25CA0904 Erickson v Dep’t of Human Services 07-02-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0904 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV33680 Honorable Michael W.V. Angel, Judge
Erika Erickson,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Colorado Department of Human Services,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Yun and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 2, 2026
Byram Law, P.C., Elle J. Byram, Broomfield, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kendra Yates, Assistant Attorney General II, Jennifer L. Carty, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 Erika Erickson appeals the district court’s affirmance of the
administrative law judge’s (ALJ) entry of summary judgment against
her in Erickson’s administrative appeal of the findings of the
Boulder County Department of Housing and Human Services (the
County) that she abused or neglected her minor children. We
affirm.
I. Background
A. The Dependency and Neglect Proceeding
¶2 In July 2022, the County filed a petition in dependency and
neglect (the petition) against Erickson, alleging, among other facts,
that her minor children were “mistreat[ed] or abused” and “lack[ed]
proper parental care.” In paragraph 4(c) of the petition, the County
specifically alleged that the children were dependent and neglected
because their “environment [was] injurious to their welfare.” And in
amended paragraph 10(a) of the petition, the County specifically
alleged that the “family [was] in need of support[].” (We refer to
paragraph 4(c) and amended paragraph 10(a) jointly as the “limited
admissions.”)
¶3 On January 17, 2023, the County and Erickson entered into a
stipulated continued adjudication (the deferred adjudication) under
1 section 19-3-505(5), C.R.S. 2025. The court then entered a
stipulated continued adjudication order, in which, among other
provisions, it found that Erickson “voluntarily and knowingly” made
the limited admissions by entering into the deferred adjudication.
¶4 In June 2023, after Erickson successfully completed the terms
of the deferred adjudication, the court dismissed the petition and
concluded the dependency and neglect proceeding.
B. The Criminal Child Abuse Case
¶5 In August 2022, Erickson was charged with criminal child
abuse under section 18-6-401(7), C.R.S. 2025, based on injuries
that her child G.E. sustained. The summons and complaint (the
complaint) served on Erickson in the criminal case cited her
knowingly unreasonable placement of G.E. “in a situation which
posed a threat of injury to [the] child’s life or health and resulted in
an . . . injury” to him. Erickson subsequently agreed to a
twelve-month deferred judgment under which she pleaded guilty to
child abuse.
¶6 Erickson satisfied the terms of the deferred judgment. As a
consequence, her guilty plea was withdrawn, and her criminal case
was dismissed.
2 C. Erickson Is Added to the Trails Database
¶7 The Colorado Department of Human Services (the State
Department) maintains a statewide child abuse and neglect registry
called “Trails.” Romero v. Colo. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 COA 2,
¶ 32, 417 P.3d 914, 921. The County notified Erickson in a letter
dated August 8, 2022 (the notice letter), that she had been
identified as the person responsible for five incidents of child abuse
or neglect — four “Environment Injurious” incidents and one
“Physical” incident. In the notice letter, the County said that
Erickson’s “name w[ould] be maintained” in Trails “as a person
responsible” for the five incidents of child abuse or neglect. The
County explained in the notice letter that “agencies provided by law
when making decisions regarding child protection referrals and
assessments” may access Trails and that “certain employers and
agencies are required, or allowed, by law to request a check of Trails
when screening individuals for positions that involve the care,
treatment, or supervision of children.” In addition, the County
advised Erickson of her right to appeal her inclusion in Trails.
3 D. Erickson’s Initial Appeals
¶8 Erickson appealed her inclusion in Trails. Her appeal was
referred to the Office of Administrative Courts. The State
Department — the adverse party in Erickson’s appeal — filed a
notice of issues that recited the factual basis for the County’s
determination that Erickson was “a person responsible for an
incident of child abuse or neglect.”
¶9 After Erickson responded to the notice of issues, the State
Department filed a summary judgment motion (the motion)
supported by four exhibits — (1) the notice letter; (2) certified court
records, including the complaint and the police incident report in
her criminal case; (3) a certified copy of the deferred judgment; and
(4) a certified copy of the deferred adjudication.
