Erick M. Moron and Mauricio Moron-Gonzalez v. General Motors LLC and Does 1 to 10, inclusive

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERICK M. MORON, an individual, and Case No.: 3:25-cv-02458-H-BLM MAURICIO MORON-GONZALEZ, an 12 individual, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR Plaintiffs, ATTORNEYS’ FEES 14 v. 15 [Doc. No. 19.] GENERAL MOTORS LLC, a Delaware 16 limited liability company, and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18

19 On December 19, 2025, Plaintiffs Erick M. Moron and Mauricio Moron-Gonzalez 20 (“Plaintiffs”) filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. (Doc. No. 19.) On December 30, 2025, 21 Defendant General Motors (“GM”) filed a response in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion. 22 (Doc. No. 20.) On February 2, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a reply. (Doc. No. 26.) On February 23 3, 2026, the Court took the matter under submission. (Doc. No. 27.) For the reasons below, 24 the Court grants in part Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees. 25 Background 26 On August 14, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California, 27 County of San Diego against Defendant, alleging causes of action for: (1) violation of Civil 28 Code § 1793.2(d); (2) violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(b); (3) violation of Civil Code § 1 1793.2(a)(3); (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability in violation of Civil 2 Code § 1791.1 and § 1794; and (5) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 3 U.S.C. § 2301-2312. (Id. ¶¶ 8-44.) 4 On September 17, 2025, Defendant filed an answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint. (Doc. 5 No. 1-3, Answer.) Subsequently, on September 18, 2025, Defendant timely removed the 6 action to United States District Court for the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 7 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) and 1446(b) on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1, Notice 8 of Removal.) On October 10, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand. (Doc. No. 8.) On 9 November 21, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion. (Doc. No. 16.) 10 On October 29, 2025, following a neutral evaluation conference, the parties partially 11 settled except as to attorneys’ fees and costs. (Doc. No. 10.) On December 12, 2025, after 12 weeks of discussion regarding attorneys’ fees and costs without resolution, the Court 13 ordered Plaintiffs to file a motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. (Doc. No. 18.) 14 On December 17, 2025, the parties partially resolved this matter via Defendant’s Offer of 15 Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 (“Rule 68 Offer”). (Doc. No. 16 19-6.) In the Rule 68 Offer, the parties agreed “Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees, expenses and 17 costs that have been reasonably incurred pursuant to California Civil Code § 1794(d) may 18 be determined by the Court via noticed motion. For purposes of any such motion, GM will 19 agree that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party.” (Doc. No. 19 at 5; Doc. No. 19-6 ¶ 4, Rule 20 68 Offer; Doc. No. 20 at 2.) 21 By the present motion, Plaintiffs move for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses 22 pursuant to Civil Code § 1794(d) of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. (Doc. No. 23 19 at 2, 18.) Specifically, Plaintiffs request that the Court award attorneys’ fees in the 24 amount of $27,337.501 plus a lodestar multiplier of .2 in the amount of $4,922.50. (Id. at 25 1-2, 18.) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(iii) (requiring that any motion for attorney’s fees 26 27 28 1 Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees in the amount of $24,612.50 with anticipated time of $2,725.00. 1 must “state the amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it”). Plaintiffs also move this 2 Court for reimbursement of verifiable costs and expenses in the amount of $507.39, totaling 3 $32,767.39. (Doc. No. 19 at 1-2; Doc. No. 26 at 11.) 4 Discussion 5 I. Legal Standard 6 Because Defendant removed this action under diversity jurisdiction, “the law of the 7 state in which the district court sits determines whether a party is entitled to attorney fees,” 8 but “the procedure for requesting an award of attorney fees is governed by federal 9 law.” Carnes v. Zamani, 488 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (citation 10 omitted). Thus, California law is determinative “not only [of] the right to fees, but also in 11 the method of calculating the fees.” Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 12 1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 13 Under California Civil Code § 1794, the “prevailing buyer” in a Song-Beverly 14 action “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the 15 aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s 16 fees.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). The Ninth Circuit utilizes the lodestar method for 17 calculating reasonable attorneys’ fees, “multiplying the number of hours reasonably 18 expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 19 F. 3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2007). The burden is on the party seeking fees to establish their 20 reasonableness. Id. at 945-46 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). 21 In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the district court should consider: (1) the 22 experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (2) the outcome of the proceedings; (3) 23 customary fees; and (4) the novelty or difficulty of the question presented. Hiken v. Dep't 24 of Def., 836 F. 3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Chalmers v. City of L.A., 796 F.2d 25 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1986)). Additionally, district courts may “rely[] on their own 26 knowledge of customary rates and their experience concerning reasonable and proper 27 fees.” Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F. 3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011). 28 1 District courts have broad “discretion in determining the amount of a fee award ... 2 in view of [their] superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding 3 frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 4 437. The “district court may exclude from the fee request any hours that are ‘excessive, 5 redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’” Ingram, 647 F.3d at 926 (quoting Hensley, 461 6 U.S. at 434). If a court determines that some hours billed are not reasonable, it may exclude 7 them using one of two methods: the court may either conduct an “hour-by-hour analysis” 8 of the fee request or make an “across the board percentage cut.” Gonzalez v. City of 9 Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2013). 10 II. Analysis 11 The parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees 12 under § 1794(d) as the prevailing parties in this action. Rather, at issue is whether 13 Plaintiffs’ request for $27,337.50 in attorneys’ fees plus a lodestar multiplier of .2 in the 14 amount of $4,922.50 is reasonable. Defendants do not oppose Plaintiffs’ request for costs 15 in the amount of $507.39. (Doc. No. 19 at 18; Doc. No. 20 at 1, 12.) 16 A. Reasonable Rates 17 The first step in calculating the lodestar is determining the reasonable hourly rate. 18 In determining a reasonable rate for attorneys’ fees, “the burden is on the fee applicant to 19 produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the 20 requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by 21 lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 22 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). “The relevant community is that in which the district court 23 sits.” Carr v. Tadin, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 3d 970, 978 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Weeks v. 24 Kellogg Co., 2013 WL 6531177, at *32 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2013)). “Once the fee 25 applicant has proffered such evidence” of the prevailing market rate in the community, “the 26 opposing party must produce its own affidavits or other evidence to rebut the proposed 27 rate.” Nguyen v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2023 WL 173921, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 28 2023) (quoting Cortes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 380 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 1 2005)). 2 Plaintiffs contend that the following hourly rates for their attorneys are reasonable: 3 (1) $545 for Stephanie Pengilley (10 years of practice); (2) $525 for Michelle Yang (7 4 years of practice); (3) $450 for Andrea Plata (3 years of practice); and (4) $545 for John 5 Myers (8 years of practice). (Doc. No. 19-1, Pengilley Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 7-8; Doc. No. 19 at 6 11-13.) Plaintiffs also contend that the hourly rate of $125 is reasonable for paralegals, 7 legal assistants, and case managers. (Id. at 11, 14; Doc. No. 19-1, Pengilley Decl. ¶ 13.) 