IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Erica Anders, Jun 22 2026, 9:45 am
Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
June 22, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-3171 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Matthew E. Symons, Magistrate The Honorable Helen W. Marchal, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D26-2506-CM-18203
Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas Judges Bradford and Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3171 | June 22, 2026 Page 1 of 8 Tavitas, Chief Judge.
Case Summary [1] Erica Anders was found guilty of battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A
misdemeanor. On appeal, Anders argues that there was a material variance
between the charging information and the evidence presented at trial and that
her defense was prejudiced as a result of the variance. We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm.
Issue [2] Anders raises one issue, which we restate as: whether there was a material
variance between the charging information and the evidence presented at trial
that prejudiced Anders’ defense.
Facts [3] On April 28, 2025, Shannon Germaine went outside to observe the roofers
working on her neighbor’s house. Anders 1 approached Germaine and swore at
Germaine. Anders hit Germaine on the head and eye, knocked Germaine’s
glasses off, pulled out some of Germaine’s hair, and tried to kick Germaine.
Anders then ran away. Germaine had redness and swelling above her eyebrow
and a bump on her head.
1 Anders was the current girlfriend of Germaine’s ex-partner.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3171 | June 22, 2026 Page 2 of 8 [4] On June 13, 2025, the State charged Anders with battery resulting in bodily
injury, a Class A misdemeanor. The charging information stated: “On or about
April 28, 2025, Erica Anders did knowingly touch Shannon Germain[e] in a
rude, insolent, or angry manner by punching, kicking, and stomping her
resulting in bodily injury, that is: pain and/or abrasions and/or contusions
and/or welts, and/or redness; . . . .” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 10 (emphasis
added).
[5] At the bench trial, Germaine testified regarding the encounter. The State rested
its case, and Anders then requested a directed verdict. Anders argued that
Germaine’s identification of Anders was questionable, that Germaine’s injuries
did not amount to bodily injury, and that the evidence was uncorroborated and
inconsistent. Anders argued that the State did not meet its burden to prove that
Anders kicked and stomped Germaine. The trial court denied Anders’ motion.
Anders then testified and claimed self-defense.
[6] On November 17, 2025, the trial court found Anders guilty as charged and
sentenced her to 364 days with all days suspended and 180 days of probation.
Anders now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [7] Anders argues that there was a material variance between the evidence
presented at trial and the charging information. “The allegations in the
pleading and the evidence used at trial must be consistent with one another”
because “the charging information advises a defendant of the accusations
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3171 | June 22, 2026 Page 3 of 8 against [her].” Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 569 (Ind. 2014) (citing Simmons v.
State, 585 N.E.2d 1341, 1344 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)). “A variance is an essential
difference between the two.” Id. (citing Mitchem v. State, 685 N.E.2d 671, 677
(Ind. 1997)). “Relief is required only if the variance (1) misled the defendant in
preparing a defense, resulting in prejudice, or (2) leaves the defendant
vulnerable to future prosecution under the same evidence.” Id. (citing Winn v.
State, 748 N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ind. 2001)). “[F]ailure to make a specific objection
at trial waives any material variance issue.” Reinhardt v. State, 881 N.E.2d 15,
17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); see also Utley v. State, 91 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Ind. 1950).
[8] A charging information must contain “a plain, concise, and definite written
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged,” Ind. Code §
35-34-1-2(e), and “‘must be sufficiently specific to apprise the defendant of the
crime for which [she] is charged and to enable [her] to prepare a
defense.’” Mathews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 438, 444-45 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012) (quoting Bonner v. State, 789 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)), trans.
denied. The State may, but is not required to, “‘include detailed factual
allegations in the charging instrument.’” Reinhardt, 881 N.E.2d at 18 (quoting
Bayes v. State, 779 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). An
allegation is surplusage when the specific facts alleged “could have been entirely
omitted without affecting the sufficiency of the charge against the defendant.”
Winn, 748 N.E.2d at 356 (quoting Mitchem, 685 N.E.2d at 676).
[9] Here, Anders was charged with battery resulting in bodily injury, which
requires a (1) knowing or intentional (2) touching (3) of another (4) in a rude, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3171 | June 22, 2026 Page 4 of 8 insolent, or angry manner (5) resulting in bodily injury to another person. Ind.
Code § 35-42-2-1(c)-(d). The information here alleged: “On or about April 28,
2025, Erica Anders did knowingly touch Shannon Germain[e] in a rude,
insolent, or angry manner by punching, kicking, and stomping her resulting in
bodily injury. . . .” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 10 (emphasis added).
[10] Anders argues that the State did not prove the kicking and stomping as alleged
in the information and that this was a material variance. We, however, find
that the descriptive terms within the charge—“punching, kicking, and
stomping”—are unnecessary for a valid charge of battery resulting in bodily
injury, and the State could have omitted them without affecting the charge’s
validity. As such, the descriptive terms are surplusage, and we may disregard
them.
