IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-KA-00303-COA
ERICK TYRIE HUNT APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/11/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LISA P. DODSON COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD DISTRICT ATTORNEY: WILLIAM CROSBY PARKER NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/25/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND WEDDLE, JJ.
WEDDLE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. On June 27, 2022, Erick Hunt, Richard Norman, and Eric Chopin participated in a drug deal with Garrett White and Anthony Oatis.1 Subsequent trial testimony reflected that during the meeting, Hunt and Chopin robbed White at gunpoint. As the confrontation unfolded, Hunt also fatally shot Oatis. A Harrison County grand jury indicted Hunt, Norman, and Chopin each for one count of capital murder for the shooting of Oatis during the commission of a robbery and each for one count of the armed robbery of White. Hunt and
1 Although the record contains alternative spellings for Oatis’s last name, we use the spelling employed by the indictment.
Norman proceeded to a joint trial on their charges, and Chopin pled guilty to manslaughter and armed robbery in exchange for his testimony against Hunt and Norman.
¶2. Following deliberations, a Harrison County Circuit Court jury convicted Hunt of the lesser-included offense of first-degree murder and armed robbery. The Harrison County Circuit Court sentenced Hunt to life imprisonment for first-degree murder and to a consecutive twenty-year term for armed robbery and ordered Hunt to serve both sentences in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC).
¶3. On appeal, Hunt argues that (1) the circuit court failed to conduct a proper Batson2 analysis regarding two jurors stricken during jury selection, (2) the circuit court erred by failing to give a cautionary jury instruction on accomplice testimony, (3) insufficient evidence supported his convictions, and (4) the jury’s verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm Hunt’s convictions and sentences.
FACTS
¶4. At Hunt and Norman’s joint trial, the jury heard testimony that on the day in question, Oatis and White arranged to buy marijuana from Norman. White testified that in preparation for the purchase, he collected $2,300 and that Oatis planned to buy even more marijuana than White did. In all, White estimated that he and Oatis took about $7,000 with them to the meeting.
2 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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¶5. Hunt, Norman, and Chopin arrived at the meeting spot first in Hunt’s white Dodge Challenger. Hunt sat in the driver’s seat, Norman sat in the front passenger seat, and Chopin sat in the back seat. When Oatis and White arrived, Oatis parked his vehicle directly in front of and facing Hunt’s Dodge Challenger. Norman and White exchanged places with one another so that White could inspect the marijuana.
¶6. White testified that when he got into the Dodge Challenger, Hunt had two book bags in his possession. Although the first book bag contained marijuana, White stated that the second book bag looked as though it had been stuffed with clothing. White testified that he sensed something about the transaction was wrong. As a result, White told Hunt and Chopin that he needed to return to Oatis’s vehicle to get all his money for the marijuana purchase. White testified that after he exited Hunt’s vehicle, he heard Oatis calling out his name. White ran toward Oatis’s open driver’s side window and saw Oatis and Norman wrestling over a black pistol. White testified that he did not have a weapon with him, and as far as he had been aware, Oatis did not have a weapon in his possession either.
¶7. According to White, Hunt and Chopin exited Hunt’s Dodge Challenger right behind him. White testified that Hunt and Chopin each pointed a gun at him. White further testified that Chopin took his cell phone and the $2,300 he had in his pocket. Although White was no longer paying as much attention to the struggle between Oatis and Norman, he heard the sound of a gunshot from inside Oatis’s vehicle. White stated that after the gunshot, Oatis put his vehicle into reverse. White testified that Norman exited Oatis’s vehicle, and he (White)
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ran away from the scene. According to White, he heard one more gunshot come from the direction of Oatis’s vehicle as he fled.
¶8. White ran into a nearby business, but the employees had heard the gunshots and made him leave their store. The jury watched video footage from the business, which showed White running from the building. White stated that when he returned to the crime scene, police officers had already arrived. Although White spoke to the officers, he gave them a fake name and denied having any knowledge of Oatis’s shooting. The following day White voluntarily went to the police station and provided a statement about the shooting. From photographic lineups that police officers showed him, White identified Norman and Chopin as two of the men present during the armed robbery and shooting. On redirect examination, White testified that both Hunt and Chopin pointed guns at him and robbed him of his phone and money. A local resident later found White’s cell phone on the pavement in the vicinity of the shooting and turned the phone in to the police department.
