Cite as 2025 Ark. 105 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-24-21
Opinion Delivered: June 5, 2025 ERIC OVERTON APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 30CR-22-164] V. HONORABLE STEPHEN SHIRRON, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE AFFIRMED.
CODY HILAND, Associate Justice
Eric Overton was convicted by a Hot Spring County jury of rape and internet
stalking of a child, for which he sentenced to life in the Arkansas Department of Correction
on each count. On appeal, Overton argues that (1) substantial evidence does not support his
conviction of rape and (2) the circuit court erred by instructing the jury on applicable law
not contained in the jury instructions. We affirm.
In March 2022, Kayla Clark received a call regarding a disclosure her twelve-year-
old child, Minor Victim (MV), made to a school counselor. When Clark confronted MV,
it was confirmed that MV was actively engaged in communications on the Snapchat
application with the account “dudetf”––later confirmed by both MV and Snapchat records
to be twenty-six-year-old Eric Overton. Clark took possession of MV’s phone and messaged
Overton on the application to obtain a photograph of the man with whom MV was
communicating. Once Clark observed Overton’s apparent age from the picture she
received, she ended the conversation, but not before taking pictures with her own phone of the remaining conservations available on Snapchat. After Clark called the police and
provided the pictures of the conversations from MV’s phone, MV gave a statement to both
the child advocacy center and a detective. Those conversations revealed that not only had
there been an exchange of nude photographs and sexually explicit conversations but also
that Overton had picked up MV from Clark’s house on three occasions in which they
engaged in sexual intercourse––the same information to which MV testified, in detail, at
Overton’s trial.
During voir dire, Overton objected to the prosecutor’s line of questioning regarding
whether a juror would be willing to convict when the evidence presented was that of a
single, credible witness. The defense contended that the prosecutor stated the “incorrect
presumption of the law” because the State must prove the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court overruled the objection, stating that the prosecutor was entitled to ask questions
during voir dire. After questioning resumed, Overton moved for a mistrial on the same
grounds, stating that the jury is not to consider any statements of law that are not included
in the jury instructions. While the court agreed that the jury was not to consider any law
except as instructed, including the law being addressed in voir dire, it denied the mistrial.
At the close of the evidence, the jury was instructed as to the presumption of
innocence and that the State bore the burden of proving Overton’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The jury returned a conviction of both rape and internet stalking of a child. This
appeal followed.
For his first argument on appeal, Overton contends there was insufficient proof to
sustain his rape conviction. He claims that the “testimony [was] wholly inadequate to
2 support a conviction given the fact that MV testified she couldn’t remember when it
happened, couldn’t remember what happened or where it happened.” He also argues that
the State failed to prove MV was less than fourteen years old. He is entirely mistaken.
In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court asks whether
substantial evidence supports the verdict. McCauley v. State, 2023 Ark. 68, at 3, 663 S.W.3d
383, 385. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient certainty to compel a conclusion
without resorting to suspicion or conjecture. Id. The court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State and considers only evidence that supports the conviction. Id.
And the jury, as the trier of fact, is free to believe all or part of the witnesses’ testimony and
to resolve any questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence; any variance or
discrepancy in the proof goes to the weight or credibility of the evidence and, thus, is a
matter for the fact-finder to resolve. Starling v. State, 2016 Ark. 20, at 5, 480 S.W.3d 158,
161. Under this standard, the evidence presented at trial established that Overton raped MV
multiple times on multiple occasions.
To establish the crime of rape, the State needed only prove that on one occasion,
Overton “engaged in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity” with MV while MV was
“less than fourteen (14) years of age.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 2021).
“Sexual intercourse” means penetration, however slight, of the labia majora by a penis,1
while “deviate sexual activity” is defined as any act of sexual gratification involving the
1 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(13) (Supp. 2021).
3 penetration, however slight, of the anus or mouth of a person by the penis of another
person.2
MV testified that she snuck out of the house on three specific occasions and met
Overton and that on each occasion he penetrated both her vagina and her mouth with his
penis. While Overton argues MV did not recall specific dates or the exact address, neither
time nor physical location is an essential element of the crime of rape. See Rains v. State, 329
Ark. 607, 613, 953 S.W.2d 48, 52 (1997). On the contrary, a rape victim’s testimony need
not be corroborated, and scientific evidence is not required. McCauley, 2023 Ark. 68, at 4,
663 S.W.3d at 386. The victim’s uncorroborated testimony describing penetration may
constitute substantial evidence to sustain the conviction. Id. Regarding proof of MV’s age,
MV testified she was twelve when the incidents occurred, provided her date of birth, and
was only thirteen at the time of the trial––so it is axiomatic that MV was fourteen or younger
when the sexual intercourse to which she testified occurred. As such, all of the essential
elements required to prove rape were clearly met.
