Eric Springstun v. the Wharf at Clear Lake Slip Maintenance Association, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 20, 2025
• Docket: 01-24-00711-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued February 20, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00711-CV ——————————— ERIC SPRINGSTUN, Appellant V. THE WHARF AT CLEAR LAKE SLIP MAINTENANCE ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee

On Appeal from the 122nd District Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 24-CV-0102

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Eric Springstun, acting pro se, filed a “Notice of Interlocutory

Appeal” seeking to challenge an interlocutory order issued on September 18, 2024

granting appellee’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Springstun’s counterclaims against appellee. Springstun later amended his notice of appeal to

assert that the challenged order is a final judgment. We dismiss the appeal.

Appellee, The Wharf at Clear Lake Slip Maintenance Association, Inc. (the

“Association), is a homeowners’ association that filed suit against Springstun for

unpaid assessments and other charges owed to the association. Springstun responded

by filing various counterclaims against both the Association and its individual board

members. The Association and its individual board members subsequently filed a

plea to the jurisdiction requesting dismissal of Springstun’s counterclaims. The trial

court issued an order (1) granting the Association’s plea to the jurisdiction and (2)

dismissing Springstun’s counterclaims against the Association.

The trial court’s order does not include any language indicating that it is a

final judgment. The order does not dismiss Springstun’s counterclaims against

individual board members and Springstun’s filings in this appeal assert that those

claims remain pending. Additionally, the Association’s claims against Springstun

remain pending.

Generally, appellate courts have jurisdiction only over appeals from final

judgments unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal. CMH Homes v. Perez,

340 S.W.3d 444, 447–48 (Tex. 2011); see N.Y. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez,

799 S.W.2d 677, 679–80 (Tex. 1990) (“In the absence of a special statute making an

interlocutory order appealable, a judgment must dispose of all issues and parties in

2 the case . . . to be final and appealable.”) (citing N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge,

400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966)). Here, the order Springstun seeks to appeal is

neither a final judgment nor an interlocutory order for which an appeal is authorized.

Springstun’s “Notice of Interlocutory Appeal” filed on September 20, 2024

acknowledged that the challenged order was interlocutory but purported that the

appeal was filed “pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section

51.014(a),” which permits appeals from certain specified interlocutory orders. See

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a). The interlocutory order in this case,

however, is not among the types of orders for which the statute authorizes an appeal.

Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court notified Springstun that the appeal was subject

to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction unless a written response was provided

demonstrating that this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal.

Springstun filed multiple responses to our notice. His initial responses

asserted that an interlocutory appeal was authorized under various statutes, but these

responses failed to demonstrate our jurisdiction because none of the statutes cited by

Springstun were applicable to this case. Springstun subsequently filed amended

responses claiming that, despite his prior acknowledgement that he was seeking an

interlocutory appeal, the order dismissing his counterclaims is “a final judgment

concerning those claims.” Around the same time, Springstun filed an amended

3 notice of appeal similarly asserting that “[t]he dismissal with prejudice constitutes a

final judgment as to all of Appellant’s counterclaims against the [Association].”

Springstun’s responses and amended notice of appeal fail to demonstrate our

jurisdiction over this attempted appeal. An order is not final merely because it

disposes of certain claims, the order must dispose of all claims and parties. See N.Y.

Underwriters Ins. Co., 799 S.W.2d at 679–80. Here, the record demonstrates that

the order is interlocutory because the Association’s claims are still pending against

Springstun and other counterclaims filed by Springstun are still pending against

other parties. Moreover, the order does not include any language suggesting that it

is a final judgment. Because the order is neither a final judgment nor an appealable

interlocutory order, we lack jurisdiction over this attempted appeal. See In re M.G.,

No. 01–05–00426–CV, 2006 WL 1549754, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

June 8, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“When a party attempts to appeal a non-appealable

interlocutory order, appellate courts have no jurisdiction except to declare the

interlocutory nature of the order and to dismiss the appeal.”) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). Any pending motions are dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Morgan.