¶9. Chopin, who also testified as a witness for the State, substantially corroborated White’s version of events. Chopin was fifteen years old at the time that the armed robbery and shooting occurred. Chopin admitted that on the day in question, he, Hunt, and Norman met with Oatis and White to conduct a marijuana sale. Chopin testified that after Norman and White switched places with one another, Hunt showed White a bag containing marijuana.
¶10. Chopin stated that White initially pulled out “a bunch of money” and began counting his cash to pay for the marijuana. Chopin further stated, however, that White suddenly
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stopped counting and claimed he did not have all the money he needed. White exited Hunt’s Dodge Challenger and ran toward Oatis’s vehicle. According to Chopin, White began yelling, “[G]ive me the gun, give me the gun.” Although White did not have a gun in his possession, Chopin stated that he and Hunt each grabbed a pistol and pursued White. Chopin testified that he held a black and silver Smith and Wesson gun, and Hunt held a black Glock 43. Chopin further testified that after he and Hunt “chased . . . White down[,]” they “robbed him for his items.” Chopin stated that he ran one way, Hunt ran another, and they “trapped” White between them. Chopin testified that he and Hunt both pointed their guns at White. Chopin retrieved White’s cell phone from White’s pants pocket. Chopin stated that White had dropped a bunch of money on the ground as he was running away and that Hunt picked up the money.
¶11. Chopin testified that after he and Hunt robbed White, White ran away. Chopin could see that Oatis and Norman were wrestling over a gun inside Oatis’s vehicle. Chopin stated that he got back into Hunt’s Dodge Challenger while Hunt walked to the driver’s side window of Oatis’s vehicle to help Norman. Chopin testified that he “heard the gun go off like once or twice[,]” and then he saw Hunt “discharge his firearm at O[a]tis through the driver seat window.” Chopin stated that immediately after Hunt fired his gun, Oatis began to yell and put his vehicle into reverse. Chopin testified that as Oatis backed into the middle of the road, “Norman hopped out [of] the car with the gun they were fighting over and the stash of money.” Chopin stated that he did not see Norman in possession of a weapon or any
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money until Norman exited Oatis’s vehicle with both items in his hands. Although Chopin did not know exactly how much money Norman had as he exited Oatis’s vehicle, Chopin stated that it probably amounted to “a couple of grand.”
¶12. After Norman got back into Hunt’s vehicle, Oatis drove away in one direction, and Hunt headed in the other direction. Chopin stated that he handed White’s cell phone to Norman, who tossed the phone out the window. Despite the events that had just occurred, Chopin testified that he, Hunt, and Norman were laughing and joking with one another as Hunt drove them back to Pascagoula. In fact, Chopin admitted that he and the other two men recorded a video that showed “Hunt flashing a bunch of money with [Chopin] and Norman in the background laughing.” Chopin testified that he thought he, Hunt, and Norman had gotten “about ten grand” in cash from White and Oatis. Chopin stated that he received “[a]bout a grand or two” of the stolen money, which he used to buy new clothes and shoes. Chopin testified that when he asked Hunt and Norman where they had shot Oatis, Hunt responded that he had shot Oatis in the arm and that Oatis would be fine.
¶13. Chopin later turned himself in to law enforcement. After being taken into custody, officers showed Chopin a photographic lineup. Chopin testified that he circled Norman’s photograph and identified Norman as the person who had struggled with Oatis over control of a gun. Chopin acknowledged at trial that he had agreed to testify against Hunt and Norman in exchange for pleading guilty to the reduced charges of manslaughter and armed robbery. Chopin further acknowledged that he had not yet been sentenced for his crimes.
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¶14. Gulfport police officers responded to the dispatch about the shooting around 6:55 p.m. When the officers arrived at the scene, they found Oatis slumped over the steering wheel of his vehicle. Upon noticing blood around Oatis’s midsection, the officers removed him from the vehicle. Oatis’s autopsy later showed that he had suffered a gunshot wound to his abdomen that caused a great deal of internal bleeding. The jury heard testimony that a bullet entered Oatis’s abdomen on the front left side and traveled in a downward trajectory before exiting through the back right side of his abdomen.
