Eric Mendis, et al. v. BMW of North America LLC, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 28, 2025
• Docket: 2:22-cv-00922
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 ERIC MENDIS, et al., 9 Plaintiffs, Case No. C22-922-MLP 10 v. ORDER 11 BMW OF NORTH AMERICA LLC, et al., 12 Defendants. 13

14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 This matter is before the Court on Defendant BMW of North America, LLC’s 16 (“Defendant” or “BMW NA”) Corrected Motion to Seal. (Mot. (dkt. # 142).) Plaintiff Eric 17 Mendis (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Mendis”) filed an opposition (Resp. (dkt. # 147)),1 and Defendant 18 filed a reply (Reply (dkt. # 150)). Plaintiff filed a surreply requesting the Court strike 19 Defendant’s entire Reply. (Surreply (dkt. # 151).) 20 Having considered the parties’ briefing, the governing law, and the balance of the record, 21 the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion (dkt. # 142). The Court DENIES the request to strike in 22 1 Plaintiff’s Response was filed late and Plaintiff moved for an extension of time the next day. (Dkt. 23 # 149.) Plaintiff is reminded to meet and confer before filing a motion as required by the Court’s Chambers Procedures. The extension was unopposed (see dkt. # 154) and, accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend the Response Deadline (dkt. # 149) is GRANTED. 1 Plaintiff’s Surreply (dkt. # 151) because it fails to identify any new argument Defendant raised in 2 its Reply. Citing additional case law in a reply to support an argument previously raised in a 3 motion is not improper. Plaintiff’s Surreply (dkt. # 151) is STRICKEN because it provides 4 argument on the substance of Defendant’s Motion and thus is not “strictly limited to addressing

5 the request to strike.” Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR (“LCR”) 7(g)(2). 6 II. BACKGROUND 7 Plaintiff filed the instant action in June 2022, alleging that a defect in the wireless charger 8 in his 2019 BMW X5 vehicle caused his iPhone to overheat. (Dkt. # 1-1.) After a period of 9 discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment and to exclude reports by Plaintiff’s expert, 10 Edwin Hernandez Mondragon, Ph.D. (Dkt. ## 51, 54.) 11 With his opposition, Plaintiff submitted a declaration from his counsel, Boris 12 Davidovskiy. (Davidovskiy Decl. (dkt. # 114 at 1-11).) Mr. Davidovskiy attached to his 13 declaration customer complaints related to phones overheating that had been produced by 14 Defendant in discovery. (See id., ¶ 10, Ex. 8 (dkt. # 114 at 324-66).) The complaints related to

15 vehicles of the same model Plaintiff purchased—2019 X5—as well as two other models, 2020 16 X5 and 2019 X3. (See id.; Wallace Decl. (dkt. # 123), ¶ 3.) In ruling on summary judgment, the 17 Court concluded the complaints were not relevant because Plaintiff failed to show that they 18 involved the same type of wireless charger as in his vehicle. (Dkt. # 126 at 7-8.) 19 Plaintiff also submitted a declaration by Dr. Hernandez. (Hernandez Decl. (dkt. # 113).) 20 The Court struck the declaration as an attempt to add new expert opinions long after the deadline 21 had passed and noted that, even if considered, the new opinions would not change the Court’s 22 analysis on summary judgment. (Dkt. # 126 at 8 n. 4.) 23 1 Shortly after Plaintiff filed his opposition and accompanying declarations, Defendant 2 moved to seal the customer complaints as well as portions of Plaintiff’s opposition brief, Mr. 3 Davidovskiy’s declaration, and Dr. Hernandez’s declaration that quote, display, describe, or 4 characterize the customer complaints. (See dkt. # 122; Mot.)

5 The Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. 6 (Dkt. # 126.) The Court found that Dr. Hernandez’s expert reports, even if accepted, did not 7 provide evidence of a defect in the wireless charger and, accordingly, denied as moot the motion 8 to exclude his testimony. (Id. at 2, 8-11.) Plaintiff has appealed the decision. (Dkt. # 135.) 9 Although this case is closed, Defendant’s Motion to Seal remains pending. (Mot.) 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 A. Legal Standards for Motion to Seal 12 There is a strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial records and documents. 13 As the Ninth Circuit explained in Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, “judicial records are 14 public documents almost by definition, and the public is entitled to access by default.” 447 F.3d

