Eric Willrich v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 13, 2024
• Docket: 04-22-00435-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-22-00435-CR

Eric WILLRICH, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2019CR11728A Honorable Frank J. Castro, Judge Presiding 1

Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 13, 2024

AFFIRMED

After the trial court denied appellant Eric Willrich’s pretrial motion to suppress, Willrich

pled nolo contendere to the possession of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced Willrich

to six years’ imprisonment pursuant to a plea bargain agreement. In a single issue, Willrich asserts

the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because he was illegally detained, arrested,

and searched. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9. We affirm.

1 The Honorable Frank J. Castro presided over Eric Willrich’s plea proceeding and signed the Final Judgment of Conviction by Court—Waiver of Jury Trial. The Honorable Andrew W. Carruthers presided over the suppression proceedings and made the findings of fact and conclusions of law. 04-22-00435-CR

BACKGROUND

Willrich sought to suppress drugs discovered from a warrantless search and his warrantless

arrest. At the suppression hearing, the State presented three witnesses, Detective Cameron Helle,

Officer Alejandro Sandoval, and Officer Franklin Millstid, all with the San Antonio Police

Department.

Detective Helle, a narcotics detective, testified that on the day in question, he was

conducting surveillance on a suspected narcotics house from which police had seized narcotics in

the past. According to Detective Helle, Paul White arrived at the house in a pick-up truck, exited

the truck, and went inside the house for a short time. Soon thereafter, White and Alejandro

Alvarado came out of the house and got into the truck. Detective Helle followed the truck, now

driven by Alvarado, to a shopping complex referred to as the Quarry. Alvarado drove slowly

through various parking lots, parked for a while, then drove to another parking lot and parked away

from the vehicles parked at the business. Neither White nor Alvarado exited the truck. Rather, after

being parked for a short time, Detective Helle saw another vehicle park directly next to the

passenger side of the truck. The driver of that vehicle, Willrich, then immediately exited his vehicle

and got into the back seat passenger-side of the truck.

Detective Helle then explained that he saw White, who was sitting in the front passenger’s

seat, turning his body around and moving his arms back and forth with Willrich, who was still

seated in the back. Detective Helle acknowledged he did not witness an actual hand-to-hand

transaction. However, based on his surveillance and narcotics investigation experience, the

vehicles’ parked locations next to each other and away from other vehicles, and Willrich’s

immediate entry into the backseat of the truck, “it appeared to [Detective Helle] that they were

conducting a hand-to-hand transaction”—a “narcotics transaction . . . inside that truck.” At that

time, Detective Helle requested uniformed police officers approach the occupants of the truck.

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Just prior to the officers approaching the truck, Detective Helle saw White reach down.

Detective Helle testified this is “indicative of potentially trying to conceal something or discard

something.” At some point, Willrich had moved over in the backseat behind Alvarado. The

uniformed officers approached the truck, contacting the occupants. Detective Helle then followed,

opened the front passenger-side door and asked White to exit, and notified him he was being

detained for a narcotics investigation. During this time, Detective Helle observed a plastic baggie

containing a white powdery substance on the front passenger-side floorboard underneath the front

passenger seat. Detective Helle testified the area where the baggie was located was within both

Whites’s and Willrich’s reach. Detective Helle also found on the back passenger’s seat and

floorboard a “white powdery . . . looked like crack crumbs is the best way to describe it” substance.

White informed the officers that Willrich was his “drug dealer[,]” and that he was in the

parking lot to “buy drugs.” White was buying $1,000 worth of crack. Detective Helle also spoke

to Alvarado, who told police that Willrich was in the truck to give White crack, but Alvarado

thought White had given Willrich $2,000.

Officer Sandoval and Officer Millstid testified they waited nearby in the Quarry until

Detective Helle directed them to drive their marked patrol units up to the scene. According to

Officer Sandoval, when he pulled his car on the right side of the truck, he saw three people in the

truck, and Willrich was seated in the back seat behind front passenger White. Officer Sandoval

received permission from White to search his person. According to Officer Sandoval, he found a

crystal or white rock-like substance in White’s pocket, and after claiming it was salt, White later

admitted it was crack cocaine. Officer Sandoval arrested White and read him his warnings before

Detective Helle questioned him. Willrich gave Officer Sandoval permission to retrieve his Texas

ID from his car parked beside the truck when Officer Sandoval asked for Willrich’s identification.

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According to Officer Millstid, when he arrived on the scene, he saw the car parked to the

right, or passenger-side of the truck. As Officer Millstid approached the driver’s side of the truck,

he noticed Alvarado and White in the front seats, and Willrich in the back seat, now seated behind

the driver. Alvarado gave Officer Millstid his Texas ID. Alvarado did not have a driver’s license.

Officer Millstid testified he read Willrich his warnings and found approximately $2,000 in cash

on Willrich’s person.

Willrich moved to suppress all the evidence obtained contending he was unlawfully

detained and then unlawfully arrested. The trial court denied Willrich’s motion to suppress and

made several oral findings of fact—which followed the testimonies of Detective Helle, Officer

Sandoval, and Officer Millstid, and their accounts of the events leading up to the search of the

truck, the results of the search, and Willrich’s arrest and subsequent search. The trial court also

made oral conclusions of law, including:

1. Willrich, as “merely a passenger in the [truck] from which the crack cocaine was seized,” had no expectation of privacy in the truck and lacked standing to challenge the search.

