Erick v. Johnson

6 Mass. 193
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedMarch 15, 1810
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 6 Mass. 193 (Erick v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Erick v. Johnson, 6 Mass. 193 (Mass. 1810).

Opinion

Sewall, J.

The interest of B. Johnson in the insurance effected by N. Bixby is to be considered as proved by the protest, or as admitted on the part of the underwriters, by the proceedings of their agent upon the receipt of it; and then the general question, whether the underwriters are chargeable, as his trustees, to the amount .of his share in the loss proved by the protest, and awarded by Mr. Jones, depends upon the effect of the adjustment, made by their broker, Mr. Touro, with Messrs. Appleton, acting for N. Bixby, and intrusted by him with the policy effected in his name.

If the discount of his premium notes, due to the office-keeper, was an effectual payment of the loss, the underwriters [ * 196 ] are discharged; or if the cancelling of the policy, * in consequence of that payment, and the charges allowed by the several underwriters in the subsequent adjustment of their accounts with their broker, are to operate as an adjustment and payment of the loss, then the underwriters were not liable to any demand of B. Johnson at the time this action was commenced.

It may admit of some question, perhaps, whether, after the notice given by the protest of the parties concerned in interest in the policy, upon which a loss was demanded, the insurance broker had any right, which he could insist upon, to a set-off or discount of his demands against the party in whose name the assurance was effected, he not being a party in interest to the policy. But even in [161]*161this view of the case, the consent of the agent of N. Bixby renders him liable to his employers ; and their long, acquiescence is strong presumptive evidence of their after-consent to the adjustment made in behalf of their agent, and may be considered as operating a confirmation of it, if that was necessary for the discharge of the insurance broker. But as it respects the underwriters upon the policy, the other circumstances stated seem to render this payment completely effectual. The particular mode of payment was adopted with the consent of the agent intrusted to effect the insurance, and to obtain payment of the loss demanded upon the policy; and the instrument itself was cancelled in consequence of the adjustment If there was no collusion or intended fraud in the case, the trans action, in this view of it, is equivalent to a payment to a factor, with whom the contract has been made. Besides, in mercantile negotiations, the possession of the contract, by the confidence of the party interested, is a sufficient token of authority in the party intrusted with it; and his cancelling of the contract, upon a fair equivalent, is a discharge to the party liable upon it.

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Related

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61 Mass. 579 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1851)
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17 N.J.L. 425 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1840)
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Bluebook (online)
6 Mass. 193, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/erick-v-johnson-mass-1810.