Erick Lawson v. Pamela Thielke

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 25, 2024
• Docket: 07-24-00092-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00092-CV

ERICK LAWSON, APPELLANT

V.

PAMELA THIELKE AND THE TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, APPELLEES

On Appeal from the 154th District Court Lamb County, Texas Trial Court No. DCV-20818-23, Honorable Scott A. Say, Presiding

July 25, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Erick Lawson, an individual committed to the Texas Civil Commitment Center as a

sexually violent predator, appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his suit against

Pamela Thielke and the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board). Thielke and the

Board filed a plea to the trial court’s jurisdiction. They contended that the court committing

him to the center had jurisdiction of the proceeding. So too did they invoke sovereign immunity. Upon hearing the plea, the trial court granted it. That lead to this appeal

through which Lawson attacks the decision to dismiss. We affirm.

Background

Lawson was confined to the Lamb County commitment center in 2016. The trial

court that did so was the 9th Judicial District Court of Montgomery County. In perusing

his live, amended petition, we see that the dispute resulting in this appeal concerned his

continued confinement to the facility. Simply put, he viewed himself as entitled to

“release[] back into the community county, to the county of [his] conviction.” There he

would serve the remainder of his term of supervision. Claims of breached fiduciary duty

and denied due process were the mechanisms through which he sought to achieve that

end, and they were levied against Thielke and the Board.

Discussion

As said in the opening paragraph of this opinion, Thielke and the Board asserted

dismissal was warranted because 1) the district court for the 9th Judicial District retained

jurisdiction over the complaint and 2) they enjoyed sovereign immunity.

As can be seen from the record, Lawson did not commence his action in the 9th

Judicial District but rather in the 154th. Furthermore, the latter did not specify the

particular ground upon which it relied in dismissing the action. This is of import since the

burden fell to Lawson to illustrate why neither supported the decision. Yet, the focus of

his appellate brief seemed to be sovereign immunity and why it did not bar the trial court

from adjudicating the suit. Little was said about the other potential reason supporting

dismissal, and we find it dispositive.

2 Per statute, the court placing one in the commitment center “retains jurisdiction of

the case with respect to a proceeding conducted under this subchapter, other than a

criminal proceeding involving an offense under Section 841.085, or to a civil commitment

proceeding conducted under Subchapters F and G.” TEX HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §

841.082(d). That jurisdictional umbrella encompasses effort to secure less restrictive

housing and supervision. Cupit v. Tex. Civil Commitment Office, No. 07-18-00228-CV,

2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 9384, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 16, 2018, no pet.) (mem.

op.). Seeking release from total confinement into the community and being freed from

his ubiquitous ankle monitor are tantamount to pursuing less restrictive housing and

supervision. Thus, the district court for the 9th Judicial District, rather than that of the

154th Judicial District, had continuing jurisdiction over the action.

“Lawson may attempt to couch his complaint under the monikers of breached

fiduciary duty and [unconstitutional] tort.” Lawson v. Edd, No. 07-19-00176-CV, 2019

Tex. App. LEXIS 9210, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 18, 2019, no pet.) (mem op.). Yet

its essence remained effort to change the nature of his confinement and secure lesser

restrictive supervision. And, as we said in his earlier suit, “one may call an elephant an

iguana” but “it is still an elephant.” Id. So, casting the mask of breached fiduciary duty

and constitutional violation over his allegations did not change the effect of § 841.082(d).

The dispute still fell within the jurisdiction of a court other than the 154th.

We overrule Lawson’s issues and affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal without

prejudice.

Brian Quinn Chief Justice 3