8 Defendant contends that Plaintiffs' counsel's requested rates “are excessive and 9 unsupported.” (Doc. No. 20 at 6.) Defendant asserts that the rates are far too high for 10 “relatively junior attorneys with minimal trial and appellate backgrounds” and “a largely 11 routine lemon law case”. (Id. at 7-8.) Defendant notes “the highest biller, Christine Haw, 12 is not mentioned in Plaintiffs’ declaration”. (Id. at 7.) Defendant requests that the Court 13 award a rate of $250 per hour for all attorneys. (Id. at 9.) 14 In support of Plaintiffs’ motion, Stephanie Pengilley submits a declaration citing 15 several cases in which hourly rates comparable to those requested here were awarded to 16 that specific attorney or to an attorney of similar experience in the Central and Southern 17 Districts of California. (Doc. No. 19-1, Pengilley Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13.) See e.g., 18 Zamora v. BMW of North America LLC, 2023 WL 8896264, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 19 2023) (concluding hourly billing rates of $565 for Sephanie Pengilley and $545 for John 20 Myers were reasonable). Pengilley’s declaration also attests that Michelle Yang, founding 21 partner of Prestige Legal Solutions, P.C. (“PLS”), “considered factors such as experience 22 as a litigator, years as a practicing attorney, the skills and knowledge acquired over those 23 years, and the rates reasonably charged by other attorneys in the area” when setting the 24 hourly rates of all attorneys at PLS. (Doc. No. 19-1, Pengilley Decl. ¶ 6.) 25 Based on Pengilley’s declaration, the requested rates for Stephanie Pengilley, 26 Michelle Yang, and John Myers are reasonable. These rates are also comparable to those 27 awarded to different counsel in other recent Southern District of California “lemon law” 28 cases. See Garcia v. Ford Motor Co., 2023 WL 3961090, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 1 2023) (upholding attorney rates ranging “between $475 and $605 per hour”); Scherer v. 2 FCA US, LLC, 2022 WL 22902332, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2022) (finding rates from 3 $410-$550 per hour were “supported by evidence and [were] reasonable”); Bendavid v. 4 Kia Am., Inc., 2023 WL 6063442, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2023) (concluding that 5 requested rates of $410-$550 per hour were reasonable in light of orders from comparable 6 cases reflecting approval of similar rates). 7 i. Christine Haw 8 The Court agrees with Defendant that the hourly rate of $625 for Christine Haw is 9 too high. Plaintiffs do not include or provide any support for Christine Haw’s billing rate 10 in their motion or supporting declaration. (See Doc. Nos. 19, 19-1.) Further, the submitted 11 bill contains only two entries for Haw, one of which was “not charged”. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 12 4.) The charged entry is for 0.3 hours for “review[ing] and revis[ing] fee invoice and 13 provid[ing] direction to S.P. re same.” (Id.) Based on the lack of support for Christine 14 Haw in Plaintiffs’ motion declaration, the Court concludes that the requested rate is 15 unreasonable and declines to include Haw’s single entry in the attorneys’ fee calculation. 16 ii. Andrea Plata 17 The Court also agrees with Defendant that the rate charged for Andrea Plata, an 18 attorney with three years of experience, is too high. The Court observes that the cases 19 Plaintiffs cite in support of the reasonableness of the $450.00 hourly rate primarily involve 20 attorneys with more experience and skill than Plata. (See Doc. No. 19-1 at 4.) For 21 example, Plaintiffs cite to Zargarian v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, where an attorney with 10 22 years of experience was awarded a $435.00 hourly rate and an attorney with 13 years 23 of experience was awarded a $445.00 hourly rate. 442 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1226 (C.D. Cal. 24 2020); see also Zomorodian v. BMW, 2019 WL 6534513 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2019) 25 (granting an hourly rate of $435.00 for an attorney with 10 years of experience and $410.00 26 for attorneys with 9 years of experience). 27 The Court adjusts the hourly rate for Andrea Plata to $250.00. In making this 28 determination, the Court considers rates awarded to attorneys with similar years of 1 experience in other recent Southern District of California “lemon law” cases. See Cabrera 2 v. Ford Motor Co., 2025 WL 2462442, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025) (upholding 3 as reasonable rates of $250/hour–$325/hour for associates); Hellenberg v. Ford Motor Co., 4 2020 WL 1820126, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. April 10, 2020) (same). 