an amendment that took effect following the motion but prior to the decision on the motion. We affirm the present increase in support, but reverse the provision for a constant level of support, as support must be based on the number of unemancipated children.

FACTS

The marriage of the parties was dissolved by a judgment entered September 6, 1978. The parties have three children who were 14, 12 and 9 years old at the time of the motion hearing.

In March 1983, the parties agreed to increase child support to $1050 per month for the three children, who were then ages 10, 8, and 5. The Minnesota Child Support Guidelines became effective in August 1983, and child support under those guidelines would have been $2100, based on the number of children and on appellant’s income.

On June 24, 1986; respondent filed a motion for a further increase in child support. In February 1987 orders, the trial court increased child support to $1400 per month, and ordered that this level of support continue until the parties’ youngest child is 18 years of age or is emancipated.

A. Increased amount of support.

The trial court found appellant’s income increased from $117,000 in 1983 to $141,000 in 1986. Appellant disputes the court’s omission of his 1983 capital gains in the calculation of his 1983 income, a calculation that was a part of the court’s findings and determination of whether there was a substantial change in circumstances that made the original award unfair. Appellant does not dispute his ability to pay the modified support obligation.

The court also found that the children’s needs have increased $900 per month since the 1983 award, and that their current needs are $1400 per month. The court made further findings explaining that this “increase is due in part to an increase in the cost of living and an increase in the needs of the children due to their ages and participation in additional activities.” Appellant disputes respondent’s estimation of the children’s needs, pointing specifically to inconsistencies in her evidence. Appellant *900 also claims the trial court erred in including respondent’s transportation expenses, because a substantial portion of these expenses are met by her present husband’s business. The trial court found respondent earns $673 per year from the sale of her art. Appellant asserts the evidence requires a finding that respondent effectively earns greater sums of money as an employee of her husband’s corporation.

B. Continued level of support until emancipation of the youngest child.

The court also modified the provisions for termination of support upon emancipation of the children. Prior to the 1986 modification, support was based upon the number of unemancipated children. As modified, the support order provides for the same amount of support until the youngest child becomes’emancipated. Appellant asserts this modification is based on speculation as to future increases in his income and increases in the needs of the children.

C. Application of the guidelines in effect at the time of the decision.

In calculating support under the guidelines in effect at the time the case was submitted for decision, no more than $4000 of an obligor’s income can be considered. Respondent filed a notice of review, challenging the trial court’s decision to apply this income cap, rather than the $6000 cap in effect at the time the motion for modification was served and the first hearing was held.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court err in finding respondent's income increased from 1983 to 1986, despite a decrease in capital gains?

2. Does the evidence support the trial court's finding as to the needs of the children?

3. Did the trial court err in determining .the amount of respondent’s earnings?

4. Did the trial court err in ordering a constant level of support until the emancipation of the youngest child?

5.Did the trial court err in applying the guidelines in effect at the time the case was decided?

ANALYSIS

The decision to modify a child support award is within the broad discretion of the trial court. Moylan v. Moylan, 384 N.W.2d 859, 864 (Minn.1986). An abuse of discretion exists only if the appellate court finds a “clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record.” Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn.1984).

A child support award may be modified if the court finds there is a substantial change of circumstances that makes the terms of the award unreasonable and unfair. Minn.Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2 (1986). A substantial change in a party’s earnings or needs will support a modification. Id.

1. Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion in disregarding capital gains when determining his 1983 income. If his income is considered to include capital gains and losses, his 1986 income was not greater than his income in 1983.

Capital assets may enter into the determination of whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances to warrant a modification of a child support or maintenance obligation. See Quaid v. Quaid, 403 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn.Ct.App.1987); Zagar v. Zagar, 396 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). However, there is no precedent to support appellant's view that capital gains must be treated as income. The gains do not represent earnings, and they are not a steady source of income. See Abuzzahab v. Abuzzahab, 359 N.W.2d 329, 332-33 (Minn.Ct.App.1984) (trial court was within its discretion in disregarding $3300 in interest earned on property settlement money that was temporarily invested, because that source of income was temporary and nonrecurring). Cf. Erler v. Erler, 390 N.W.2d 316, 319-320 (Minn.Ct.App.1986) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in including income from part-time employment as earnings for purposes of a child support modification, where those *901 earnings were a “regular, steady source of income” over a period of ten years).

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Bluebook (online)
409 N.W.2d 898, 1987 Minn. App. LEXIS 4597, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/erickson-v-erickson-minnctapp-1987.