Erica Murphy v. Dempsey Walters

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: January 30, 2026
• Docket: 499, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ERICA MURPHY and EDWIN § SANCHEZ as Guardians ad Litem of § J.S., a Minor, ALFRED EVANS, and § No. 499, 2025 KAIMYHRE IBN-BRITT- § JACKSON, § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware Plaintiffs Below, § Appellants, § C.A. No. N25C-07-163 § v. § § DELAWARE STATE POLICE § OFFICER CORPORAL DEMPSEY § R. WALTERS, NEWPORT POLICE § OFFICER THOMAS D. KASHNER, § DELAWARE STATE POLICE § OFFICER CORPORAL EARL § MARCHIONE, DELAWARE § STATE POLICE DETECTIVE § DAVID ARMSTRONG, JANE § DOE(S), JOHN DOE(S), § DELAWARE STATE POLICE, § NEW CASTLE COUNTY POLICE, § DEPARTMENT, NEWPORT § POLICE DEPARTMENT, and § ELSMERE POLICE § DEPARTMENT, § § Defendants Below, § Appellees. §

Submitted: December 12, 2025 Decided: January 30, 2026

Before VALIHURA,TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.

ORDER After consideration of the notice of interlocutory appeal and the exhibits

thereto, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Plaintiffs below-appellants seek certification of an interlocutory appeal

from the Superior Court’s decision dismissing their claims against police officers

that they named as Jane Doe and John Doe defendants because they were unable to

identify them by name when they filed their complaint.1 The claims arose from

physical and psychological injuries Plaintiffs alleged that they suffered in

interactions with police officers in August 2023. In July 2025, Plaintiffs filed a

complaint against Defendants below-appellees—police officers, their employers,

and unknown police officers—for damages. Plaintiffs asserted claims for, among

other things, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, assault and battery, and false

imprisonment.

(2) With the complaint, Plaintiffs filed a motion to proceed anonymously,

seeking to use a pseudonym for one of the plaintiffs who was a minor and to name

police officers that they were unable to identify at the time of filing as Jane and John

Doe defendants. Some of the defendants moved to dismiss and opposed the naming

of unknown police officers as Jane and John Doe defendants.

1 Murphy v. Walters, 2025 WL 3162346 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2025).

2 (3) On November 12, 2025, the Superior Court issued a decision granting

in part and denying in part the motions to dismiss. As to the naming of unknown

police officers as Jane and John Doe defendants, the court held that this was not

permitted under Delaware law. The court acknowledged Plaintiffs’ argument that

provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers Bill of Rights (“LEOBOR”) impeded

their ability to identify culpable police officers in a timely manner and thus created

compelling and exceptional circumstances for the use of fictitious names, but

concluded that it was not in a position to override the statute. The court ordered

that the allegations relating to John and Jane Doe defendants be stricken from the

complaint.

(4) Plaintiffs filed a timely application for certification of this ruling on the

grounds that LEOBOR was unconstitutional as written and as applied to their case.

Defendants opposed the application, emphasizing that the constitutionality of

LEOBOR was neither presented in the complaint nor briefed by the parties. The

Superior Court denied the application for certification.

(5) In denying certification, the Superior Court first noted that Plaintiffs

failed to allege “what they did to learn the identity of the unnamed officers that was

barred by LEOBOR.”2 This made it unclear to the court how LEOBOR prevented

2 Murphy v. Walters, 2025 WL 3554617, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 2025).

3 Plaintiffs from identifying the unknown police officers and left the court unable to

determine whether there was a substantial issue of material importance as required

for certification. The court next considered the Rule 42(b)(iii) criteria. Plaintiffs

argued that Rules 42(b)(iii)(A) (a question of law resolved for the first time in

Delaware), 42(b)(iii)(C) (a question of law relating to the constitutionality,

construction, or application of a statute that has not been, but should be resolved by

this Court before appeal of a final order), and 42(b)(iii)(H) (interlocutory review

may serve considerations of justice) supported certification.

(6) As to Rule 42(b)(iii)(A), the Superior Court found that it was possible

the interlocutory ruling resolved a question of law for the first time, but the question

asked was unclear and Plaintiffs had not explained how LEOBOR was relevant to

their claims. The court agreed that the question raised by Plaintiffs related to the

constitutionality of a statute, but resolution of that issue would not change the

outcome because the statute of limitations had already run for Plaintiffs’ claims

against the Jane and John Doe defendants. The court also concluded that review

would not serve considerations of justice under Rule 42(b)(iii)(H) because fictious

names would be barred in Delaware regardless of LEOBOR. The court found that

the remaining criteria Rule 42(b)(iii) criteria were inapplicable.

4 (7) Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound

discretion of this Court.3 In the exercise of our discretion and giving due weight to

the Superior Court’s view, we conclude that the application for interlocutory review

does not meet the strict standards for certification under Rule 42(b). We agree with

the Superior Court that the Rule 42(b)(iii) criteria do not weigh in favor of

interlocutory review. And as Defendants emphasized in their opposition to the

application for certification, Plaintiffs did not raise the constitutionality of LEOBOR

until their application for certification. Exceptional circumstances that would merit

interlocutory review do not exist,4 and the potential benefits of interlocutory review

do not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and probable costs caused by an

interlocutory appeal.5

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that this interlocutory appeal is

REFUSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gary F. Traynor Justice

3 Supr. Ct. R. 42(d)(v). 4 Id. 42(b)(ii). 5 Id. 42(b)(iii). 5