5 B. Hours Reasonably Expended 6 Plaintiffs request $24,612.50 in attorneys’ fees for pre-litigation efforts and actual 7 time billed. (Doc. No. 19 at 8-11, 13.) Plaintiffs claim their attorneys spent a total of 30.1 8 hours litigating this case, with an additional 5 hours anticipated for replying to Defendant’s 9 opposition to the instant motion and to attend the hearing. (Id. at 1-2, 13.) Defendant 10 contends that Plaintiffs’ hours should be reduced to 7.4 hours of attorney time and 0.4 hours 11 of support staff time because Plaintiffs charged an “excessive” amount for routine work. 12 (Id. at 5, 9-10, 12.) Defendant further asserts that Plaintiffs should not be able to recover 13 any pre-litigation fees due to “block billing” and use of a “flat fee”. (Doc. No. 20 at 3.) 14 The submitted bill contains an appropriate level of detail to permit the Court to 15 conduct a meaningful review for reasonableness. Attorneys seeking fee awards are “not 16 required to record in great detail how each minute of [their] time was expended.” Hensley, 17 461 U.S. at 437 n.12. Attorneys need only “keep records in sufficient detail that a neutral 18 judge can make a fair evaluation of the time expended, the nature and need for the service, 19 and the reasonable fees to be allowed.” Id. at 441 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see 20 also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Ret. Income Plan For Hourly—Rated Employees of 21 ASARCO, Inc., 512 F.3d 555, 565 (9th Cir. 2008). 22 Defendant objects to Plaintiffs’ hours on the basis that many of Plaintiffs’ pleadings 23 were “cop[ies] of hundreds of similar motions in Plaintiffs’ other cases.” (Id. at 5.) In 24 particular, Defendant notes the time Plaintiffs billed to prepare their complaint and motion 25 to remand. (Id.) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that 0.9 hours is reasonable for preparing, 26 revising, and editing a complaint. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 1; Doc. No. 26 at 5.) See Rahman v. 27 FCA US LLC, 594 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (finding that “drafting a 28 boilerplate complaint should not take more than an hour”). Defendant also contends that 1 it was “problematic” for Plaintiffs' counsel to bill 2.9 hours to review Defendant's removal 2 and draft a motion to remand. (Doc. No. 20 at 5.) The Court disagrees, concluding that 3 the 2.9 hours billed by Plaintiffs' counsel for these tasks is not unreasonable, given that this 4 time encompassed reviewing Defendant's 11-page removal, conducting legal research, and 5 drafting a 22-page motion to remand. (See Doc. Nos. 1, 8.) 6 i. Preparation of Fee Motion and Anticipated Time 7 Plaintiffs request 17.9 hours for drafting the present motion, reviewing the 8 opposition, drafting the reply, and attending a hearing. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 4-5; Doc. No. 26 9 at 10.) Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ request is “excessive” and that Plaintiffs' fees 10 for this motion should be rejected. (Doc. No. 20 at 8.) 11 The Court need not determine whether the fees for preparing and defending motions 12 for attorneys’ fees are always recoverable. Some courts permit the fees. See Quinonez v. 13 FCA US, LLC, 2022 WL 2007429, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2022) (“Generally, a plaintiff 14 is entitled to [reasonable] fees spent drafting and defending the fee motion.”) (citation and 15 internal quotation marks omitted). In lemon law cases, however, courts often reduce the 16 hours spent on motions for attorneys' fees due to the template, “boilerplate” nature of these 17 motions and their accompanying documents. See, e.g., Cabrera, 2025 WL 2462442, at *11 18 (reducing the hours spent on the fee motion from 9.2 hours to 5 hours); Ovesepyan v. 19 Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2023 WL 8586384, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2023) (finding 20 no more than nine hours spent on the fee motion to be reasonable in light of “the 21 straightforward and boilerplate nature of lemon law fee motions”); Saavedra v. Ford Motor 22 Co., 2022 WL 16629951, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2022) (reducing the plaintiff's fees for 23 time spent on the attorneys' motion to $1,250.00 because an attorneys' fees motion in a 24 Song-Beverly action “is largely a template-driven activity”). 