For his second point, Overton contends the circuit court erred by instructing the
jury on law not contained in the jury instructions and argues a mistrial should have been
granted regarding the purported instruction.
The prosecutor, while questioning a potential juror during voir dire, stated that the
law is established that a single witness is sufficient for a conviction if the jury finds that he
or she is credible––a statement to which Overton objected. After the circuit court overruled
his objection, the defense moved for a mistrial because “the jury was not to consider any
2 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(1)(A) (Supp. 2021).
4 law that’s not in the jury instructions.” The court maintained that the prosecutor was
entitled to ask questions during voir dire and denied the motion, indicating that the jurors
would be instructed on the applicable law before deliberation.
Here, Overton characterizes the circuit court’s resolution of this dispute between
counsel as error by “instruct[ing] the jury” as to a lowered burden of proof in violation of
his fundamental rights––but his characterization is incorrect. While the court did note that
the prosecuting attorney’s assertion about a point of law was factual, the circuit court went
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Cite as 2025 Ark. 105 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-24-21
Opinion Delivered: June 5, 2025 ERIC OVERTON APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 30CR-22-164] V. HONORABLE STEPHEN SHIRRON, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE AFFIRMED.
CODY HILAND, Associate Justice
Eric Overton was convicted by a Hot Spring County jury of rape and internet
stalking of a child, for which he sentenced to life in the Arkansas Department of Correction
on each count. On appeal, Overton argues that (1) substantial evidence does not support his
conviction of rape and (2) the circuit court erred by instructing the jury on applicable law
not contained in the jury instructions. We affirm.
In March 2022, Kayla Clark received a call regarding a disclosure her twelve-year-
old child, Minor Victim (MV), made to a school counselor. When Clark confronted MV,
it was confirmed that MV was actively engaged in communications on the Snapchat
application with the account “dudetf”––later confirmed by both MV and Snapchat records
to be twenty-six-year-old Eric Overton. Clark took possession of MV’s phone and messaged
Overton on the application to obtain a photograph of the man with whom MV was
communicating. Once Clark observed Overton’s apparent age from the picture she
received, she ended the conversation, but not before taking pictures with her own phone of the remaining conservations available on Snapchat. After Clark called the police and
provided the pictures of the conversations from MV’s phone, MV gave a statement to both
the child advocacy center and a detective. Those conversations revealed that not only had
there been an exchange of nude photographs and sexually explicit conversations but also
that Overton had picked up MV from Clark’s house on three occasions in which they
engaged in sexual intercourse––the same information to which MV testified, in detail, at
Overton’s trial.
During voir dire, Overton objected to the prosecutor’s line of questioning regarding
whether a juror would be willing to convict when the evidence presented was that of a
single, credible witness. The defense contended that the prosecutor stated the “incorrect
presumption of the law” because the State must prove the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court overruled the objection, stating that the prosecutor was entitled to ask questions
during voir dire. After questioning resumed, Overton moved for a mistrial on the same
grounds, stating that the jury is not to consider any statements of law that are not included
in the jury instructions. While the court agreed that the jury was not to consider any law
except as instructed, including the law being addressed in voir dire, it denied the mistrial.
At the close of the evidence, the jury was instructed as to the presumption of
innocence and that the State bore the burden of proving Overton’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The jury returned a conviction of both rape and internet stalking of a child. This
appeal followed.
For his first argument on appeal, Overton contends there was insufficient proof to
sustain his rape conviction. He claims that the “testimony [was] wholly inadequate to
2 support a conviction given the fact that MV testified she couldn’t remember when it
happened, couldn’t remember what happened or where it happened.” He also argues that
the State failed to prove MV was less than fourteen years old. He is entirely mistaken.
In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court asks whether
substantial evidence supports the verdict. McCauley v. State, 2023 Ark. 68, at 3, 663 S.W.3d
383, 385. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient certainty to compel a conclusion
without resorting to suspicion or conjecture. Id. The court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State and considers only evidence that supports the conviction. Id.