¶15. Inside Oatis’s vehicle, the officers found a cell phone wedged between the driver’s seat and the center console. The cell phone had a bullet lodged into its camera port. Officers later determined that the bullet had traveled through Oatis and caused his abdominal injuries before lodging in his cell phone. The officers also discovered money strewn around the vehicle’s floorboard. In all, officers collected $105 from the passenger side of the vehicle and $40 from the driver’s side.
¶16. During the course of their investigation, officers learned that Oatis and White had met with three other men in a white Dodge Challenger. After reviewing license plate readers, officers spotted the white Dodge Challenger leaving Gulfport around 7 p.m. on the same night as the shooting. After leaving Gulfport, the vehicle then traveled through both Biloxi and Pascagoula. In addition to Norman and Chopin, officers began to suspect that Hunt was the third individual involved in Oatis’s shooting and White’s armed robbery.
¶17. After obtaining a phone number that belonged to Hunt, officers also obtained Hunt’s
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phone records. The officers learned that Hunt had made several recent phone calls to Elliott Walker, an inmate incarcerated at the Harrison County Adult Detention Center. The officers subsequently obtained recordings of Walker’s phone calls. In a phone call that Hunt made the morning after Oatis’s shooting, Hunt told Walker that he had to “slide out of Gulfport” and that Walker should watch the news. In a second phone call later that same day, Walker stated that he had not watched the news. Hunt responded, “DOA[,]” meaning dead on arrival. In yet another phone call made on the same day, Walker asked “how much money [Hunt] got off . . . that play . . . .” Hunt said about $772 and then explained, “I only did what I did because bruh was [about] to hit [Norman] with a ten in his face.” Two days later, Hunt told Walker during a fourth phone call that Walker would not believe where Norman had set up the meeting.
¶18. Officers determined that Hunt was calling Walker from Jackson, Mississippi. The officers located Hunt’s white Dodge Challenger at a residence in Jackson. About two weeks after Oatis’s shooting, law enforcement officers had the Jackson residence under surveillance when they saw Hunt exit the home and get into the Dodge Challenger. When officers approached and identified themselves to Hunt, he fled the scene on foot. The officers apprehended Hunt soon afterward. Upon obtaining a warrant and searching the Dodge Challenger, officers found one Glock handgun and one Smith and Wesson handgun. The officers also found numerous dealership tags and license plates inside the vehicle.
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¶19. After waiving his Miranda3 rights, Hunt provided officers with a statement. During his almost two-hour recorded interview with law enforcement, Hunt provided about four or five different accounts of the events leading to and surrounding the armed robbery and shooting. Initially, Hunt completely denied being in Gulfport on the day in question. Hunt then admitted that he came to Gulfport to pick up his Dodge Challenger, but he stated that after picking up his vehicle, he immediately left the area. Next, Hunt claimed that he actually went to Pascagoula and left his Dodge Challenger with Norman and Chopin. Finally, Hunt admitted to being at the scene of the shooting and armed robbery.
¶20. During Hunt’s interview, officers showed him two different photographic lineups. One lineup included a picture of Norman, and the other included a picture of Chopin. Hunt identified both men and stated that they had also been present with him at the crime scene. Hunt admitted to officers that he had used the Glock handgun found inside his Dodge Challenger to shoot Oatis. Ballistics testing later confirmed that the Glock handgun Hunt admitted to using had fired the single projectile recovered from inside Oatis’s vehicle.
¶21. After obtaining a warrant to search Hunt’s cell phone, officers extracted a video that Hunt had recorded about an hour after Oatis’s shooting. Consistent with Chopin’s trial testimony, the video depicted Hunt, Chopin, and Norman laughing inside the Dodge Challenger as Hunt held up a large amount of money. Officers also recovered text messages between Hunt and Norman in which the men discussed the news coverage about the armed
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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robbery and homicide.
¶22. At trial, Hunt testified that on the day in question, he drove from Jackson to Gulfport to pay Walker’s bond. Based on information that Walker had provided to him, Hunt contacted Norman and asked Norman to help him get in touch with a bondsman. Hunt testified that he drove to Gulfport on June 27, 2022, and met Norman and Chopin at a gas station. According to Hunt, he then drove his own vehicle and followed the other two men to a residential neighborhood in Pascagoula. Hunt stated that the bondsman could not meet with him right then. To pass the time, Hunt gave Norman and Chopin a ride so Norman could conduct a marijuana sale.