25 In this case, the parties attempted to resolve the fee issue without a noticed motion 26 but were unable to do so. (See Doc. No. 18.) As a result, the Court will award reasonable 27 fees. In comparison to the hours that courts have deemed reasonable for the same type of 28 motion in other “lemon law” cases, the Court reduces Plaintiffs' counsel's time for drafting 1 the present Motion and its supporting documents by 7.9 hours to 10 hours. The Court also 2 denies Plaintiffs’ requested anticipated fees because the present motion was taken under 3 submission. 4 Accordingly, the Court deems the 35.1 hours Plaintiffs billed, less 7.9 hours for the 5 fee motion and 5 hours for the anticipated time, 2 to be reasonable. 6 ii. Pre-Litigation Efforts 7 As part of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees request, counsel includes $7,000.00 in pre- 8 litigation fees. (Doc. No. 19 at 8; Doc. No. 19-2 at 6.) Defendant objects to Plaintiffs’ 9 request due to the use of a “flat rate” and “block billing”. (Doc. No. 20 at 2-3.) 10 “Block billing” is “the time-keeping method by which each lawyer and legal 11 assistant enters the total daily time spent working on a case, rather than itemizing the time 12 expended on specific tasks.” Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945 n.2 13 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Under California law, block billing is not objectionable 14 “per se,” but it “certainly does increase the risk that the trial court, in a reasonable exercise 15 of its discretion, will discount a fee request.” Farmers & Merchants Bank of Long Beach 16 v. Willemsen, 2014 WL 12593981, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2014) (quoting Jaramillo v. 17 Cnty. of Orange, 200 Cal. App. 4th 811, 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)). “[B]lock billing only 18 becomes an issue where there is a need to separate work that qualifies for compensation 19 from work that does not.” Jaramillo, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 830. Courts accordingly find 20 block-billing unobjectionable where there is “no need to separate out covered from 21 uncovered work.” Id.; see also Lardizabal v. Am. Express Nat'l Bank, 2023 WL 8264435, 22 at *8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2023) (determining that block-billing was neither “egregious” nor 23 “objectionable” where all the billing entries in question were related to the plaintiff's claims 24 for which he was eligible to receive attorney's fees). 25 Here, Plaintiffs bill a flat rate for “all services rendered prior to the preparation of 26

27 2 Stephanie Pengilley and John Myers are listed as the primary billers for the fee motion. As such, the 28 reduction of 12.9 hours (7.9 + 5) will be calculated based on their hourly rates of $545 for a reduction of 1 the pre-litigation letter required to seek civil penalties” and for “all services rendered 2 relating to the preparation of the pre-litigation demand letter required by the Song-Beverly 3 Consumer Warranty Act”. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 6.) Plaintiffs provide a high-level account of 4 what these services entail including, but not limited to: “attorney review of client's repair 5 orders, purchase contract, current registration, vehicle payment information, and incidental 6 damages; the preparation of the Attorney-Client Retainer Agreement; computation of 7 client's actual damages;” “analysis of any offers or responses made by the manufacturer; 8 drafting of the pre-litigation demand letter, compiling all necessary documents for the 9 demand letter, and calendaring any deadlines associated with the pre-ligation stage 10 required by the law.” (Id.) The Court concludes that these entries do not contain any tasks 11 that are ineligible for compensation, rendering block-billing unobjectionable. See 12 also Signatures Network, Inc. v. Estefan, 2005 WL 151928, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2005) 13 (finding “reasonable pre-litigation fees are compensable under both Ninth Circuit and 14 California law”). Accordingly, the Court concludes the pre-litigation work was reasonably 15 incurred. 16 C. Lodestar Modification 17 Plaintiffs argue for an upward modification of 0.2 to “adequately reflect the 18 challenges faced throughout this litigation.” (Doc. No. 19 at 17.) Plaintiffs contend that 19 an enhancement is warranted because representation was undertaken on a contingency 20 basis and the attorneys had to account for “recent changes to the Lemon Law, the 21 potentially protracted nature of this case, and GM’s history of gamesmanship in this area 22 of law”. (Id. at 16.) Defendant argues that a multiplier should not be allowed given that 23 the matter is a “basic lemon law case” that posed no significant litigation risk. (Doc. No. 24 20 at 10.) 