¶ 10 In the motion, the State Department argued there was no
genuine issue of material fact in this case because the deferred
adjudication and the deferred judgment “ar[ose] out of the same
factual basis as the founded finding” in Trails. The State
Department said that, under Department of Human Services Rule
7.111(H), 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-2 (the Rule), the deferred
adjudication and the deferred judgment constituted Erickson’s
4 admission to “the factual basis of the finding of responsibility for
child abuse or neglect” and were therefore “conclusive evidence of
[Erickson’s] responsibility for child abuse or neglect to support a
motion for summary judgment.”
¶ 11 The Rule says, in its entirety,
The following circumstances shall be considered to be admissions to the factual basis of the finding of responsibility for child abuse or neglect entered into the state automated case management system and shall be considered to be conclusive evidence of the person’s responsibility for child abuse or neglect to support a motion for summary judgment submitted to the Office of Administrative Courts:
1. When a Dependency and Neglect Petition has been adjudicated against or a deferred adjudication entered against the Appellant on the basis of Sections 19-3-103 or 19-3-102(1)(a), (b), or (c), C.R.S.[ 2025], arising out of the same factual basis as the founded finding in [Trails];
2. The Appellant has been found guilty of child abuse, or has pled guilty or nolo contendere to child abuse as part of any plea agreement including, but not limited to, a deferred judgment agreement, arising out of the same factual basis as the founded finding in [Trails].
5 Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Rule 7.111(H), 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-2
(emphases added).
¶ 12 Erickson responded to the motion by asserting the same
arguments she raises on appeal. Significantly, she did not deny the
limited admissions or any other facts supporting the motion;
nowhere in her response did she attempt to establish that disputed
issues of material fact precluded the entry of summary judgment.
¶ 13 In September 2023, an ALJ at the Office of Administrative
Courts made an initial decision to grant the motion. Erickson filed
exceptions to the initial decision with the State Department’s Office
of Appeals. A staff adjudicator in the Office of Appeals issued a
final agency decision affirming the ALJ’s initial decision.
¶ 14 Erickson appealed the final agency decision to the Denver
District Court, which affirmed.
E. Erickson’s Appeal to This Court
¶ 15 Erickson characterizes her four contentions in this appeal as
follows: (1) the State Board of Human Services (the Board) lacked
statutory authority to adopt the Rule, and the Rule contravenes the
State Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and C.R.C.P. 56; (2) she
was improperly denied the benefits of the deferred adjudication and
6 the deferred judgment; (3) the Rule, as applied in her case, violated
her due process rights; and (4) the exhibits supporting the motion
were inadmissible.
¶ 16 We first turn to Erickson’s challenge to the Board’s authority
to promulgate the Rule.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
¶ 17 “We review administrative regulations de novo.” Gomez v. JP
Trucking, Inc., 2022 CO 21, ¶ 27, 509 P.3d 429, 436. But we
are “guided by the same principles that apply to statutory
interpretation.” Id. However, we “presume that agency rules are
valid; the person challenging them must prove the invalidity of
agency rules beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v.
Trigen-Nations Energy Co., L.L.L.P., 982 P.2d 316, 325 (Colo. 1999).
And “[w]e review an ALJ’s legal conclusions on summary judgment
de novo.” Baum v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2019 COA 94, ¶ 34,
487 P.3d 1079, 1087.
B. Erickson’s Attacks on the Rule’s Validity
¶ 18 We need not address Erickson’s contention that the Rule is
invalid and, therefore, unenforceable because Erickson did not
7 attempt to establish that disputed issues of material fact precluded
the entry of summary judgment for the State Department. The ALJ
was not required to apply the Rule in adjudicating the motion
because Erickson failed to challenge the facts underlying the
motion. In other words, by not demonstrating the existence of
disputed issues of material fact, Erickson could not defeat the
motion even if the Board had never adopted the Rule.