2. “Considering the totality of the circumstances, there was probable cause to arrest [Willrich] for possession of a controlled substance.”

3. The approximate $2,000 in cash found on Willrich’s person resulted from a search “incident to a lawful arrest.”

In exchange for a plea bargain, Willrich pled nolo contendere to count one of the

indictment—possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver cocaine in an amount

of four grams or more but less than two hundred grams, a first-degree felony. 2 The trial court

accepted Willrich’s plea, and pursuant to the agreement, sentenced Willrich to six years’

2 We note that despite the plea bargain agreement referring to Willrich’s plea pertaining to count one of the indictment—possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver cocaine in an amount of four grams or more but less than two hundred grams, a first-degree felony—the trial court’s final judgment reflects Willrich was only convicted of possessing cocaine in an amount of four grams or more but less than two hundred grams, a second- degree felony. Compare TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(a), (d), with id. § 481.115(a), (d).

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imprisonment. Willrich subsequently appealed the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to

suppress.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress using a bifurcated standard of

review. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). First, we give almost

total deference to the trial court’s factual determinations. Id. The trial court is the sole trier of fact

and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Id. The

trial court is entitled to believe or disbelieve all or part of the witness’s testimony—even if that

testimony is uncontroverted—because the trial court has the opportunity to observe the witness’s

demeanor and appearance. Id.

Second, we review de novo the application of law to the facts, and we will affirm a ruling

that is “reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the

case.” Id. at 447–48. If the trial court makes express findings of fact, as it has here, we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and determine whether the evidence

supports the factual findings. Id. at 447.

APPLICABLE LAW

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S.

CONST. amend. IV; State v. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “Under the

Fourth Amendment, a brief investigatory detention must be justified by reasonable suspicion.”

Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 602–03 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citations omitted). “A police

officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts that, combined with

rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person

detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Derichsweiler v. State, 348

S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968)) (other

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citations omitted). This is an objective standard that disregards the officer’s actual subjective intent

and instead looks to whether an objectively justifiable basis existed for the detention. See id.

We also look to the totality of the circumstances, and if combined they “reasonably suggest

the imminence of criminal conduct, an investigative detention is justified.” Id. In other words, we

focus on whether the totality of reliable information—specific, articulable facts combined with

reasonable inferences derived from those facts—leads to the reasonable conclusion that the

appellant was committing, or soon would be engaged in some type of criminal activity. See id. at

915–16.

Upon lawful arrest, the search of the person is justified by the need to assure officer safety

and the need to protect evidence from concealment or destruction without any need for a

particularized showing that weapons or evidence are likely to be found. See Price v. State, 662

S.W.3d 428, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing United States. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235

(1973)).

ANALYSIS

In this case, Detective Helle’s testimony regarding (1) observing White and Alvarado

leaving a house known for narcotic transactions and then traveling to a shopping complex and

parking away from the business’s regular traffic, (2) coupled with seeing another car park next to

the truck and watching Willrich immediately get into the back seat of the truck with White and

Alvarado, and (3) then watching White’s arm movements and turning back towards Willrich in

what appeared to be a hand-to-hand transaction all support Detective Helle’s reasonable suspicion

that the occupants of the truck, especially White and Willrich, were committing a criminal offense.

When considering the observation of the sequence of events, in addition to considering Detective

Helle’s experience in prior narcotics investigations, Detective Helle had specific, articulable facts

that, when combined with reasonable inferences, led him to reasonably conclude that the occupants

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were engaging or had engaged in criminal activity and thus he requested the uniformed officers

approach the occupants.

Next, Detective Helle’s testimony that as the uniformed officers approached the truck, he

saw White reach down, and that in Detective Helle’s experience that indicates a person hiding

something, further supported reasonable suspicion that a drug offense was occurring or had

occurred. Both Detective Helle and Officer Sandoval observed Willrich sitting behind White. This,

in addition to Detective Helle stating the plastic baggie containing cocaine was within Willrich’s

reach as well as White’s reach, supports Willrich’s direct involvement in the alleged offense.

Crack cocaine was found in White’s pocket, and he informed Detective Helle that Willrich

was his drug dealer and that he was there to buy drugs from Willrich. Alvarado also claimed

Willrich was there to sell White drugs. Evidence further supported that White paid Willrich at least

$1,000 for the drugs. The evidence, including Detective Helle’s testimony that he saw “crack

crumbs” in the back seat where Willrich sat, support the trial court’s findings of fact and

conclusions of law that under the circumstances, law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to

detain and probable cause to arrest Willrich for possession of a controlled substance.

Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914; see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (establishing that

probable cause to arrest exists when, at the moment of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within

the arresting officer’s knowledge from reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to

warrant a prudent man in believing that the particular person had committed or was committing an

offense).

Because officers had reasonable suspicion to detain and probable cause to arrest Willrich,

officers were justified in conducting a search incident to arrest. See Price, 662 S.W.3d at 433.

Therefore, we hold the trial court did not err in denying Willrich’s pretrial motion to suppress. See

Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447–48.

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We overrule Willrich’s appellate issue.

CONCLUSION

We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Willrich’s motion to suppress. Therefore,

we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Irene Rios, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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