25 The Ninth Circuit has plainly stated that the lodestar amount is “presumptively the 26 reasonable fee amount,” and that a modification of the lodestar is appropriate only in “rare” 27 and “exceptional” cases supported by both “specific evidence on the record and detailed 28 findings ... that the lodestar amount is unreasonably low or unreasonably high.” Van 1 Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F. 3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2 2000) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 3 565 (1986)). Generally, courts consider the following factors when determining whether 4 to enhance a lodestar: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill 5 displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded 6 other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee 7 award.” Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 741 (2001). Courts have also recognized that 8 “the lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a 9 ‘reasonable attorney's fee’ and ‘an enhancement may not be awarded based on a factor that 10 is subsumed in the lodestar calculation.’” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 11 553 (2010) (quoting Pennsylvania, 478 U.S. at 566). 12 Here, the Court declines Plaintiffs’ request to apply an upward multiplier of 0.2, 13 given the routine nature of this case and the lack of novel or complex issues. See Rahman, 14 594 F. Supp. 3d at 1207 (concluding that none of the factors “support[ed] an enhancement 15 of the lodestar” in “a largely routine lemon law case that involved few procedural demands 16 and the exercise of limited skill from lawyers who specialize in this practice area and 17 generally rely upon boilerplate pleadings and work product”). The amount of time and 18 skill required to properly resolve this litigation, counsel's success in resolving the matter, 19 and the case's novelty or complexity are reflected in the number of billable hours recorded 20 and the reasonable hourly rate. The Court acknowledges the contingent nature of this case; 21 nonetheless, “the [Song-Beverly Act] is a mandatory fee-shifting statute which ‘eliminates 22 any uncertainty about whether costs will be awarded to the prevailing 23 party.’” Id. (quoting Arias v. Ford Motor Co., 2020 WL 1940843, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 24 2020)). This case does not warrant the requested enhancement. The lodestar reflects the 25 reasonable amount of attorneys' fees Plaintiffs should recover, and the Court denies the 26 requested 0.2 multiplier enhancement. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 E. Calculating the Lodestar 2 In sum, the Court calculates the lodestar amount as $17,639.50. ? 3 Conclusion 4 Based on the foregoing, the Court awards $17,639.50 in attorneys’ fees and 5 $507.39 in costs. The Court declines to award a lodestar multiplier in the amount of 6 $4,922.50 or any other multiplier or additional amount. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ 7 is, therefore, granted in part. The Court orders Defendant to pay this fee award to 8 || Plaintiff's counsel within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, unless otherwise 9 || agreed by the parties. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 || DATED: February 9, 2026 lu 12 sft bt MARILYN‘. HUFF, Distri ge 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 > 3 $27,337.50 (initial requested amount) - $187.50 (Christine Haw’s single entry) - $2,480.00 (Andrea 3 Plata’s adjusted rate) - $4,305.50 (excessive hours billed to fee motion) - $2,725.00 (anticipated time) = 74 $17,639.50. The above calculation reflects the reduction of Christine Haw’s single billed entry of $187.50 and 25 || Andrea Plata’s adjusted hourly rate from $450.00 to $250.00. Note, Andrea Plata billed a total of 12.4 hours. (See Doc. No. 19-2.) At Plaintiffs’ proposed rate, Andrea Plata charged 12.4 hours * $450 = 26 $5,580.00. At the adjusted rate, Andrea Plata will charge 12.4 hours * $250 = $3,100.00. Accordingly, the Court subtracts the difference ($5,580.00 — $3,100.00 = $2,480.00). Next, the Court reduces 7.9 27 hours * $545 = $4,305.50 to bring the hours billed for the preparation of the instant fee Motion to a 28 reasonable rate. Lastly, the Court reduces 5 hours (anticipated time) * $454 = $2,725.00 for Plaintiffs’ anticipated time because the present motion was taken under submission and no hearing was required.