¶ 19 Before citing the Rule, the ALJ noted the fundamental
summary judgment principle that, if the moving party shows “there
is no record evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case,” then
“the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that there is
a triable issue of fact.” See Griswold v. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.,
2019 CO 79, ¶¶ 23-24, 449 P.3d 373, 378-79. The ALJ’s accurate
recitation of the C.R.C.P. 56 standard suggested that Erickson
could defeat the motion by establishing the existence of “a triable
issue of fact” regardless of the Rule’s reference to “conclusive
evidence.” See id. Although Erickson acknowledges the burden
that C.R.C.P. 56 places on the nonmoving party, she did not
attempt to show that “a triable issue of fact” precluded the entry of
summary judgment for the State Department. See id. Specifically,
8 she did not submit an affidavit or other evidence to dispute the
facts that led to her inclusion in Trails. The ALJ did not need to
consider whether the State Department’s evidence was “conclusive”
under the Rule because Erickson did not challenge that evidence.
¶ 20 Thus, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the State
Department based solely on Erickson’s failure to contest the State
Department’s factual allegations. See Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v.
Samora, 2013 COA 81, ¶ 38, 321 P.3d 590, 597 (“An appellate court
may affirm the trial court’s ruling based on any grounds that are
supported by the record.”).
C. Erickson Was Not Entitled to a Hearing Under the APA
¶ 21 We next consider Erickson’s contention that the ALJ denied
her a hearing in violation of the APA. Erickson seems to argue that
she was entitled to a hearing under section 24-4-105(2)(a), C.R.S.
2025, of the APA. That statute entitles parties to a hearing when an
“agency adjudicatory hearing is required under the state
constitution or by this or any other statute.” Id. But Erickson does
not point to any provision in the Colorado Constitution or a state
statute that required a hearing in her case.
9 ¶ 22 In any event, to the extent that Erickson argues the ALJ erred
by denying her a hearing on the merits of the motion, she had a full
and fair opportunity to oppose the motion — and, specifically, to
challenge the facts supporting her inclusion in Trails — through her
response to the motion. The ALJ did not bar Erickson from
submitting affidavits or other evidence contesting the facts
supporting the motion. Thus, even if Erickson was entitled to
oppose the motion at a hearing, the lack of a hearing had no impact
on the ALJ’s ruling on the motion because Erickson failed to
demonstrate that disputed issues of material fact precluded the
entry of summary judgment for the State Department. See Samora,
¶ 38, 321 P.3d at 597.
¶ 23 In addition, Erickson’s contention that she was entitled to
argue her challenge to the Rule at a hearing also fails because
section 24-4-105(2)(a) addresses hearings only in the context of
“agency adjudicatory proceeding[s].” § 24-4-105(1). The APA
defines an “[a]djudication” as “the procedure used by an agency for
the formulation, amendment, or repeal of an order.” § 24-4-102(2),
C.R.S. 2025 (emphasis added). An order is “the whole or any part
of the final disposition (whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or
10 declaratory in form) by any agency in any matter other than
[rulemaking].” § 24-4-102(10) (emphasis added). Thus, Erickson
was not entitled to a hearing under section 24-4-105(2)(a) even if
the ALJ relied on the Rule to grant the motion.
¶ 24 Moreover, contrary to Erickson’s alternative hearing argument,
section 24-4-105(14) and (15) and section 26-1-106, C.R.S. 2025,
which govern appeals of agency decisions, do not entitle appellants
to a hearing. Rather, under the APA, an ALJ, agency, or hearing
officer “may permit oral argument,” § 24-4-105(14)-(15) (emphasis
added), or “may conduct hearings on appeals from decisions of
county departments,” § 26-1-106(1)(a) (emphasis added). “[M]ay”
indicates a “grant of discretion or choice among alternatives,”
People v. Garcia, 2016 COA 124, ¶ 13, 382 P.3d 1258, 1261
(quoting A.S. v. People, 2013 CO 63, ¶ 21, 312 P.3d 168, 173-74),
unlike “shall,” which is “generally mandatory,” id. Accordingly, the
Rule does not, as Erickson asserts, contravene, “replace[,] or
bypass” the APA’s “procedures for appealing decisions made by
hearing officers.” Colo. Workers for Innovative & New Sols. v.
Gherardini, 2023 COA 80, ¶ 30, 540 P.3d 950, 957.
11 ¶ 25 For these reasons, we reject Erickson’s argument that the ALJ
erred by not granting her a hearing.