15 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006). This “federal common law right of access” to court documents 16 generally extends to “all information filed with the court,” and “creates a strong presumption in 17 favor of access to judicial documents which can be overcome only by showing sufficiently 18 important countervailing interests.” Phillips ex Rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 19 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 20 To rebut this presumption of public access, a party must file a motion that includes a 21 “specific statement of the applicable legal standard and the reasons for keeping a document 22 under seal[.]” LCR 5(g)(3)(B). Where documents accompany a motion that is “more than 23 tangentially related to the merits of the case,” such as a dispositive motion, there must be a 1 compelling reason to seal the documents. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 2 1092, 1102 (9th Cir. 2016). 3 Under the “compelling reason” standard, the party seeking to seal judicial records bears 4 the burden of “articulat[ing] compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings . . . that

5 outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the 6 public interest in understanding the judicial process.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178-79 (internal 7 citations and quotation marks omitted). “In turn, the court must conscientiously balance the 8 competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” 9 Id. at 1179. 10 B. Improper Purpose 11 Defendant contends the challenged documents should be sealed because Plaintiff filed 12 them for the improper purpose of seeking to avoid summary judgment based on a false factual 13 dispute. Specifically, Defendant argues Dr. Hernandez’s declaration, Plaintiff’s brief, and 14 Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration contain inarguably false statements grievously mischaracterizing

15 the customer complaints. (Mot. at 10-13.) Defendant further argues that counsel’s declaration, by 16 attaching all customer complaints produced despite failing to mention most of them in his 17 briefing, demonstrates the improper purpose of reputational harm. (Id. at 10.) In addition, 18 Defendant maintains that the narratives contained in the customer complaints disclose 19 competitively sensitive internal resolution practices. (Id.) Plaintiff contends his use of the 20 complaints was proper and in good faith. (Resp. at 10.) 21 “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure 22 and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a vehicle for 23 improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, 1 circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting 2 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978); citing Valley Broadcasting Co. v. U.S. 3 Dist. Ct., 798 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1986)). 4 1. Dr. Hernandez’s Declaration

5 Dr. Hernandez reviewed the customer complaints and concluded that they “describe the 6 same core issue: the wireless charging pad in various BMW models—including the BMW X5— 7 causes overheating of iPhones during ordinary use[.]” (Hernandez Decl., ¶ 32.) Defendant 8 contends Dr. Hernandez mischaracterized the customer complaints by concluding they uniformly 9 related to (1) wireless chargers of the same type installed in Plaintiff’s vehicle and (2) iPhones. 10 (Mot. at 4-7, 10.) Plaintiff contends Defendant fails to show that Dr. Hernandez’s assertions were 11 false. (Resp. at 15.) 12 The Court find Dr. Hernandez’s conclusions were not supported by the evidence he cited. 13 For example, Dr. Hernandez concluded that the same wireless charger was installed in all three 14 BMW models referenced in the customer complaints, based solely on a non-BMW website

15 selling replacement wireless chargers. (Hernandez Decl., ¶ 33, n. 12.) An unrelated seller’s 16 statement on an unverified website stating that one part could be installed in several vehicle 17 models is not evidence that the manufacturer installed the same part in all those vehicle models. 18 Plaintiff argues that Defendant offers no evidence showing the different models used different 19 chargers (Resp. at 15), but Defendant provided evidence on summary judgment that even 20

21 2 Dr. Hernandez cited a website URL, but Plaintiff did not make the website part of the record before the Court. (See Hernandez Decl., ¶ 33, n. 1 (citing https://emg.parts/product/bmw-oem-wireless-charger-wch- 22 189-g30-g31-f90-m5-g32-9107447/).) “A hyperlink reference is extraneous to any filed document and is not part of the Court’s record.” U.S. Dist. Ct., W.D. Wash., Electronic Filing Procedures at 8 (as 23 amended, 3/26/25). Dr. Hernandez’s declaration is dated July 14, 2025, and the Court notes that the website, viewed in October 2025, already contains different information from the screenshot Defendant provided in its July 28, 2025 filing. (See dkt. # 122 at 6.) 1 vehicles of the same model manufactured a few months apart have different wireless chargers 2 installed. (See Cook Decl. (dkt. # 119), ¶ 2.) 3 After concluding the customer complaints all involved the same wireless charger, Dr. 4 Hernandez opined that all the complaints “collectively and consistently” describe “overheating