¶23. Hunt testified that he drove his white Dodge Challenger to the meeting. He stated that Norman sat in the vehicle’s front passenger seat, and Chopin sat in the backseat. Hunt testified that he drove to a gas station in Gulfport, where Norman exited the vehicle to speak to Oatis and White. Hunt stated that during the ride to the gas station, he, Norman, and Chopin never discussed committing a robbery.
¶24. After leaving the gas station, Hunt drove to another location so Norman could obtain some marijuana to sell to Oatis and White. Hunt next drove to the spot where Norman had arranged to meet Oatis and White. Oatis arrived and parked his vehicle in front of Hunt’s Dodge Challenger. White and Norman then exchanged places with one another. Hunt testified that White looked inside the bag of marijuana and began to count out his money. Hunt stated that White then stopped and said he needed to return to Oatis’s vehicle to retrieve
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the rest of his money.
¶25. Hunt testified that White walked toward Oatis’s vehicle. According to Hunt, Chopin heard White begin to yell. Hunt stated that Chopin panicked, retrieved one of the two handguns inside Hunt’s vehicle, and followed White outside. Hunt testified that he then began to panic as well. Hunt stated that he grabbed the second handgun from inside his vehicle and followed Chopin and White. Hunt testified that after he exited his Dodge Challenger, he saw Norman and Oatis struggling inside Oatis’s vehicle for possession of a third gun. Hunt stated that he ran to the driver’s side window of Oatis’s vehicle. Although he passed Chopin and White as he ran, Hunt claimed that he never pointed his gun at White. Hunt further claimed that he never demanded White’s money or phone.
¶26. Hunt testified that although Oatis and Norman were still struggling for control of the gun when he reached the open driver’s side window of Oatis’s vehicle, the gun was pointed toward Norman. Hunt explained that he attempted to defuse the situation by asking Norman and Oatis several times to put down the gun. Hunt stated that both men refused, and as they continued to struggle, the gun fired once in Norman’s direction. During this time, Hunt stated that he was not paying attention to anything occurring between Chopin and White because his entire focus was on the struggle between Norman and Oatis.
¶27. Hunt testified that after the first gunshot, White fled the scene on foot, and he (Hunt) fired his own weapon. Hunt stated that he did not see where, if at all, he had hit anyone inside Oatis’s vehicle with his shot. Hunt and Chopin ran back to Hunt’s Dodge Challenger.
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As Oatis’s vehicle began to reverse, Norman exited and ran back to the Dodge Challenger as well. Once all three men were inside the Dodge Challenger, Hunt drove back to Pascagoula. Hunt testified that at that point in time, he believed Oatis was fine and had likewise driven away from the meeting spot.
¶28. Hunt confirmed that as he was driving away, Chopin gave White’s cell phone to Norman, who tossed the phone out the window. Hunt testified that Chopin wanted to make the video that depicted himself, Norman, and Chopin holding the money and laughing. Hunt stated that the money shown in the video with a band around it was the bond money he had brought for Walker. Hunt testified that Chopin had stolen from White the single bills shown in the video. Hunt claimed that he did not know Chopin had taken White’s money until after they had driven away from the scene. Hunt further claimed that he did not keep any of the stolen money. Hunt testified that making the video with Norman and Chopin had been “a dumb mistake.” Despite the video depicting all three men laughing, Hunt claimed that he actually had been scared and had only made the video because Norman and Chopin wanted to do so. After Norman and Chopin went their separate ways, Hunt returned to Jackson.
¶29. Hunt admitted that he made several phone calls to Walker, who was still incarcerated. Hunt testified that in one of the phone calls with Walker, he was explaining that he shot Oatis because he had been afraid and was trying to protect himself and Norman from getting shot. Hunt agreed that it sounded as if he were laughing about Oatis’s death in another phone call with Walker. Hunt testified, however, that he was simply shocked following the events of
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the drug deal and could not believe how badly everything had gone. Hunt stated that he did not think it was funny that Oatis had died, and he reiterated that making the video after the drug deal had been “a dumb mistake” that he regretted. Hunt also reiterated that he had only met Norman and Chopin a few hours prior to the drug deal and that they had never discussed robbing or shooting anyone.