D. The Rule Does Not Violate C.R.C.P. 56
¶ 26 Erickson also contends that the Rule “violates C.R.C.P. 56 and
its case law.” Erickson specifically argues that the ALJ and the
State Department interpreted the Rule to permit the admission of
certified copies of the petition and the deferred judgment, even
though, according to Erickson, those documents are inadmissible in
civil matters “not controlled by the [Rule].”
¶ 27 Erickson’s C.R.C.P. 56 argument fails because, as we
explained above, supra Part II.B, the State Department would have
been entitled to summary judgment under C.R.C.P. 56 even if the
Rule authorized the ALJ to consider evidence that would be
inadmissible under C.R.C.P. 56. This is so because Erickson did
not establish that disputed issues of material fact precluded the
entry of summary judgment; the limited admissions were
admissible under C.R.C.P. 56, see infra Part II.G; and the limited
admissions documented in the certified copy of the deferred
adjudication were sufficient to support the grant of summary
12 judgment to the State Department. See C.R.C.P. 56(c); Kaminsky v.
Kaminsky, 359 P.2d 675, 678 (Colo. 1961).
¶ 28 Significantly, Erickson’s arguments skirt the significance of
the limited admissions. In her deferred adjudication, she
“voluntarily and knowingly admit[ted]” the limited admissions, and
they were sufficient to support Erickson’s inclusion in Trails for the
four “Environment Injurious” founded allegations identified in the
notice letter. As the notice letter explained, a person may be added
to Trails if the person is “responsible for [an] incident of . . .
neglect.” In the deferred adjudication, Erickson admitted liability
for neglect because her children’s “environment [was] injurious to
their welfare.” She did not contest that allegation in her response
to the motion — or elsewhere.
¶ 29 Thus, it was not improper for the ALJ to grant the motion
without an oral argument or hearing, and we reject Erickson’s
argument that the ALJ improperly granted the motion based on the
Rule.
13 E. The ALJ Did Not Deprive Erickson of the Benefits of the Deferred Adjudication
¶ 30 Erickson next contends that the ALJ’s application of the Rule
deprived her of the benefits of the deferred adjudication. We
disagree.
¶ 31 Because the ALJ did not need to rely on the Rule to grant the
motion, as we explained above, see supra Part II.B, we consider
more generally whether the inclusion of the deferred adjudication as
an exhibit to the motion and the ALJ’s reference to it denied
Erickson the deferred adjudication’s benefits.
¶ 32 Recall that, when she entered into the deferred adjudication,
Erickson admitted that her children’s “environment [was] injurious
to their welfare” and that her “family [was] in need of support[].” By
entering into the deferred adjudication, Erickson avoided a judicial
adjudication that her children were dependent or neglected. “The
decision to continue or ‘defer’ an adjudication has benefits for all
parties. . . . The parents receive . . . the opportunity to
constructively address the issues that gave rise to the petition
without the adverse consequences of a formal adjudication on their
record.” People in Interest of T.W., 2022 COA 88M, ¶ 18, 519 P.3d
14 1071, 1076. Erickson received these benefits — she had the
opportunity to address the issues that led the County to file the
petition, and no formal adjudication was entered against her.
Accordingly, the ALJ’s grant of summary judgment to the State
Department did not deprive Erickson of the benefits of the deferred
adjudication.
¶ 33 Further, as the State Department notes, a person entering into
a deferred adjudication is “not immunized from all potential
consequences.” Analogous regulations involving other subject areas
require individuals to submit documentation of their prior violations
of law. For example, the Colorado Real Estate Commission requires
real estate license applicants to submit documentation of, among
other things, the disposition of criminal cases previously filed
against them, the related police or incident reports, an explanation
of the circumstances surrounding the violation, and “any other
information” the Commission deems necessary. Div. of Real Estate
Rule 3.4(A)(5), 4 Code Colo. Regs. 725-1; see also § 12-30-102(4)(g),
(8), C.R.S. 2025 (requiring licensed physicians to report “[a]ny final
criminal conviction or plea arrangement” to the director of the
Colorado Division of Professions and Occupations under the
15 Healthcare Professions Profiling Program, Dep’t of Regul. Agencies
Rules, 4 Code Colo. Regs. 743-1). These requirements are no
different from requiring a person deemed responsible for an incident
of neglect be added to Trails.