5 of iPhones[.]” (Hernandez Decl., ¶ 32.) Only a small minority of complaints identify an iPhone, 6 however. (See Wallace Decl., ¶ 7; Davidovskiy Decl., Ex. 8.) Plaintiff states it is “false” that any 7 complaints pertain to non-iPhone devices because all of the complaints either refer to an iPhone 8 or do not specify the phone type. (Resp. at 12-13.) Not specifying a phone type does not mean 9 that it must be an iPhone. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any reasonable basis for concluding that 10 all or most of the complaints relate to iPhones. 11 2. Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Declaration 12 Mr. Davidovskiy stated in a declaration that the customer complaints that “BMW NA 13 [produced] reveal highly damaging admissions—namely, that BMW itself repeatedly diagnosed 14 the wireless chargers as defective, replaced them for numerous other customers, and

15 acknowledged the overheating condition as abnormal.” (Davidovskiy Decl., ¶ 20.) 16 Defendant contends that characterizing the complaints as its “admissions” that the 17 charger is “defective” constitutes intentional, improper mischaracterization. (Mot. at 7.) Plaintiff 18 contends that Mr. Davidovskiy’s declaration “distinguishes between ‘BMW NA’ (the Defendant) 19 and ‘BMW’ as the general dealer network” and thus did not identify the complaints as 20 Defendant’s admissions. (Resp. at 11.) Plaintiff also argues, in contradiction to his first 21 argument, that dealers could be agents of a manufacturer. (Id. at 11-12.) On reply, Defendant 22 contends that the “contrived distinction between ‘BMW NA’ and ‘BMW’ underscores his bad 23 1 faith” and that Plaintiff made no showing that Defendant exercised sufficient control that the 2 dealers could be considered agents. (Reply at 5.) 3 There is no dispute that the content of the customer complaints is created by third party 4 dealerships, not Defendant. (See Mot. at 7; Holguin Decl. (dkt. # 73), ¶ 10.) It is not clear how

5 Defendant could make “admissions” of other entities’ knowledge or actions, nor how evidence of 6 other entities’ knowledge or actions could assist Plaintiff in opposing summary judgment. Mr. 7 Davidovskiy’s language blurred the distinction between Defendant and other BMW-related 8 entities, and he indicates he chose the language intentionally. Plaintiff argues in the alternative 9 that third party dealerships could be considered agents of a manufacturer, if there is a factual 10 showing that the manufacturer exerts sufficient control. (Resp. at 11-12.) Plaintiff does not 11 appear to suggest or offer any evidence that Defendant exercised the requisite control here, 12 however. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the characterization of the complaints as an 13 “admission” by Defendant was misleading. 14 3. Plaintiff’s Briefing Opposing Summary Judgment

15 Like Dr. Hernandez’s declaration, Plaintiff’s briefing in opposition to summary judgment 16 concludes that the customer complaints relate to the same type of wireless charger found in Mr. 17 Mendis’ vehicle and show that it was defective. (Dkt. # 110 at 22-23.) The opposition brief cites 18 no evidence other than the complaints. (Id.) Nothing in the complaints indicates that all 19 addressed the same type of wireless charger as that found in Mr. Mendis’ vehicle. 20 4. Customer Complaints 21 Aside from characterizing the complaints as a whole as discussed above, Plaintiff’s 22 opposition brief cited to only one of the 129 complaints. (Dkt. # 110 at 6.) Defendant contends 23 1 Plaintiff attached all 129 of the complaints to give the impression of a widespread defect without 2 any factual basis. (Mot. at 14.) 3 Plaintiff argues that “[i]rrelevant documents would not be discoverable and should not 4 have been produced.” (Resp. at 12.) Relevance is generally not finally determined at the

5 discovery stage; here, the issue came before the Court on a motion for summary judgment. 6 Particularly under the circumstances here, when Defendant produced the complaints only after 7 the Court so ordered, Plaintiff’s argument is unfounded. 8 C. Balance of Interests 9 Under the stringent compelling reasons standard, a court may seal records only when it 10 finds a compelling reason and articulates the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on 11 hypothesis or conjecture. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1096. “The court must then 12 “conscientiously balance[ ] the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep 13 certain judicial records secret.” Id. at 1097. Under LCR 5(g)(3)(B), the Court should consider (i) 14 “the legitimate private or public interest that warrant the relief sought;” (ii) “the injury that will