[11] This language is similar to the surplusage in Winn. There, our Supreme Court
found that, if the surplus language, “‘refusing to let her leave,’” was omitted
from the charging information, the remaining language, “the defendant ‘did
knowingly, while armed with a deadly weapon, that is: rifle, confine [M.S.],
without the consent of [M.S.], by laying next to her with a rifle,’” would have
been sufficient to charge Winn with criminal confinement. 748 N.E.2d at 357
(quoting the trial record). Here, if we remove the surplus language, “by
punching, kicking, and stomping her,” the remaining language, “Anders did
knowingly touch Shannon Germain[e] in a rude, insolent, or angry manner . . .
resulting in bodily injury,” would have been sufficient to charge Anders with
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IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Erica Anders, Jun 22 2026, 9:45 am
Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
June 22, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-3171 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Matthew E. Symons, Magistrate The Honorable Helen W. Marchal, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D26-2506-CM-18203
Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas Judges Bradford and Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3171 | June 22, 2026 Page 1 of 8 Tavitas, Chief Judge.
Case Summary [1] Erica Anders was found guilty of battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A
misdemeanor. On appeal, Anders argues that there was a material variance
between the charging information and the evidence presented at trial and that
her defense was prejudiced as a result of the variance. We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm.
Issue [2] Anders raises one issue, which we restate as: whether there was a material
variance between the charging information and the evidence presented at trial
that prejudiced Anders’ defense.
Facts [3] On April 28, 2025, Shannon Germaine went outside to observe the roofers
working on her neighbor’s house. Anders 1 approached Germaine and swore at
Germaine. Anders hit Germaine on the head and eye, knocked Germaine’s
glasses off, pulled out some of Germaine’s hair, and tried to kick Germaine.
Anders then ran away. Germaine had redness and swelling above her eyebrow
and a bump on her head.
1 Anders was the current girlfriend of Germaine’s ex-partner.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3171 | June 22, 2026 Page 2 of 8 [4] On June 13, 2025, the State charged Anders with battery resulting in bodily
injury, a Class A misdemeanor. The charging information stated: “On or about
April 28, 2025, Erica Anders did knowingly touch Shannon Germain[e] in a
rude, insolent, or angry manner by punching, kicking, and stomping her
resulting in bodily injury, that is: pain and/or abrasions and/or contusions
and/or welts, and/or redness; . . . .” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 10 (emphasis
added).
[5] At the bench trial, Germaine testified regarding the encounter. The State rested
its case, and Anders then requested a directed verdict. Anders argued that
Germaine’s identification of Anders was questionable, that Germaine’s injuries
did not amount to bodily injury, and that the evidence was uncorroborated and
inconsistent. Anders argued that the State did not meet its burden to prove that
Anders kicked and stomped Germaine. The trial court denied Anders’ motion.
Anders then testified and claimed self-defense.
[6] On November 17, 2025, the trial court found Anders guilty as charged and
sentenced her to 364 days with all days suspended and 180 days of probation.
Anders now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [7] Anders argues that there was a material variance between the evidence
presented at trial and the charging information. “The allegations in the
pleading and the evidence used at trial must be consistent with one another”
because “the charging information advises a defendant of the accusations
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3171 | June 22, 2026 Page 3 of 8 against [her].” Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 569 (Ind. 2014) (citing Simmons v.
State, 585 N.E.2d 1341, 1344 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)). “A variance is an essential
difference between the two.” Id. (citing Mitchem v. State, 685 N.E.2d 671, 677
(Ind. 1997)). “Relief is required only if the variance (1) misled the defendant in
preparing a defense, resulting in prejudice, or (2) leaves the defendant
vulnerable to future prosecution under the same evidence.” Id. (citing Winn v.
State, 748 N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ind. 2001)). “[F]ailure to make a specific objection
at trial waives any material variance issue.” Reinhardt v. State, 881 N.E.2d 15,
17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); see also Utley v. State, 91 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Ind. 1950).
[8] A charging information must contain “a plain, concise, and definite written
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged,” Ind. Code §
35-34-1-2(e), and “‘must be sufficiently specific to apprise the defendant of the
crime for which [she] is charged and to enable [her] to prepare a
defense.’” Mathews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 438, 444-45 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012) (quoting Bonner v. State, 789 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)), trans.
denied. The State may, but is not required to, “‘include detailed factual
allegations in the charging instrument.’” Reinhardt, 881 N.E.2d at 18 (quoting
Bayes v. State, 779 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). An
allegation is surplusage when the specific facts alleged “could have been entirely
omitted without affecting the sufficiency of the charge against the defendant.”
Winn, 748 N.E.2d at 356 (quoting Mitchem, 685 N.E.2d at 676).
[9] Here, Anders was charged with battery resulting in bodily injury, which
requires a (1) knowing or intentional (2) touching (3) of another (4) in a rude, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3171 | June 22, 2026 Page 4 of 8 insolent, or angry manner (5) resulting in bodily injury to another person. Ind.