¶30. On cross-examination, Hunt again admitted that he had shot Oatis, and he agreed that there had been inconsistencies between his trial testimony and his pretrial statement to police. Despite Hunt’s insistence that Oatis first fired at Norman, police officers found no evidence to show that another shot had been fired inside Oatis’s vehicle. Although Hunt claimed that Chopin had wanted to make the video after the drug deal, Hunt agreed that he had been the one to record the video on his phone. Hunt further agreed that his phone was turned toward him during the video and that he could be seen for the entire length of the recording.
¶31. Even though Hunt claimed the money he held in the video was actually for Walker’s bond, he was unable to recall with any specificity the total amount of Walker’s bond. At trial, Hunt testified that he had taken thousands of dollars with him to pay Walker’s bond. Hunt admitted, however, that when he was interviewed by police prior to trial, he had told them that he only had about $300 for Walker’s bond. Despite the discrepancy between his pretrial statement and his trial testimony, Hunt insisted that he had not obtained the money seen in the video by robbing White. Hunt instead claimed that Chopin had been the only person who robbed White. Hunt also claimed that after he returned to Jackson, someone
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other than him put a tint stripe on the windshield of his Dodge Challenger and replaced the license plate on his vehicle with a different one.
¶32. After considering all the testimony and evidence, the jury convicted Hunt of first- degree murder and armed robbery. The circuit court sentenced Hunt to life imprisonment for first-degree murder and to a consecutive twenty-year term for armed robbery and ordered that Hunt serve both sentences in MDOC’s custody. Hunt moved unsuccessfully for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial. Aggrieved, Hunt appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Batson Analysis
¶33. Hunt contends that the circuit court conducted an incomplete Batson analysis after his attorney objected to the State’s use of peremptory challenges to strike two black jurors during the jury-selection process. “We apply a highly deferential standard of review on appeal of a trial court’s Batson rulings. In particular, a Batson ruling may not be overturned unless the record indicates that the ruling was clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Dewberry v. State, 407 So. 3d 269, 275 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶34. Mississippi courts employ the following three-step procedure to determine if a party’s peremptory strike is discriminatory:
First, the party objecting to the use of a peremptory strike has the burden to make a prima facie case that race or gender was the criterion for the strike.
Under step two, the burden shifts to the striking party to state a race-neutral reason for the strike. Step three requires that if the striking party offers a valid
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race-neutral reason, then the trial judge must allow the strike unless the other party demonstrates that the valid race-neutral reason was a pretext for discrimination.
Id. at (¶21) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Pitchford v. Cain, 146 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (2026).
¶35. Here, during the jury-selection process, the State exercised its peremptory strikes for Jurors 3 and 8. After the State moved to strike Juror 8, the defense asserted a Batson challenge on the ground that both stricken jurors were black. The circuit judge requested that the State provide a race-neutral reason for striking each juror.
¶36. With regard to Juror 3, the State explained that it wished to strike him due to his personal and family interactions with local law enforcement in similar past cases. Juror 3 stated during voir dire that he previously had been accused of attempted murder and that he had family members who had been accused of crimes involving murder and drugs. With regard to Juror 8, the State explained that she had said her brother was falsely accused of an armed robbery that occurred at an Exxon gas station in Gulfport. The State’s attorney recalled that he previously had tried a case in front of the current circuit judge where the defendant, who had the same last name as Juror 8, had been charged with committing a robbery at the Exxon gas station in Gulfport. In addition, the State’s attorney noted that Juror 8 appeared to live in close proximity to where Oatis’s shooting had occurred, and she indicated during voir dire that she had read something about the crime on Facebook.
¶37. The circuit judge found that the State had provided valid race-neutral reasons for
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striking both jurors and allowed the defense to respond. As to Juror 3, the defense simply noted that he was a black male. And as for Juror 8, the defense responded that she was not only a black female, but she also was a gainfully employed postal service employee, was thirty years old, resided in Gulfport, and had completed graduate school.