¶ 34 Thus, Erickson was not deprived of the benefits of her deferred
F. The Application of the Rule Did Not Violate Erickson’s Due Process Rights
¶ 35 Erickson contends that the ALJ’s application of the Rule
violated her procedural and substantive due process rights because
it deprived her of the right to present evidence to challenge her
inclusion in Trails.
1. Preservation
¶ 36 The parties disagree whether Erickson preserved this
argument. The State Department argues that Erickson “failed to
present any analysis or argument” supporting her due process
“allegations beyond conclusory statements.” But an issue is
preserved for appeal in an administrative proceeding if the party
raises the substance of the issue before the ALJ. See City of
Durango v. Dunagan, 939 P.2d 496, 500 (Colo. App. 1997).
16 ¶ 37 Erickson raised her due process argument in her response to
the motion and her exceptions to the ALJ’s initial decision. Both
the ALJ and the staff adjudicator in the Office of Appeals
acknowledged her due process argument.
¶ 38 The ALJ acknowledged that she lacked the authority to
address Erickson’s constitutional challenge to the Rule. Therefore,
even if Erickson had not preserved her due process argument at the
ALJ stage of the case, she could not have raised the argument until
she filed her district court appeal. See Farmer v. Colo. Parks &
Wildlife Comm’n, 2016 COA 120, ¶ 16, 382 P.3d 1263, 1267
(“[W]hen the hearing officer has no authority to address the issue, it
can be raised for the first time on appeal.”). By raising the due
process argument in her district court appeal, Erickson preserved
it.
2. Procedural Due Process
¶ 39 Erickson argues that the ALJ’s summary disposition of her
case, based on the Rule, deprived her of the opportunity to
challenge the facts underlying her inclusion in Trails. She argues
that the Rule, as applied in her case, violated her procedural due
process rights because it “usurp[ed] [her] right to be heard” and she
17 “ha[d] never in fact been heard on the alleged facts and no alleged
facts ha[d] in fact been admitted to or been found to be facts by any
court.” We disagree.
¶ 40 “The fundamental requisites of due process are notice and the
opportunity to be heard.” Franz v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 250
P.3d 755, 758 (Colo. App. 2010) (quoting Hendricks v. Indus. Claim
Appeals Off., 809 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Colo. App. 1990)). “Due process
requires ‘that the parties be apprised of all the evidence to be
submitted and considered, and that they be afforded a reasonable
opportunity in which to confront adverse witnesses and to present
evidence and argument in support of their position.’” Delta Cnty.
Mem’l Hosp. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2021 COA 84, ¶ 28, 495
P.3d 984, 992 (quoting Hendricks, 809 P.2d at 1077). The
determination of what constitutes sufficient due process is flexible;
no specific procedure is mandated “as long as the basic opportunity
for a hearing and judicial review is present.” Id. (quoting Ortega v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 207 P.3d 895, 899 (Colo. App. 2009)).
¶ 41 Erickson’s procedural due process argument appears to rest,
at least in part, on her contention that she did not admit the facts
supporting the petition when she entered into the deferred
18 adjudication. Accordingly, she argues that she had a right to be
heard on the factual basis for her inclusion in Trails and “for the
matter to be decided on its merits.”
¶ 42 As we explained above, supra Part II.B, Erickson had an
opportunity to challenge the facts underlying the motion when she
responded to it. She chose not to challenge those facts, however,
and, instead, relied solely on procedural arguments. Further, she
had a full and fair opportunity to challenge the findings supporting
her inclusion in Trails before she stipulated to the deferred
adjudication. Not only did she not challenge those findings, but she
admitted the limited admissions, which alone were sufficient to
support her inclusion in Trails. Notably, she does not argue that, at
the time she agreed to the deferred adjudication, she was unaware
of her rights, was unaware of the County’s allegations against her,
or lacked an understanding of the consequences of agreeing to the
deferred adjudication. See People in Interest of N.G., 2012 COA 131,
¶¶ 19, 22, 303 P.3d 1207, 1212-13. Thus, through the deferred
adjudication, Erickson waived her right to a trial or a further
hearing on the limited admissions, as well as the other factual
allegations in the petition. See id. at ¶¶ 26, 53, 303 P.3d at 1214,
19 1218 (holding that during the deferral period and before the entry of
an adjudicatory order, a parent has a right to an adjudicatory
hearing and to present new evidence before the deferred
adjudication is revoked or expired).