Code § 35-42-2-1(c)-(d). The information here alleged: “On or about April 28,
2025, Erica Anders did knowingly touch Shannon Germain[e] in a rude,
insolent, or angry manner by punching, kicking, and stomping her resulting in
bodily injury. . . .” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 10 (emphasis added).
[10] Anders argues that the State did not prove the kicking and stomping as alleged
in the information and that this was a material variance. We, however, find
that the descriptive terms within the charge—“punching, kicking, and
stomping”—are unnecessary for a valid charge of battery resulting in bodily
injury, and the State could have omitted them without affecting the charge’s
validity. As such, the descriptive terms are surplusage, and we may disregard
them.
[11] This language is similar to the surplusage in Winn. There, our Supreme Court
found that, if the surplus language, “‘refusing to let her leave,’” was omitted
from the charging information, the remaining language, “the defendant ‘did
knowingly, while armed with a deadly weapon, that is: rifle, confine [M.S.],
without the consent of [M.S.], by laying next to her with a rifle,’” would have
been sufficient to charge Winn with criminal confinement. 748 N.E.2d at 357
(quoting the trial record). Here, if we remove the surplus language, “by
punching, kicking, and stomping her,” the remaining language, “Anders did
knowingly touch Shannon Germain[e] in a rude, insolent, or angry manner . . .
resulting in bodily injury,” would have been sufficient to charge Anders with
battery.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3171 | June 22, 2026 Page 5 of 8 [12] Even if the language was not mere surplusage, we conclude that there was no
material variance. This Court has held in battery cases that the form of
touching does not necessarily create a material variance. In Tucker v. State, this
Court found that it was not a material variance when the charging information
alleged that Tucker elbowed an officer in the face, but the officer testified at trial
that Tucker’s elbow struck the officer’s chest. The Court found that Tucker
knew “that he was charged with striking an officer regardless of where the blow
landed.” 725 N.E.2d 894, 896-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. Similarly,
in Rupert v. State, this Court held that a variance between the charging
information and the trial evidence was not material when the defendant had
adequate notice of the charge to prepare a defense and the variance only
concerned the form of deviate sexual conduct. 717 N.E.2d 1209, 1212 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999) (finding no material variance between the charging information,
which alleged fellatio, and the evidence at trial, which demonstrated sucking
the scrotum).
[13] Similar to Tucker, where the form of the strike was not material, here, Anders
knew that she was charged with rudely touching Germaine, regardless of how
Anders struck Germaine. Further, like in Rupert, the precise form of the
touching was immaterial. Here, although the charging information alleged
punching, kicking, and stomping and the trial evidence showed punching,
hitting, and pulling hair, the difference was not material because the charge
identified the incident at issue and gave Anders adequate notice to present a
defense.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3171 | June 22, 2026 Page 6 of 8 [14] Anders further argues that she was prejudiced because defense counsel believed
that Anders only needed to rebut the kicking and stomping. Trial counsel,
however, argued self-defense, that the evidence was inconsistent and
uncorroborated, and that Germaine misidentified Anders. Anders’ defense
strategy did not turn on the method by which Anders rudely touched
Germaine.
[15] In Broude v. State, this Court found that Broude’s defense was not prejudiced
when Broude denied all sexual touching; his defense “would have been the
same no matter the factual nature of the child molesting allegations.” 956
N.E.2d 130, 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Conversely, in Blackmon v.
State, the charging information alleged that Blackmon’s motivation for
intimidating Courtway, his neighbor, was that Courtway caught Blackmon
stealing water from Courtway’s outdoor spigot; at trial, the State argued that
Blackmon was motivated to intimidate Courtway because Courtway confronted
Blackmon about the stealing. 32 N.E.3d 1178, 1184-86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
We found a fatal variance between the words “catch” and “confront” because
the defendant’s opening statement and cross-examination focused on whether
Courtway “caught” Blackmon stealing. Id. This impact on Blackmon’s defense
demonstrated prejudice. Id.
[16] Similar to the defense strategy in Broude, here, Anders’ defense would have
been the same no matter the factual nature of the alleged rude touching.
Anders’ defense was not prejudiced. This case is dissimilar to Blackmon,
because Blackmon’s defense was based on the variance itself, and, here,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3171 | June 22, 2026 Page 7 of 8 Anders’ defense did not depend on the variance. Thus, there was no material
variance between the charging information and the evidence presented at trial.
[17] Accordingly, we conclude that the language at issue was mere surplusage and
that there was no material variance. 2
Conclusion [18] We conclude that there was no material variance. Accordingly, we affirm.
[19] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Steven J. Halbert Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Ian McLean Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
2 Anders does not argue that the variance might subject her to double jeopardy. Therefore, we need not address that issue. See Tucker, 725 N.E.2d at 897 n.3.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3171 | June 22, 2026 Page 8 of 8