¶38. After considering the parties’ explanations and responses, the circuit judge found the defense failed to establish that the State’s race-neutral reasons for striking the jurors were a pretext for discrimination. First, the circuit judge noted that during voir dire, Juror 3 stated “he was falsely accused of attempted murder” and had “multiple family members who have been charged here locally with a multitude of different crimes,” which the circuit judge found “probably means that this District Attorney’s Office is the one who has prosecuted them.” The circuit judge concluded that the defense’s response simply noting that Juror 3 was a black male was insufficient to overcome the State’s valid race-neutral reasons for striking him. Next, the circuit judge found that Juror 8 had “very clearly indicated voluntarily that her brother was charged here and was falsely accused, also prosecuted by this District Attorney’s Office because it’s been within the last recent years.” The circuit judge stated that “[t]o have someone . . . they believe was falsely accused [prosecuted] by the same [District Attorney’s O]ffice that is bringing this case is not cause, but it is a sufficient race[-]neutral reason.” In addition, the circuit judge found that the defense’s rebuttal discussing Juror 8’s employment, age, residency, and educational background failed to establish that the State had struck her due to her race. The circuit judge therefore denied the defense’s Batson challenges
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and allowed both jurors to be stricken.
¶39. On appeal, Hunt challenges the thoroughness of the circuit judge’s Batson analysis. Hunt alleges that the State struck the two black jurors “based on supposed concerns about prior criminal charges in their families” but “accepted white jurors who had virtually identical backgrounds after they gave the same assurances of impartiality.” Specifically, Hunt argues that Jurors 34, 40, and 52 had family members who had faced prosecution, yet these three jurors still “were seated once they confirmed” their ability to remain impartial.
¶40. Upon review, we find that Hunt’s claims lack merit. First, despite Hunt’s assertions, the record reflects that Jurors 34, 40, and 52 were not seated for the petit jury or as alternates. In fact, the record reflects that the State actually struck Juror 34 as an alternate juror, and the selection process did not extend to either Juror 40 or 52. Moreover, the record reflects, and the circuit judge found, that the State struck Jurors 3 and 8 for multiple reasons and not simply because they had family members who had previously faced criminal prosecution. In reviewing the record, we find no reversible error with the circuit judge’s determination that each of the explanations the State provided for striking Jurors 3 and 8 was a valid race- neutral reason that the defense then failed to rebut as pretext. As a result, we find no clear error in the circuit judge’s Batson rulings with regard to Jurors 3 and 8. We therefore decline to reverse her decision as to this issue.
II. Accomplice Jury Instruction
¶41. Hunt contends that the circuit court also erred by refusing to give the following
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proposed jury instruction on accomplice testimony:
The Court instructs the Jury that you have heard testimony that [Chopin] was an accomplice in the crime alleged in this case. The Court instructs the Jury that the testimony of [Chopin] is to be considered with great care, caution, and suspicion. You may give it such weight and credit as you deem it is entitled.
¶42. “We review a circuit court’s decision to give or refuse jury instructions for abuse of discretion.” Greene v. State, 433 So. 3d 331, 338 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting Fears v. State, 402 So. 3d 791, 797 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025)). “Defendants are entitled to have instructions on their theory of the case presented to the jury for which there is foundation in the evidence, even though the evidence might be weak, insufficient, inconsistent[,] or of doubtful credibility.” Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 283 So. 3d 64, 72 (¶41) (Miss. 2019)). Relevant to Hunt’s argument on appeal, “[a]n accomplice is a person who is implicated in the commission of the crime, and if the evidence gives a reasonable inference that the person may have been a co-perpetrator or the sole perpetrator, then that person is an accomplice.” Id. at (¶37) (quoting Fears, 402 So. 3d at 797 (¶36)). As our caselaw explains,
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may be sufficient to convict an accused. This rule is inapplicable in those cases where the testimony is unreasonable, self-contradictory, or substantially impeached. Only slight corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony is required to sustain a conviction.
The testimony that must be corroborated is the part connecting the defendant to the crime. If the testimony is not corroborated, a cautionary jury instruction is required.
Id. at (¶36) (quoting Jones v. State, 203 So. 3d 600, 606 (¶11) (Miss. 2016)).
¶43. Here, the circuit judge found that although Chopin was indeed an accomplice, his testimony connecting Hunt to White’s armed robbery and Oatis’s shooting “was corroborated
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by White, the physical evidence, and even by Hunt.” The circuit judge therefore refused to give Hunt’s proposed instruction regarding Chopin’s accomplice testimony.