¶ 43 For these reasons, we conclude that Erickson was not denied
due process when she entered into the deferred adjudication and
thereby waived her right to challenge the limited admissions, which
alone supported her inclusion in Trails.
¶ 44 Although Erickson’s limited admissions themselves may not
have been sufficient to establish her responsibility for the “Physical”
incident of abuse identified in the notice letter, she does not develop
an argument that she should have had the opportunity to contest
this separate finding even though she admitted the factual basis for
the four “Environment Injurious” incidents listed in the notice
letter. Thus, we do not further address that issue. See People v.
Liggett, 2021 COA 51, ¶ 53, 492 P.3d 356, 365, aff’d, 2023 CO 22,
529 P.3d 113 (explaining that appellate courts do not address
undeveloped arguments).
20 3. Substantive Due Process
¶ 45 Erickson next contends that the ALJ’s application of the Rule
violated her substantive due process rights because the Rule is not
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest” and “creates
only a mere convenience” for the State Department to “put whatever
evidence it wants” before an ALJ, even if that “evidence is not
otherwise admissible to prevail on [s]ummary [j]udgment.” She goes
so far as to suggest that the Rule “shocks the conscience.”
¶ 46 But she fails to develop this argument, relying only on
conclusory statements and a restatement of the standard of review.
Thus, we decline to address such argument. See Barnett v. Elite
Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010). In any event,
as we explain below, infra Part II.G, Erickson’s limited admissions
were sufficient to support the grant of summary judgment to the
State Department in the absence of a factual dispute, and, for that
reason, the ALJ was not required to rely on the Rule to grant the
motion.
21 G. Erickson’s Limited Admissions Were Admissible
¶ 47 Erickson’s final contention is that the ALJ erred by
considering evidence that was inadmissible under C.R.C.P. 56.
Specifically, Erickson challenges the admissibility of (1) the notice
letter; (2) the certified court records, including the complaint and
the related police incident report in her criminal case; (3) the
deferred judgment; and (4) the deferred adjudication. Erickson
contends that this evidence was inadmissible because it did not
take the form of affidavits and that the notice letter was
inadmissible hearsay.
¶ 48 While we review de novo an order granting a summary
judgment motion, Baum, ¶ 34, 487 P.3d at 1087, “[w]e review
evidentiary rulings in summary judgment proceedings for abuse of
discretion,” Andersen v. Lindenbaum, 131 P.3d 1154, 1157 (Colo.
App. 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 160 P.3d 237 (Colo. 2007). “A
lower court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or
when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.”
Terra Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. Keaten, 2025 CO 40, ¶ 28, 572 P.3d 126,
133.
22 ¶ 49 “If the reviewing court finds no error, it must affirm the agency
action.” Romero, ¶ 25, 417 P.3d at 920. Under this standard, we
“presume the validity and regularity of the administrative
proceedings and resolve all reasonable doubts as to the correctness
of the administrative ruling in favor of the agency.” Id.
¶ 50 Because Erickson did not challenge any of the facts
supporting the motion, the ALJ could consider Erickson’s deferred
adjudication as “conclusive evidence” of her responsibility for child
abuse and neglect. See supra Part II.B. Critically, Erickson does
not provide support for her suggestion that the limited admissions
vanished into thin air when she satisfied the terms of the deferred
adjudication and the dependency and neglect proceeding closed.
¶ 51 Moreover, contrary to Erickson’s narrow reading of the
references to “affidavit” in C.R.C.P. 56, that rule does not require
that every exhibit supporting a summary judgment motion take the
form of an affidavit. The court may consider “pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.”
C.R.C.P. 56(c) (emphasis added). Erickson does not explain why
the ALJ could not consider Erickson’s limited admissions under
23 CRE 801(d)(2), which provides that a party-opponent’s admissions
are admissible evidence.