15 result if the relief sought is not granted;” and (iii) “why a less restrictive alternative to the relief 16 sought is not sufficient.” 17 The Court finds that Defendant has made a strong showing that each of the challenged 18 documents was submitted for the improper purpose of defeating summary judgment without a 19 valid factual basis. Accordingly, the Court assesses the balance of public and private interests. 20 Defendant identifies legitimate interests in preventing future litigation, reputational harm, 21 and competitive injury based on false statements made in this litigation. (See Mot. at 4, 12.) 22 Plaintiff argues any harms are speculative. (Resp. at 7.) The Court disagrees. In particular, a 23 sworn expert declaration claiming to have found evidence of a widespread defect—based on 1 false premises—is poised to harm Defendant if it remains publicly available. Plaintiff’s 2 opposition brief and Mr. Davidovskiy’s declaration build on the same false premise. Defendant 3 need not wait for harm to occur before seeking protection. 4 On the other side of the scale is Plaintiff’s interest and the public interest in

5 understanding and evaluating judicial processes. Plaintiff does not address the Court’s balancing 6 task and has not identified any personal interest. Plaintiff notes that “revealing hazards” is in the 7 public interest (Resp. at 8), but falsely claiming a hazard is not. As Plaintiff notes (id. at 7), 8 “embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel 9 the court to seal its records.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (emphasis added). Here, Defendant 10 has shown more: that such reputational harm and exposure to litigation are based on false 11 premises perpetuated by Plaintiff. 12 Regarding the public’s general interest in the judicial process, the weight given to the 13 presumption of access is greater for documents that play a role in determining litigants’ 14 substantive rights. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099. The public has a lesser interest in

15 materials that “play no role in the adjudication process.” Id. at 1100. Defendant cites a 16 Washington Supreme Court case holding that, under Washington state court rules, “[i]f a party 17 attaches to a motion something that is both irrelevant to the motion and confidential to another 18 party, the court should seal it.” Rufer v. Abbott Lab’ys, 154 Wn.2d 530, 547 (Wash. 2005). 19 “When there is indeed little or no relevant relationship between the document and the motion, the 20 court, in balancing the competing interests of the parties and the public . . . , would find that there 21 are little or no valid interests of the party attaching the document to its motion or of the public 22 with respect to disclosure of the document.” Id. at 547-48. 23 1 The Court finds this logic persuasive. While Plaintiff had an interest in defeating 2 summary judgment, achieving his goal based on false statements was not a legitimate interest. 3 And the public’s interest in understanding the judicial process involved in ruling on summary 4 judgment is not well served by keeping irrelevant and false information available. In balancing

5 the harms articulated by Defendant against Plaintiff’s and the public’s interest, the Court 6 concludes Defendant has shown compelling reasons to seal the challenged materials that 7 outweigh public policies favoring disclosure. 8 Finally, the Court must consider less restrictive alternatives. LCR 5(g)(3)(B). The only 9 exhibit Defendant seeks to seal in its entirety is the collection of customer complaints. 10 (Davidovskiy Decl., Ex. 8.) Defendant seeks to redact only limited portions of Plaintiff’s 11 summary judgment opposition brief and Mr. Davidovskiy’s declaration. Further, Defendant has 12 provided redacted versions of each document. (Dkt. ## 132-34.) The Court finds Defendant’s 13 redactions constitute the least restrictive alternative that appropriately protects Defendant’s 14 legitimate interests. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion.

15 IV. CONCLUSION 16 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS: 17 (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend the Response Deadline (dkt. # 149) is GRANTED. 18 (2) Defendant’s Corrected Motion to Seal (dkt. # 142) is GRANTED. 19 (3) The Clerk is directed to maintain Mr. Davidovskiy’s declaration with exhibits 20 (dkt. # 114) under seal. The document Defendant submitted (dkt. # 134) shall 21 remain on the docket as the publicly available redacted version of Mr. 22 Davidovskiy’s declaration and exhibits. 23 1 (4) The Clerk is directed to seal Dr. Hernandez’s declaration (dkt. # 113) and 2 Plaintiff’s opposition brief on summary judgment (dkt. # 110). The redacted 3 versions Defendant submitted (dkt. ## 132-33) shall remain on the docket. 4 (5) The request to strike in Plaintiff’s Surreply is DENIED and the Surreply is

5 STRICKEN. (Dkt. # 151.) 6 Dated this 28th day of October, 2025. 7 A 8 MICHELLE L. PETERSON United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23