¶44. On appeal, Hunt does not dispute that he shot Oatis. Rather, his argument focuses on the armed-robbery charge. Hunt alleges there was no testimony presented that he directly “took [White’s] property, tried to take property, or encouraged anyone else to do so.” Instead, Hunt asserts “that the only evidence tying [him] to the robbery of White was Chopin’s bare assertion.” Upon review, we disagree. Although Hunt denied taking part in the armed robbery, both White and Chopin disputed Hunt’s version of events. Most importantly, White’s testimony corroborated Chopin’s statement regarding Hunt’s participation in the crime. Specifically, White testified that both Chopin and Hunt exited Hunt’s Dodge Challenger with guns and that both men pointed their guns at him as Chopin took his money and his cell phone. Based on White’s testimony, we find the record reflects sufficient corroboration of the portion of Chopin’s testimony connecting Hunt to the armed- robbery charge. We therefore conclude that the circuit judge did not abuse her discretion by refusing Hunt’s proposed jury instruction on accomplice testimony.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶45. Hunt challenges the sufficiency of the State’s evidence supporting his convictions for armed robbery and first-degree murder and argues that the jury’s verdicts were against the weight of the evidence presented at trial. We review a “challenge[] to the sufficiency of evidence de novo.” Foreman v. State, 433 So. 3d 759, 764-65 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2026)
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(quoting Ratcliff v. State, 396 So. 3d 1101, 1104 (¶4) (Miss. 2024)). “[W]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and decide if rational jurors could have found the State proved each element of the crime.” Pierre v. State, 431 So. 3d 903, 909
(¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting Richards v. State, 283 So. 3d 1151, 1160 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019)). “All credible evidence supporting a defendant’s guilt should be accepted as true, and all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence must be reconciled in the prosecution’s favor.” Odom v. State, 426 So. 3d 378, 385 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 162, 166 (¶7) (Miss. 2005)). “The relevant inquiry is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pierre, 431 So. 3d at 909 (¶23) (quoting Richards, 283 So. 3d at 1160-61 (¶36)). We will only reverse the jury’s verdict “when the facts point so overwhelmingly in favor of the defendant that reasonable men could not have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty . . . .” Id.
A. Armed Robbery
¶46. To convict Hunt of armed robbery, the State had to establish the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) a felonious taking or attempt to take; (2) from the person or from the presence; (3) the personal property of another; (4) against his will; (5) by violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of immediate injury to his person by the exhibition of a deadly weapon.
Odom, 426 So. 3d at 385-86 (¶19) (quoting Cowart v. State, 178 So. 3d 651, 666 (¶42) (Miss. 2015)).
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¶47. The State presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Chopin and Hunt, acting together, used guns to put White in fear of immediate injury to his person and took White’s property against his will. “When two people act in concert or when one person aids another in committing a crime, both are equally guilty as principals in the eyes of the law.” Wofford v. State, 350 So. 3d 628, 636 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Lipsey v. State, 756 So. 2d 823, 825 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)). Hunt and Chopin both readily admitted at trial that they had guns in their possession as they exited Hunt’s Dodge Challenger. Based on the entirety of the trial testimony, a rational juror could find that Hunt and Chopin both pointed their guns at White as Chopin retrieved White’s cell phone and money. Moreover, Hunt admitted that the video recorded on his phone after the robbery showed him holding some of the stolen money. And in a recorded phone call with Walker, when Walker asked “how much money [Hunt] got off . . . that play[,]” Hunt responded that he got about $772. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find the State presented sufficient evidence to allow a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Hunt committed all the elements necessary for armed robbery. See Pierre, 431 So. 3d at 909 (¶23) (quoting Richards, 283 So. 3d at 1160-61 (¶36)).
B. First-Degree Murder
¶48. On appeal, Hunt argues that with regard to Oatis’s shooting, the record “contains no testimony of any intent other than [his] own statement that he was fearful” when he shot Oatis. Although Hunt admitted at trial to shooting Oatis, he stated that “he did so because
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he saw Oatis with a gun pointed at Norman and believed Norman’s life was in immediate danger.” As a result, Hunt asserts that the record lacks sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for first-degree murder.