¶ 52 Because, by entering into the deferred adjudication, Erickson
admitted facts regarding the children’s injurious environment —
facts that she did not contest in her response to the motion — there
was no genuine dispute of material fact and the ALJ properly
granted summary judgment to the State Department. Those facts
also supported her addition to Trails. See Dep’t of Hum. Servs.
Rule 7.111(H)(1), 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-2 (providing that a
deferred adjudication arising out of the same factual basis as the
“founded finding” in Trails “shall be considered to be [an]
admission[] to the factual basis of the finding of responsibility for
child abuse or neglect” in Trails).
¶ 53 Furthermore, even if, as Erickson argues, the ALJ could only
consider “affidavits,” the certified copy of the deferred adjudication
attached to the motion was the legal equivalent of an affidavit.
“[C]ertified court records in and of themselves constitute a sufficient
affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment under
[C.R.C.P. 56].” Kaminsky, 359 P.2d at 678 (emphasis added).
24 ¶ 54 Erickson argues that, even though the State Department
provided the ALJ with a certified copy of the deferred adjudication,
that document was nonetheless inadmissible under a federal case
cited in Kaminsky — Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hammer,
83 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Va.), rev’d on other grounds, 177 F.2d 793
(4th Cir. 1949). In that case, the federal district court said that
certified court records are admissible as affidavits only if a clerk
made a sworn statement “as to what the court records are” and did
not purport to swear to “the truth of the facts” set out in the
records. Id. at 386. But the Kaminsky court did not cite Hammer
for this proposition, and Erickson does not point to any Colorado
case adopting Hammer’s reasoning. Moreover, Erickson does not
argue that the State Department’s certification contained a third
party’s statement regarding “the truth of the facts” in the deferred
adjudication. Nor does she challenge the completeness or accuracy
of the copy of the deferred adjudication submitted in support of the
¶ 55 Accordingly, we hold that Erickson’s limited admissions in the
deferred adjudication were admissible and sufficient to support the
motion, and the ALJ did not abuse her discretion by considering
25 them. For this reason, we need not consider whether the ALJ erred
by reviewing the notice letter, the complaint, the police incident
report, or the deferred judgment.
¶ 56 Finally, Erickson contends that, in the motion, the State
Department misrepresented her responses to the notice of issues.
But in her response to the motion, Erickson did not argue that the
State Department misrepresented her responses, and she failed to
submit an affidavit contesting any fact in the notice of issues.
¶ 57 As the district court observed in affirming the ALJ’s and the
staff adjudicator’s decisions, “Erickson made no effort to dispute
[her] factual admissions in her response to the motion . . . aside
from general denials unsupported by evidence.” The court added,
“In light of the strong evidence provided by the [State] Department
(almost entirely consisting of Erickson’s own admissions) and the
lack of any evidence provided by Erickson to dispute the [State]
Department’s evidence, the Court holds that the ALJ’s decision was
supported by competent evidence on the record.” See Sandstrom v.
Solen, 2016 COA 29, ¶ 33 n.8, 370 P.3d 669, 675 n.8 (explaining
that entry of summary judgment was appropriate because the
opposing party “provided no affidavits or other evidence in . . .
26 response to the . . . motions for summary judgment”). We agree
with the district court.
¶ 58 In administrative proceedings, the ALJ is the finder of fact, see
Colo. Ethics Watch v. City & County of Broomfield, 203 P.3d 623,
626 (Colo. App. 2009), and has authority to determine whether
there are any genuine issues of material fact, see Coffman v. Colo.
Common Cause, 102 P.3d 999, 1003 (Colo 2004). The ALJ’s
findings were aligned with the limited admissions established
through the deferred adjudication. And when the limited
admissions are coupled with Erickson’s failure to demonstrate the
existence of a factual dispute, we conclude that the State
Department did not misrepresent any of Erickson’s statements.
¶ 59 Thus, we hold that the ALJ did not err by granting summary
judgment to the State Department and that the staff adjudicator
and district court did not err by affirming the ALJ’s initial decision.
III. Disposition
¶ 60 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.