And the jury, as the trier of fact, is free to believe all or part of the witnesses’ testimony and
to resolve any questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence; any variance or
discrepancy in the proof goes to the weight or credibility of the evidence and, thus, is a
matter for the fact-finder to resolve. Starling v. State, 2016 Ark. 20, at 5, 480 S.W.3d 158,
161. Under this standard, the evidence presented at trial established that Overton raped MV
multiple times on multiple occasions.
To establish the crime of rape, the State needed only prove that on one occasion,
Overton “engaged in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity” with MV while MV was
“less than fourteen (14) years of age.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 2021).
“Sexual intercourse” means penetration, however slight, of the labia majora by a penis,1
while “deviate sexual activity” is defined as any act of sexual gratification involving the
1 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(13) (Supp. 2021).
3 penetration, however slight, of the anus or mouth of a person by the penis of another
person.2
MV testified that she snuck out of the house on three specific occasions and met
Overton and that on each occasion he penetrated both her vagina and her mouth with his
penis. While Overton argues MV did not recall specific dates or the exact address, neither
time nor physical location is an essential element of the crime of rape. See Rains v. State, 329
Ark. 607, 613, 953 S.W.2d 48, 52 (1997). On the contrary, a rape victim’s testimony need
not be corroborated, and scientific evidence is not required. McCauley, 2023 Ark. 68, at 4,
663 S.W.3d at 386. The victim’s uncorroborated testimony describing penetration may
constitute substantial evidence to sustain the conviction. Id. Regarding proof of MV’s age,
MV testified she was twelve when the incidents occurred, provided her date of birth, and
was only thirteen at the time of the trial––so it is axiomatic that MV was fourteen or younger
when the sexual intercourse to which she testified occurred. As such, all of the essential
elements required to prove rape were clearly met.
For his second point, Overton contends the circuit court erred by instructing the
jury on law not contained in the jury instructions and argues a mistrial should have been
granted regarding the purported instruction.
The prosecutor, while questioning a potential juror during voir dire, stated that the
law is established that a single witness is sufficient for a conviction if the jury finds that he
or she is credible––a statement to which Overton objected. After the circuit court overruled
his objection, the defense moved for a mistrial because “the jury was not to consider any
2 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(1)(A) (Supp. 2021).
4 law that’s not in the jury instructions.” The court maintained that the prosecutor was
entitled to ask questions during voir dire and denied the motion, indicating that the jurors
would be instructed on the applicable law before deliberation.
Here, Overton characterizes the circuit court’s resolution of this dispute between
counsel as error by “instruct[ing] the jury” as to a lowered burden of proof in violation of
his fundamental rights––but his characterization is incorrect. While the court did note that
the prosecuting attorney’s assertion about a point of law was factual, the circuit court went
out of its way to caution the jury that voir dire questions or statements by counsel are not
the law and that the jury would receive all instructions as to the applicable law at the end of
the case. Which is exactly what happened.
A mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy that is warranted only when an error is
so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing with the trial or when fundamental
fairness of the trial has been manifestly affected. McClinton v. State, 2015 Ark. 245, at 2, 464
S.W.3d 913, 914. Moreover, declaring a mistrial is proper only when the error is beyond
repair and cannot be corrected by any curative relief. Id. The judge presiding at trial is in a
better position to evaluate the impact of any alleged errors; the circuit court has wide
discretion in granting or denying a motion for mistrial. Id. at 3, 464 S.W.3d at 914.
Consequently, the circuit court’s exercise of its discretion will not be reversed except for
abuse of that discretion or manifest prejudice to the complaining party. Id., 464 S.W.3d at
914–15.
The extent and scope of voir dire examination is likewise largely within the sound
discretion of the circuit court and that discretion will not be reversed absent clear abuse.
5 Sanders v. State, 278 Ark. 420, 422, 646 S.W.2d 14, 15 (1983). Moreover, “[t]he mere fact
some inquiry on voir dire may touch on the instructions later to be given does not per se
render such questions beyond the scope of voir dire.” Brazel v. State, 296 Ark. 563, 566,
759 S.W.2d 28, 30 (1988).
Because Overton’s rape conviction was supported by substantial evidence, and
because the circuit court did not clearly abuse its discretion by denying Overton’s objection
and the motion for a mistrial during voir dire, we affirm accordingly.
Finally, in compliance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(a), the record has
been examined for all objections, motions, and requests made by either party that were
decided adversely to Overton. No prejudicial error has been found.
Affirmed.
Special Justice SHANE HENRY joins in this opinion.
BRONNI, J., not participating.
Gregory Crain, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: David L. Eanes, Jr., Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.