¶49. Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19(1)(a) (Rev. 2020) defines first-degree murder as “[t]he killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner . . . [w]hen done with deliberate design to effect the death of the person killed, or of any human being . . . .” Thus, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hunt committed first- degree murder, the State had to show that “(1) [Hunt] killed [Oatis]; (2) without authority of law; [and] (3) with deliberate design to effect [Oatis’s] death.” Holifield v. State, 425 So. 3d 527, 538 (¶47) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Willis v. State, 352 So. 3d 602, 617 (¶41) (Miss. 2022)). “[D]eliberate” refers to “a full awareness of what one is doing and generally implies careful and unhurried consideration of the consequences[,]” and “the term ‘design’ means to calculate, plan or contemplate.” Id. at 539 (¶51) (quoting Watts v. State, 402 So. 3d 744, 749 (¶20) (Miss. 2025)). “[D]eliberate design may be inferred through the intentional use of any instrument, which based on its manner of use, is calculated to produce death or serious bodily injury.” Id. (quoting Watts, 402 So. 3d at 749 (¶20)).
¶50. Despite Hunt’s assertions to the contrary, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence from which rational jurors could find that Hunt shot Oatis with deliberate design and not in defense of Norman. Hunt’s own testimony reflected that he intentionally exited his vehicle with a gun in his possession, proceeded to Oatis’s open driver’s side
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window, inserted himself into the situation occurring inside the vehicle, and fired his weapon at Oatis from close range. Although testimony reflected that Norman and Oatis had begun struggling for control of a weapon, Hunt was the only witness who testified that Oatis had greater control of the gun or that Oatis had the weapon pointed in Norman’s direction. Not only did Chopin and White fail to corroborate Hunt’s version of the struggle taking place inside Oatis’s vehicle, but the evidence reflected that police officers found no projectile (other than the one Hunt shot) inside Oatis’s vehicle.
¶51. As previously discussed, the State presented evidence to show that Hunt participated in robbing White. Based on White’s and Chopin’s testimonies regarding Hunt’s actions prior to shooting Oatis, as well as Hunt’s actions following the shooting, a rational juror could find that Hunt first used his weapon to commit armed robbery and then proceeded to use the same weapon to deliberately murder Oatis. The jury is the sole judge of conflicting evidence and witness credibility. Holifield, 425 So. 3d at 539 (¶53). After considering the evidence and testimony presented here, the jury concluded that Hunt was guilty of first-degree murder. Viewing the same trial evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that rational jurors indeed could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the State proved the essential elements of first-degree murder.
IV. Weight of the Evidence
¶52. In his final assignment of error, Hunt argues that the jury’s verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. In evaluating Hunt’s claim, we “view the evidence
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in the light most favorable to the verdict and disturb the verdict only when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Campbell v. State, 406 So. 3d 1, 7 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288, 289 (¶1) (Miss. 2017)). As our caselaw establishes, “[w]e do not reweigh evidence[, w]e do not assess the witnesses’ credibility[, a]nd we do not resolve conflicts between evidence.” Id. (quoting Little, 233 So. 3d at 289 (¶1)). Rather, “we bear in mind that when evidence or testimony conflicts, the jury is the sole judge of the weight and worth of evidence and witness credibility.” Holifield, 425 So. 3d at 539 (¶53) (quoting Campbell v. State, 380 So. 3d 985, 990 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024)).
¶53. As previously discussed, the State presented evidence to satisfy the elements of both armed robbery and first-degree murder. After the jurors weighed the evidence, assessed the witnesses’ credibility, and resolved any conflicts in the evidence, they returned a verdict finding Hunt guilty of one count of armed robbery and one count of first-degree murder. Considering the jury’s authority to resolve these questions, and viewing the record “evidence in the light most favorable to the [jury’s] verdict[,]” we cannot say that allowing the verdict “to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Campbell, 406 So. 3d at 7 (¶26) (quoting Little, 233 So. 3d at 289 (¶1)). Accordingly, we decline to find that the jury’s verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
CONCLUSION
¶54. Because we find no reversible error, we affirm Hunt’s convictions and sentences for
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armed robbery and first-degree murder.
¶55. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.